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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to follow through on two “calls for further research” from 
recognized film scholars. One line of research centers on early cinema and 
especially on early American film publications (from 1906 to 1913), which Jan 
Olsson has defined as a “discursive domain calling for analysis as a 
phenomenon in its own right,” as opposed to only being “source material” film 
historians use for writing about early cinema. Another line of research 
concerns the “relationship between consciousness and film” that Murray 
Smith argues is an “unchartered territory” in film studies.  
In this thesis, this relationship between “consciousness and film” is defined 
from the perspective of ‘film consciousness’, which is a formulation with 
several functions. In some contexts, it refers to a “movement of consciousness” 
that appears in early film publications over the course of several years 
(between 1907 and 1912) manifested in a growing recognition of the 
constructed, aesthetic nature of film, changes in terminologies for naming and 
defining the object of cinema, in particular activities showing an appreciation 
of the contextual meaning of films, and in self-consciousness, such as in the 
study of audiences and meta-criticism.  
These parallel lines of research have an important scientific and 
methodological implication, in that early film publications are sometimes 
implicitly seen as displaying a “naïve consciousness” that is transposable onto 
early spectators broadly. A “film consciousness” approach recognizes a more 
complex consciousness that is revealed in subtle changes in language-use and 
behaviour over a period of time. It also allows for the study of the subjectivity 
of the writers as well, which is often revealed indirectly to the film historian, 
as opposed to explicit descriptions of subjective film experience.  
 iii 
The formulation ‘film consciousness’ – which is occasionally used in film 
discourse, though usually without an institutional definition – is also regarded 
in this thesis as presenting its own ontological nature in the way it brings two 
semantic fields (“consciousness” and “film”) into relation. From this 
formulation, several “categories of film consciousness” are constructed. These 
include “film aesthetic awareness,” “film production awareness,” “film culture 
awareness,” “ways of existing towards film,” and several “entities of 
consciousness” (an imagined place in consciousness assumed to contain past 
film experiences, conscious phenomena derived from film experiences that are 
seen as bound to personal identity, a faculty that determines the way reality is 
engaged with, and a particular kind of conscious experience, defined as 
“subjective film consciousness.”)  
These categories of film consciousness collectively constitute an imagined 
“field of film consciousness” that serves to conceptualize the “unchartered 
territory” Murray Smith defines. Each category represents an individual area 
of research with concomitant questions and criteria that nevertheless exist on 
a continuum that the key term ‘film consciousness’ brings into constant 
rhetorical relation. When this field is applied to a set of film-related data, such 
as early film discourse, a set of connections between different regions of film 
consciousness emerges, thus allowing for the description of film consciousness 
at various levels.  
 
 
 
Key Terms: film consciousness, consciousness, film experience, early film 
discourse, film trade publications, early cinema, film and philosophy.  
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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Cette étude s’inspire de questionnements soulevés, dans le cadre de leur 
recherche, par deux spécialistes du cinéma. Une première piste de recherche 
concerne l’histoire du cinéma des premiers temps et les sources 
documentaires, que l’historien Jan Olsson a défini comme un « domaine 
discursif » (“discursive domaine”) à part entière. Une deuxième piste de 
recherche s’inspire d’une remarque du philosophe et théoricien Murray Smith 
à propos de la manière dont les spectateurs se représentent mentalement les 
films qu’ils ont vus comme un domaine de la recherche cinématographique 
inexploré (“unchartered territory”). 
Cette thèse se concentre sur la « conscience cinématographique », c’est-à-dire 
sur la capacité du spectateur à se représenter mentalement un objet filmique 
ou à penser cinématographiquement. Cette formulation désigne des 
phénomènes particuliers. Historiquement, cette « conscience » est une forme 
de « sensibilisation au cinéma » (« movement of consciousness »), phénomène 
dont on peut observer les effets dans les textes consacrés au cinéma dans les 
années 1907-1912. Cette « sensibilisation » se manifeste par un intérêt 
grandissant pour les films, par l’invention de termes et de notions permettant 
de parler de cinéma, par des études spécialisées, portant sur le spectatorat ou 
la critique, montrant que les contemporains avaient conscience de cette 
« sensibilisation » (« self consciousness »).  
Ce questionnement de fond sur les sources documentaires, en tant qu’elles 
sont le révélateur d’une « conscience cinématographique », a une implication 
historiographique et méthodologique importante. L’apparente naïveté des 
sources d’époque a conduit certains historiens à décrire les spectateurs de 
l’époque comme étant, eux aussi, naïfs. Or, en réalité, la perception des 
phénomènes filmiques par les contemporains était plus complexe et nuancée 
que ce que les sources ne laissent le dire. Cette approche, qui porte sur les 
mentalités de l’époque et l’impact du cinéma sur les spectateurs, conduit à 
 v 
chercher les traces de cette « sensibilisation » dans les textes d’époque, à 
prendre compte des champs lexicaux et de leur évolution dans le temps. Elle 
permet également, pour l’historien, de tenir compte de la subjectivité des 
textes d’époque plutôt que de ne s’attacher qu’à des sources objectives ou des 
témoignages. 
Dans le cadre de cette thèse, la formulation « conscience cinématographique », 
dont l’occurrence n’est pas rare dans la littérature consacrée à l’histoire du 
cinéma, désigne cette partie de la conscience qui est façonnée par le cinéma. 
Cette conscience a plusieurs fonctions qui correspondent, chacune, à diverses 
catégories de conscience cinématographique. Il s’agit de la « sensibilité à 
l’esthétique du film », la « sensibilité à la technicité du film », la « sensibilité à 
la culture cinématographique », la « sensibilité au cinéma en tant qu’objet de 
pensée » ainsi que d’autres éléments permettant à la conscience de s’exercer 
(le lieu de la mémoire où reposent les souvenirs de films, les moments de 
cinéma associés à une identité personnelle, la faculté d’être conscient de sa 
propre conscience filmique et la conscience filmique subjective, forme de 
conscience et de sensibilité liée à une grande connaissance du cinéma. 
Ces diverses catégories de « sensibilité » à la chose cinématographique forment 
un vaste champ d’étude permettant de prendre la mesure de la transformation 
des mentalités et de cartographier le territoire inexploré évoqué par Murray 
Smith. Chacune de ces catégories représente un domaine de recherche 
spécifique, avec ses questionnements et ses enjeux propres, mais prend place 
dans un champ plus vaste, celui de « conscience cinématographique ». Quand 
cette approche s’applique aux sources documentaires portant spécifiquement 
sur le cinéma et son évolution, il est possible de voir à quel point le cinéma 
transforme les mentalités. 
 
 
Mots-clés : conscience cinématographique, mentalité, spectateur, 
historiographie, épistémologie, presse corporative, cinéma des premier temps 
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TERMINOLOGY 
 
Note to the reader: this thesis makes frequent usage of the formulation ‘film 
consciousness’ which appears with single quotation marks, double quotation 
marks, or no quotation marks.1 The same is true of other words in this thesis 
(‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, ‘film experience’). These punctuations generally, 
though not always, have the following significance: 
 
 
‘film consciousness’ Single quotations marks are used when the 
formulation itself is under discussion. It is not 
yet an expression, term or concept, but simply a 
set of words. 
“film consciousness” Double quotation marks are usually clarified in 
context, but might indicate “film consciousness” 
is being discussed as a provisional or undefined 
idea, as an expression, or as a concept.   
film consciousness The absence of quotation marks does not 
necessarily mean that it has shifted from 
provisional idea, expression or concept to 
established fact, only that some fact about the 
formulation has been established in context, 
such that scare quotes are not necessary.  
 
                                            
1 This style of punctuation is taken from Willard Quine’s discussion of the same problem in 
“Use versus Mention” in Mathematical Logic (Harvard University Press, 1981 [1940]), §4. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis started as an attempt to define a means of studying early 
American film publications between 1907 and 1913, which answered to Jan 
Olsson’s call for treating these publications as a “discursive domain ” rather 
than just “source material.”1 As a discursive domain, these publications offer 
a rich variety of writing about film that over the course of several years 
reveals historically significant changes in terms of attitudes taken toward 
film, terminology, types of discourse, writing style, and self-awareness. The 
set of data comprising these different “regions” of activity did not seem to fit 
within a single overarching discursive category,2 such as film theory or film 
criticism, that would provide an interconnected historical narrative. Out of a 
                                            
1 Jan Olsson, Los Angeles before Hollywood: Journalism and American Film Culture, 1905 to 
1915 (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2008), 18. 
2 “Region” has several different meanings in this thesis: 1) It refers literally to the different 
parts of a publication that contain discourse – articles, headings, titles, editorials, 
advertising, letters to the journal and so forth; 2) It refers to the activities associated with 
these different sections, such as attending screenings and observing audiences; 3) It is a 
deliberate metaphorical abstraction of the journal in order to see all activities as 
“territorially” connected, since writers operate in several regions simultaneously. In seeing 
them as regions, the idea is to limit observations to a particular region, in order to identify 
patterns or relationship with other regions, but also to see that the activity in one region as 
relevant to the understanding of the other regions (since sometimes changes in discourse or 
approach occur without an accompanying explanation). I appropriate this metaphor from 
Edward Branigan’s usage of “region” (which he uses twice in Projecting a Camera: Language-
Games in Film Theory) in reference to language. Branigan writes: “Thus, Wittgenstein’s 
approach to meaning allows one to see how Socrates is making meaning with reference to 
metaphors and models that move us from one region of language to another in an attempt to 
solve a problem (in this case, the problem of identifying the perfect state).” (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 158 (my emphasis).  
 2 
desire to categorize these various changes, and make sense of them globally 
and chronologically, the term that emerged was ‘film consciousness’, which 
enabled charting data that reflected an emerging, elusive and new 
consciousness of cinema that other discursive categories were not necessarily 
able to detect or conceptualize.   
However, while the thesis started in this direction and accomplished, I 
believe, the objective of illustrating this consciousness,3 the formulation itself 
– ‘film consciousness’ – subsequently became the main source of attention. 
The single quotation marks specify the nature of the phenomenon – ‘film 
consciousness’ is not initially regarded as a concept, idea, or fact of the world, 
but rather as a formulation in which the words ‘film’ and ‘consciousness’ are 
deliberately brought into relation in a performative act that renders them into 
a linguistic expression.4  Because of the undetermined meaning of these words 
                                            
3 In Chapter 1 of this thesis, “Film Consciousness in Early Film Trade Publications.” 
4 Stanley Fish’s summarizes the significance of “performative” language in contrast with 
“constative” language, based on his reading of J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) and John Searle’s Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Language (London: Cambridge, 1969): “Constative language is language that is, or strives to 
be, accountable to the real or objective world. It is to constatives—to acts of referring, 
describing, and stating—that one puts the question, ‘Is it true or false?’ in which true and 
false are understood to be absolute judgments, made independently of any particular set of 
circumstances. Performative language, on the other hand, is circumstantial through and 
through. The success of a performative depends on certain things being the case when it is 
uttered; performatives therefore are appropriate or inappropriate in relation to conditions of 
utterance rather than true or false in relation to a reality that underlies all conditions.” 
Stanley Fish, “How To Do Things With Austin and Searle,” in Is There A Text In This Class? 
The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 198. 
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– and the different forms of combining them5 – the result is a dynamic, poetic 
and ambiguous text. In other words, when considered outside of the original 
context from which it emerged (my study of early film publications), the 
formulation presents a self-contained ontology open to different 
interpretations and uses, much like discovering a poem scribbled on a 
blackboard.6  
Thus, in addition to analyzing “film consciousness” in early film publications, 
this thesis presents an inquiry into the possibilities of this formulation, which 
evolved organically from this initial historiographic process. The original 
objective of exploring the possibilities of ‘film consciousness’ was to situate 
and define my original usage of the formulation7 within the broadest “film 
consciousness” context conceivable. However, the question that informally 
                                            
5 As explained in Chapter 3, “‘Consciousness Defined,” in the section “Compound Nature: A 
“Grammar” of ‘Consciousness’.” 
6 I am referring, of course, to Stanley Fish’s “How to Recognize a Poem When You See One.” 
Fish describes drawing a frame around a series of names left on a classroom blackboard from 
a previous class. He then proceeds to ask his students to interpret the ‘poem’.” This 
experiment explains the title of his book, which is intended to show, among other things, that 
textual meaning is relative to a given “interpretive community.” Stanley Fish, Is There A 
Text In This Class?, 322-337. 
7 The first usage was probably in the context of writing this thesis, but it emerged from an 
article I published, “Film Theory as Practice: Criticism and Interpretation in the Early 
American Trade Press,” in which I concluded, “The appearance, in 1909, of a new language of 
film criticism . . . marks the emergence of a new consciousness about cinema.” This last 
statement became ‘film consciousness’ in the course of reformulating this idea. In Proceedings 
of the XVI International Film Studies Conference-Permanent Seminar on History of Film 
Theories: In the Very Beginning, at the Very End, 2009, edited by Francesco Casetti and Jane 
Gaines (Udine: Forum, 2010): 83-93. 
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guided this pursuit – “what is film consciousness?” – presented a difficult 
challenge. It had no “final answers,” 8 or any answer, that made sense without 
first defining a set of conditions under which such a question was intelligible 
– which in turn then became the main problematic. As Stanley Fish writes, 
The success of a performative depends on certain things being the 
case when it is uttered; performatives therefore are appropriate or 
inappropriate in relation to conditions of utterance rather than true 
or false in relation to a reality that underlies all conditions.9  
The guiding question thus shifted from “what is film consciousness” to “what 
is the effect of using the formulation ‘film consciousness’ under different 
conditions?” This question, as opposed to the first, was answerable 
pragmatically by defining a “semantic field of consciousness.” This field is 
imagined as consisting of the sum of statements in which the term 
‘consciousness’ – including its variants (‘conscious’) and relatives (‘awareness’) 
– is used intelligibly.10  It is then possible to bring the “semantic field of 
consciousness” into relation with the semantic field of ‘film’. This process gives 
rise to a series of “categories of film consciousness,” each with different areas 
of concern, orientations and applicability that nevertheless share in common 
this initial act of regarding the formulation as a poetic text.  
                                            
8 This is a positions sometimes attributed to Richard Rorty, who believed there were no “final 
answers” to “questions about truth and knowledge,” as Manuel Arriaga details in The 
Modernist-Postmodernist Quarrel on Philosophy and Justice: A Possible Levinasian 
Mediation (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 97. 
9 Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class?, 198. 
10 Presented in Chapters 2 and 3, “Talking Past Each Other” and “‘Consciousness’ Defined.” 
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The “categories of film consciousness” constructed on this basis are dividable 
as follows: “film awareness” (which comprises “film aesthetic awareness,” 
“film production awareness,” and “film culture awareness,”), 11  “a way of 
existing towards film”;12 and an “entity in consciousness” (which includes 
“identity,” “place,” “faculty,” and “conscious experience”). 13  Each of these 
categories and subcategories should be regarded as examples of “film 
consciousness” by virtue of being derived from the formulation. Taken 
collectively, the categories constitute an imagined “field of film 
consciousness.”  
A strict focus on the formulation naturally raises questions about the 
objective status of “film consciousness.” Is there something in the world that 
is “film consciousness?” Or is the formulation the means through which “film 
consciousness” as a fact or phenomena is imagined? Of course, the answer to 
these questions depends on the particular meaning of ‘film’ and 
‘consciousness’, but there is also a more general epistemological problem 
underlying it regarding the relationship between language and the world. As 
                                            
11 Presented in Chapter 4, “‘Film Consciousness’ as Film Awareness” and Chapter 5, “Film 
Culture Awareness and A Way of Existing Towards Film.” 
12 Presented in Chapter 5. It is comparable, but not equivalent to, the idea of a “film 
movement” and to François Albera’s notion of “cinematic episteme,” as Albera presents in 
“First Discourses on Film and the Construction of a ‘Cinematic Episteme’,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Early edited by André Gaudreault, Nicolas Dulac and Santiago Hidalgo 
(Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 121-140. 
13 Presented in Chapter 8, “An Entity in Consciousness.” 
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Edward Branigan asks in his study on the word ‘camera’, “does the world 
dictate language or does language dictate a world?”14 While I am using 
Branigan to raise this point, the question of “linguistic relativity” is widely 
explored within the philosophy of language, such as in the works of Benjamin 
Lee Whorf (inspired from Edward Sapir, hence the “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis”), 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, John Searle, George Lakoff, Richard 
Rorty and John Searle. 15 These authors are therefore broadly cited in this 
thesis. 
It seems the case that both the relativist and the more objectivist positions on 
language are supportable through evidence. In some cases the word seems to 
determine the object it names, as with abstract ideas like “cinema” or certain 
kinds of complex emotions, like “melancholy” or “love.” Even the performance 
and experience of visceral emotions like anger, as George Lakoff has 
illustrated in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thing: What Categories Reveal 
                                            
14 Branigan, Projecting a Camera, 98. 
15 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality; Selected Writings (Cambridge: 
Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956); George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); George Lakoff, 
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (1953; repr., 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1967); Richard Rorty, “Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-dualist 
Account of Interpretation,” in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93–110; and Donald Davidson, “Radical 
Interpretation,” Dialectica, 27 (1973): 314–28 and “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47 (1973-
1974): 5–20. 
 7 
About the Mind, are given form by everyday expressions particular to 
cultures.16 In other cases, as with John Searle’s concepts presented in Chapter 
2, “‘Talking Past Each Other’: Establishing a Conversation about 
‘Consciousness’,” objects are sometimes present to the senses in a way that 
seems to go beyond the subjectivity of language, in which case the “thing” the 
language names is not necessarily “observer-dependent” (John Searle offers 
the example of a mountain).17   
However, Rorty suggests that the purpose of these seemingly unresolvable 
questions that have no final answers is to “keep the conversation going rather 
than to find objective truth.”18 This is the position adopted in this thesis. It is 
an attempt to initiate and maintain a conversation that examines the 
relationship between “film” and “consciousness” from different perspectives. 
The difference between the relativist and objectivist approach lies more so at 
a rhetorical and methodological level. When language is regarded as 
“dictating a world,” then ‘film consciousness’ functions more as a category 
applied to certain data in order to “draw out” details showing different sorts of 
relationships between “film” and “consciousness.” However when the world is 
                                            
16 “[E]motions have an extremely complex conceptual structure, which gives rise to a wide 
variety of nontrivial inferences.” Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 380.  
17 In which case, the relationship between the word and its object is more on the order of 
“intrinsic.” John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 9.  
18 “[T]he point of edifying philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find 
objective truth.” Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University 
Press, 1979), 377. 
 8 
seen as “dictating language,” then ‘film consciousness’ will seem to name 
something in the world that is regarded as a unified phenomenon or property 
that has emerged from film experiences. Since a performative speech-act 
initiates both positions, the second position, the one that adopts an objective 
view of film consciousness, is more of an “as if” thought experiment that 
entails approaching “film consciousness” as having an objective standing. 
Thus, rather than resolving the question of linguistic relativity on absolute 
terms, both positions are useful to the objective of creating a field of film 
consciousness. 
Consider, for example, the effect of seeing “film consciousness” as a fact in the 
world, as something in consciousness, such as a “faculty,” a “place in 
consciousness” containing our memories and experiences of film, a kind of 
“conscious experience,” or a part of our “identity.”19 When regarding it from 
this perspective, certain questions and propositions logically arise. What 
causes “film consciousness” to emerge? The answer seems to point to “film 
experiences,” since experiences determine consciousness, at least in part. It is 
then logical to formulate the axiomatic proposition that “film consciousness 
belongs to a world in which film experiences occur.” The result of this axiom is 
the need to examine the meaning of “film experience” (in Chapter 6, “The 
Meaning of ‘Film Experience’) in order to illustrate its connection with film 
                                            
19 Each of these is discussed in Chapter 7, “An Entity in Consciousness.”  
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consciousness. Film experience is also important to define because discussions 
within film studies regarding the relationship between film and consciousness 
are typically framed according to this terminology.20 
Another assumption that follows from seeing film consciousness as a thing, as 
opposed to a category, is that it becomes a historical phenomenon that is 
linked with the history of film and discourse. As explained below, it is 
assumed to arise in conjunction with film, thus establishing the premise of 
“zero-degree” film consciousness, which is an imagined starting point of such 
consciousness. With such a hypothesis in mind, film consciousness will then 
assume a historical trajectory, through a series of “stages” or “turning points,” 
until a moment of attainment is reached, in which it will be possible to say, 
“film consciousness begins around this time.” These motifs are imposed on the 
historical field based on the assumption that film consciousness grows from 
“zero-degree” to a more complex, fulfilled variety.21 In order to determine that 
film consciousness “begins” at a certain moment, and within a particular 
context, a set of criteria or conditions is therefore required. Thus, the very 
idea of an imagined, growing of consciousness from a zero-degree moment, to 
                                            
20  For example, Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film 
Experience  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
21 I am adopting Hayden White’s usage of “motifs” as a historiographic maneuver. “This 
transformation of chronicle into story is effected by the characterization of some events in the 
chronicle in terms of inaugural motifs, of others in terms of terminating motifs, and of yet 
others in terms of transitional motifs.” White, Metahistory, 5. 
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attainment and fulfilment, drives towards the need for defining objectively 
verifiable criteria – and this without yet asserting what film consciousness is 
or should be. It is simply in the nature of this sort of thought experiment that 
these questions arise as a necessity. We can even wonder, for example, if 
there is film consciousness before film, such as when film consciousness is 
defined as a set of awareness that enables the understanding of film.22   
While these are illustrations of the sorts of questions that arise when seeing 
“film consciousness” as having a unified, objective standing, this thesis is not 
the first place where ‘film consciousness’ appears in discourse. Over the years, 
there have been many “informal” usages in both public and institutional 
discourse (which is to say, it was used without a sense of it being a concept or 
term worth defining). Nor is this thesis the first attempt at a formal definition 
of  “film consciousness.”23 It is, though, the first attempt at defining a set of 
categories that seem to follow from examining the possibilities of the 
formulation ‘film consciousness’ and transforming these categories into a field 
of film consciousness. This field can serve to explain the informal history of 
the formulation’s usage from the likes of David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson 
                                            
22 This is a point discussed in a presentation I delivered with Pierre Chemartin at DOMITOR 
on the connection between film and comics in early cinema, in which “montage” precedes 
cinema in some sense (pre-1890).  Santiago Hidalgo and Pierre Chemartin, “Learning Film 
Performance through Comics,” DOMITOR, Brighton, 2012. 
23 Spencer Shaw, Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 2008), 3 
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and Dudley Andrew.24 Therefore, I believe one of the outcomes of this thesis 
has been to rationalize and render explicit already existing ideas circulating 
within film studies that have been given momentary form through this 
terminology.   
Finally, because of the change in trajectory in this thesis, from one area of 
concern (early writing about film) to another (the categories of film 
consciousness), the chapters do not necessarily follow a standard progression 
from a general hypothesis to a specific case study. Rather I would suggest 
that it is the contrary; the structure of the thesis reflects my own thought 
process, which began with a case study and self-awareness about the 
terminology used for presenting my argument, and then moved towards 
examining this terminology and its possibilities. Therefore, the chapter on 
early writing about film is presented first when the idea of “film 
consciousness” was in an emergent state. The remainder of the thesis is an 
attempt at following through on this intuitive usage, constructing the 
categories of film consciousness that form the basis of the field of film 
consciousness.  
                                            
24 Examples from these authors are presented in the course of this thesis. For now, I will 
simply note these references in David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film History: An 
Introduction (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 356, 517, 529, 532; David Bordwell, “Chinese 
boxes, Russian dolls, and Hollywood movies,” David Bordwell’s Website on Cinema (June 6, 
2011). http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2011/06/06/chinese-boxes-russian-dolls-and-
hollywood-movies; and Dudley Andrew, The Major Film Theories: An Introduction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 75.  
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While the ideas taking shape in Chapter 1 were, from my perspective, 
internally coherent, there is nevertheless a break in method, subject and 
approach between Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which initiates a different way of 
thinking about film consciousness. I believe this break, while stark, shares a 
common spirit with Edward Branigan’s Projecting a Camera: Language 
Games in Film Theory – a work that partly inspired this thesis as many of the 
examples will show. Some of Branigan’s chapters are drawn from texts 
written at different periods in his career and rewritten or reworked for his 
book. The effect is that each chapter stands as its own particular argument 
contributing to the essential idea that film theory, or any understanding of 
film, is revealed in the use of particular language, such as ‘camera’ and 
‘frame’.  Thus, rather than being a unified argument, in which each chapter 
builds towards an inevitable conclusion, there is a spectrum of discussions 
that converge on a central, guiding idea. In spite of being rigorous, well 
researched and inventive, Branigan clearly recognizes the fact his work is on 
the margins of conventional approaches of film studies and at times 
incomplete in its conclusions. The same is true of this thesis – it is an 
orienting idea that connects the various middle chapters, as opposed to 
building towards a final conclusion.  
A key element determining the way ‘film consciousness’ is defined and 
approached in this thesis is in the way the term “introduced itself” into my 
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own thinking and vocabulary. As mentioned, ‘film consciousness’ is not always 
discussed as a term, concept, or fact, although each of these is a possibility 
that exists in the nature and usage of the term. Based on my experience and 
observations in early cinema and early cinema historiography, and perhaps of 
academics more generally, the “trajectory” a particular word or expression 
takes either historically or within an individual vocabulary has an impact on 
the way the term is eventually defined.  
Early cinema offers many examples of terminological trajectories, both from 
the perspective of the time and from the perspective of the historian. For 
example, one type of trajectory is when an existing term is used in reference 
to a phenomenon that is related in meaning to the original term. This is the 
case with the term “motography,” or any number of early cinema devices, 
which then came to name the phenomena as a whole, as David Hulfish’s 1909 
article, “Art in Moving Pictures,” illustrates: 
Photography….in motography should be considered as merely the 
means for placing before the audience the thoughts of the author of 
the picture as embodied in changing scenes, the art of the picture 
being developed fully in the scenes themselves before the motion 
picture camera is placed before them.25   
The meaning of “motography” in this passage is that of “film” or “cinema.” As 
Chapter 1 indicates, early cinema, especially the first five years, is 
                                            
25 David Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” Nickelodeon 1, no. 5 (May 1909): 139–40 
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overflowing with terms naming some aspect of the general phenomena of 
“film” – a confusing fact already lamented as early as 1899.26 John Searle 
defines the concept of taking an existing word and giving it another new 
meaning as assigning the word a new “status-function.”27  However, this 
assignment of meaning, as the “motography” example shows, is not always 
deliberate or sudden. Sometimes it grows over time through many usages and 
appropriations.  
A parallel terminological trajectory, closely linked with this one, is when an 
existing term or expression is deliberately assigned a new “status-function.” 
The trajectory of the term begins at that moment, in the act of presenting it 
and explaining its new function and meaning. Of course, as with Gaudreault’s 
concept of “cinématographie-attraction” (translated as kine-attractography)28 
the term might already have a prior history which serves to shape its new 
institutional meaning, 29  but the difference between Hulfish’s use of 
                                            
26  Henry V. Hopwood, Living Pictures: Their History, Photo-Production, and Practical 
Working (1899; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1970), 187. 
27 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 51-57. 
28 Translated into English by Timothy Barnard and André Gaudreault, as explained in André 
Gaudreault, Film and Attraction: From Kinematography to Cinema (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press), 47-48. 
29 Gaudreault explains the advent of this term as follows: “I would very much have liked to 
have had a flash of genius and been able to blend these two expressions to come up with 
something like cinématographie-attraction, but I found that I had been beaten to the punch: 
in consulting Jean Giraud’s indispensable Le Lexique français du cinéma des origines à 1930 
I discovered that this French term already existed. Its only known occurrence to date is in the 
writings of one of the first film historians: not just anybody because, some twenty years before 
publishing his history of the cinema, he had been not only a contemporary of 
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“motography” and Gaudreault’s usage of “cinématographie-attraction” is 
precisely at the level of self-awareness and intention. Hulfish’s usage is an 
example of an existing way of talking; Gaudreault’s usage is a deliberate act 
of redefining, or reassigning a new status function to an already existing 
term. Yet both are examples of an existing term that previously had a 
different linguistic life.  
We can contrast the above trajectories with an activity that is perhaps best 
described as “inventing” words and expressions. A clear example in early 
cinema is the term “photoplay,” which was invented in a contest in which the 
public participated to name the object of cinema.30 The Moving Picture World 
reported on this contest in 1910 in an article named “There Is Everything In 
A Name: What the Essanay Contest Means,” in which the editor indicates a 
preferred outcome to the contest: 
We look then for a clean, good, ennobling name, one saying what it 
means and meaning what it says; easily, and if possible, universally 
understood, lest its good be lost in translations.31 
                                                                                                                                   
cinématographie-attraction but also one of its major figures. This early (!) historian was G.-
Michel Coissac, the author in 1906 of the imposing La Théorie et la pratique des projections, 
published by La Bonne Presse.” André Gaudreault, Film and Attraction, 47. 
30 Torey Liepa, Figures of Silent Speech: Silent Film Dialogue and the American Vernacular, 
1909-1916 (PhD diss., New York University, 2008), 223 
31 Moving Picture World (20 August 1910): 400. See as well Moving Picture World, “The New 
Name, Photoplay” (October 22, 1910): 933. 
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Moving Picture World also warned that the new name must not be 
“ambiguous or clouded in the verbiage of too technical or ‘dead language’ 
origin … its growth must be in the clear atmosphere of the modern.”32 While 
some invented words may hold an arbitrary relation to their objects, 
“photoplay” is particularly interesting because the ontological nature of the 
expression bears some connection with the referent in the way the individuals 
words combine to form an idea. “Photoplay” is made of up two separate words, 
‘photo’ and ‘play’, which construct not just a third object, but also a 
perspective on the nature of that object (the implication of which is that film 
consists in recording a play or in recording profilmic reality).  
As with the earlier trajectory, this one also has different levels of intention. 
The term ‘photoplay’ was deliberately and consciously invented with a specific 
purpose in mind. But then there are also many early cinema terms that are 
similarly structured. One thinks of “moving pictures” and “animated views.” 
As opposed to “photoplay,” these expressions were hastily formed, without 
much forethought. They are examples of sudden reflexive reactions to a 
complex new phenomenon that is yet to receive a formal definition. Over time, 
there is a “settling” on a particular name as the most dominant. This was the 
                                            
32 “There Is Everything In A Name: What the Essanay Contest Means,” quoted in Torey 
Liepa, Figures of Silent Speech: Silent Film Dialogue and the American Vernacular, 1909-
1916 (PhD diss., New York University, 2008), 223. 
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case as well with film. From a collection of many terms, eventually a few 
terms emerged as dominant – ‘movies,’ ‘film,’ ‘cinema’.  
There are then two sets of terminological trajectories: one consists of taking 
existing terms and assigning them new meanings, either involuntarily or, as 
in academic activity, with a high degree of awareness; the other consists of 
“inventing” terms or expressions, which also follows a similar intentional 
spectrum, from very deliberate as with the “photoplay,” or less deliberate, as 
with “moving pictures.” This grid – with its different axes – can illuminate 
one of the challenges presented in this thesis, which is how to situate oneself 
in relation to the term ‘film consciousness’.  
Obviously, the ideal trajectory from an academic perspective, and the one that 
offers the most control over the meaning and its delivery to an audience, is 
either through the deliberate and self-conscious invention of a term, or 
through the assignment of a new meaning to an existing term. The “life of the 
term” – so to speak – begins though a deliberate, conscious act, in which a 
phenomenon or problem is encountered that requires a new name. In such a 
scenario, the academic explains the procedure through which a new term 
came into being, such as the one André Gaudreault provides in Film and 
Attraction.33 Gaudreault engages in the process that Searle defines as the 
                                            
33 See footnote 28 above.  
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basis of all acts of constructing social reality, which is declaring that “X counts 
as Y in C” – where X is an existing word, sign, behaviour, Y is the same word, 
sign or behaviour but with a different status-function, and C is the context in 
which Y obtains this status function.34 Thus, Gaudreault asks us to regard 
“cinématographie-attraction” as a new paradigm of cinema in the context of 
early cinema studies.   
With this context in mind, I would like to consider a different trajectory, 
particular to this thesis – that displays elements from each of these 
mentioned; and which therefore presents a challenge that requires developing 
a unique model. It involves a situation in which a term enters a vocabulary 
through the second trajectory – which is to say, as “invented” – but in a 
manner that is not necessarily intentional. The case with ‘film consciousness’ 
is that it gradually “nudged” its way into my own writing and thinking, 
acquiring a temporary, ambiguous function and meaning, before attaining a 
defined function and meaning. In such a scenario, the formulation begins to 
occupy a space in the imagination before there is an opportunity to reflect on 
it. It stands in an “indeterminate” position, ready to become an idea or 
concrete thought as certain facts are encountered, such as the ones presented 
in Chapter 1. 
                                            
34 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 43-44. 
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Thus, for a period of time I used the formulation with an apparent clarity in 
mind. But then as the term was applied again and again, in new contexts, and 
as my attention was turned towards the formulation itself, this clarity was 
put into question, resulting in a struggle to understand its meaning. 
Formulations or words without context are by nature difficult to define. Yet, it 
soon became clear that the vagueness of the term was something desirable – 
it “directed the attention” in ways that offered just the right distance and 
perspective on a particular subject, neither closing it down, nor rendering it 
meaningless.35  
Thus, there was a moment when the formulation shifted from its latent 
imaginary position to another area of the imagination, perhaps because of a 
requirement to finally explain its meaning, such as in this thesis. There was 
suddenly an institutional obligation to explain the meaning of ‘film 
consciousness’. At that moment, it was difficult to define an approach to the 
question of what film consciousness referred to, after all how does one 
rationally define a formulation that enters consciousness through this 
trajectory, in which it initially seemed clear, but only for a time, but then 
became vague and elusive? Each of these stages in the “life of the term” 
                                            
35 Kenneth Burke, “Terministic Screens,” in Language as symbolic action; essays on life, 
literature, and method (Berkeley: University of California Press). Burke defines certain terms 
as being “a terministic screen” that “directs the attention to one field rather than another,” in 
which “there can be different screens, each with its ways of directing the attention and 
shaping the range of observations implicit in the given terminology.” 
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appeared to serve a function, to advance thinking in a particular manner, in 
which case the means through which it attained such functions would indicate 
its meaning. However, this would entail a description of a conscious process 
that is too complex, and disordered, especially since these “usages” were never 
publicly defined, such as in publications, so that a history of its changing 
meaning could be definitively charted (otherwise, would a history of “thesis 
drafts” be at all salient – my feeling is not).  
Moreover, consider a situation in which in the course of defining the term it is 
discovered, much as in Gaudreault’s own process, that the formulation 
already has a history of informal usage. How would one begin the process of 
defining a formulation that assumed each of these various positions and 
functions in the imagination, and which also had an external life, in public 
and academic discourse, but not really at a level that would be considered 
“institutional”? Does one describe the process the formulation undertook in 
the imagination? Is the public life of the formulation relevant? How would 
these public uses fit with a personal definition? These questions do not seem 
to have a clear answer or an accepted method of rationalization.  
In going over these questions, several options emerged as potential ways of 
defining the formulation. One option was to define the way the formulation 
operated in one’s own thinking, which, as stated, seemed difficult and perhaps 
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self-indulgent. A second possibility was to assign an axiomatic definition to 
the formulation, as if it were invented on the spot, based on the particular 
purposes that it was given over time. This is the “ideal situation” mentioned 
above, because the process of explanation is more or less rational, although 
the history of the life of the term is cut short. A third possibility was to 
research the term through the technologies now available, such as search 
engines or databases, to see if the formulation had an existing meaning and to 
define the formulation from this external perspective, which would remove 
the subjective experience. A final possibility was to approach the formulation 
as if it were encountered for the first time, as a poetic construction, in which 
case, the goal would be to explore its possibilities of meaning based on the 
words found in the term (the reason “cinema of attractions” is so successful, I 
would argue, is because it generates just this type of reflection).  
While this thesis adopted the latter option, it includes elements from the 
other three in order to cover a broader range of possibilities and to explain the 
reasoning in implementing the formulation in a particular manner. Therefore, 
it makes sense at this moment, from the perspective of this Introduction, to 
say that ‘film consciousness’ is foremost a possibility of thought, whose 
meaning or function depends on the way ‘film consciousness’ is interpreted 
and used in different contexts. These “possibilities” become actualized in 
terms of concepts, facts, thought experiments, and conjectures under different 
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conditions, but can nevertheless be described as an ensemble, as a field. This 
process of reflection begins in Chapter 2, “Talking Past Each Other:” 
Establishing a Conversation about ‘Consciousness.’  
 
1. Research Justification  
Part of the justification for this thesis is admittedly an act of faith that this 
sort of exploration into the meaning of words, in which all of the possibilities 
of an expression are considered, is a relevant contribution, especially an 
expression as elusive and evocative as ‘film consciousness’. It answers, in 
part, to Richard Rorty’s belief that academic activity within the humanities 
sometimes entails “recontextualizing for the hell of it,” 36  which involves 
examining and inventing vocabularies through which reality is 
“redescribed.”37 Nevertheless, even if the above accurately expresses the ethos 
of the thesis, there is also a more traditional academic justification. I would 
suggest that from the perspective of “contributing to a body of knowledge,” 
                                            
36 Richard Rorty, “Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-dualist Account of Interpretation,” 
in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 110. 
37 Rorty uses “redescription” as a “method of inquiry” (and political act) that contends with 
the “privileged contexts” that presume to provide access to objective truth, as Christopher J. 
Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein write in The Rorty Reader in defining Rorty’s ideas: 
“Without privileged contexts and accepted criteria, all we can do is redescribe things and 
compare one redescritpion with another.” (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 34. 
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this thesis unambiguously contributes to at least two of them: the study of 
“early film discourse” and the study “film and consciousness.” Furthermore, I 
believe this thesis presents an example of the process through which academic 
terms become knowledge, and in this regard, the thesis also contributes to the 
epistemology of film studies. Because the thesis adopts a pragmatic posture 
towards language, it hopefully also clarifies some of the key terminology – 
such as “film experience” – that is typically used for thinking about the 
relationship between film and consciousness as well.  
A. Early Cinema Discourses 
The first field then – early film discourse – is of increasing importance within 
cinema studies. 38  Jan Olsson, in his Los Angeles before Hollywood: 
Journalism and American Film Culture, 1905 to 1915, synthesizes one of the 
problems faced in this field when it comes to early film publications, the main 
corpus treated in this thesis: 
                                            
38 The recently published The Blackwell Companion to Early Cinema dedicates an entire 
section to this subdomain of early cinema studies. Gaudreault, Dulac and Hidalgo, eds., The 
Blackwell Companion to Early Cinema, 119-242. But it also occupies an important place 
within the ongoing Permanent Seminar on Film Theory, based on a relatively extensive 
network of universities and research groups, including the Universities of Milan, Montreal, 
Udine, Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Concordia and Goldsmiths, the University of London, as 
well as GRAFICS (University of Montreal) and ARTHEMIS (Concordia University). Such 
conferences as IMPACT (The Impact of Technological Innovations on the Historiography and 
Theory of Cinema), held in Montreal in November 2011, are a reflection of this growing 
interest as well.  
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The interplay between cinema and daily print culture at critical 
junctures during the transitional era represents a discursive domain 
calling for analysis as a phenomenon in its own right, apart from 
being yet another trove of source material added to the panoply of 
paper sources otherwise mobilized by film historians for fleshing out 
film culture.39 
This echoes Charlie Keil’s criticism of Eileen Bowser’s “transparent” use of 
the Moving Picture World in The Transformation of Cinema, 1907-1915: 
[I]deally, sources like Moving Picture World should be treated as 
forms of discourse which, though valuable for the information they 
contain, must also be understood as representational instances 
themselves.”40 
When seen as “discursive domains,” or as “forms of discourse,” the data 
presented in these journals assumes a different evidentiary status. The data 
reflects film experience, which underlies film consciousness. While these 
publications offer discourse for analysis, these writings are also difficult to 
classify in terms of types of discourse, especially without accounting for 
intention and awareness. The overriding assumption, characterized in the 
language applied to this discourse, is that underlying its production is a 
“naïve consciousness,” which tends to dismiss critical or theoretical concerns 
found in the writing.41 The means of discerning this consciousness varies, but 
one of them includes avoiding “methodological individualism,” which 
                                            
39 Jan Olsson, Los Angeles before Hollywood, 18. 
40  Charlie Keil, “Book Review: Primitive No More: Early Cinema’s Coming of Age,” 
Persistence of Vision, no. 9 (1991): 107-117. 
41 I will explain this assumption in Chapter 1.  
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privileges explanations of “social phenomena in terms of individuals and their 
interaction. . .”42 especially those that emphasize “great men.”43  
Thus, in order to grasp the consciousness of early film publications, which 
contains substantial discourse published anonymously, particularly in the 
film criticism sections, it is necessary to see the “collective activity” as the 
most essential. This aligns with what David Bordwell and Kristen Thompson 
define as “group causes,” or “methodological collectivism,” which emphasize 
the “rules and roles, structures and routines” of institutions such as trade 
publications.44 Early cinema works such as Richard Abel’s The Red Rooster 
Scare: Making Cinema American, 1900-1910,45 Charlie Keil’s Early American 
Cinema in Transition: Story, Style, and Filmmaking, 1907–1913 (especially 
the section on early film criticism),46 and of course the Jan Olsson book 
mentioned above, strike a balance between observing collective patterns and 
emphasizing the important contributions of lesser known writers, such as 
                                            
42 Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, History, and Meaning (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 1 
43 Paul A. Erickson and Liam Donat Murphy, A History of Anthropological Theory (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2013), 100. 
44 Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell, Film history: An Introduction. 2nd ed. (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 2003), 6-7. 
45 Richard Abel, The Red Rooster Scare: Making Cinema American, 1900-1910 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
46 Charlie Keil, Early American Cinema in Transition: Story, Style, and Filmmaking, 1907–
1913 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 27-44. 
 26 
Thomas Bedding, W. Stephen Bush, Louis Reeves Harrison, and David S. 
Hulfish.47  
As will be discussed in Chapter 1, the form in which the discursive data is 
presented in these publications is critical to the way consciousness becomes 
apparent to historians, incrementally revealing, as anthropologists Nigel 
Rapport and Joanna Overing describe it, “consciousness [that] comes to know 
itself in and through the movement between different points of view in time 
and space.” 48  In this regard, these publications present four key 
characteristics favourable to describing “film consciousness:” the data is 
produced in regular intervals (weekly and monthly) over a sustained period of 
time; the data is dispersed over a range of different regions, including within 
sections of the journal, but also across a variety of journals; the discourse is 
produced by a collection of writers, many of whom remain anonymous; and 
perhaps most significantly, these journals operated in the absence of any 
competing institutions during a time of “discovery” about writing about film, 
which therefore encouraged experimentation with language and terminology. 
This spatial and temporal background thus bring slight changes, such as 
                                            
47 The first three worked for The Moving Picture World, while Hulfish wrote for Nickelodeon.  
48 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing write: “consciousness [that] comes to know itself in and 
through the movement between different points of view in time and space.” Social 
and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2007), 72. 
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those found in ordinary language-use, into relief, thus becoming signs of 
underlying, changing consciousness. 
This approach shares a likeness with the one Paul Moore espouses in his 
study of early newspaper publications – defined as “distant readings” – which 
consists of an “analysis across texts, as opposed to a ‘close reading’ of the text 
itself.”49 Moore adopts the concept of “distant readings” from Franco Moretti, 
who describes it as a “focus on units that are much smaller or much larger 
than the text: devices, themes, tropes—or genres and systems.”50 In other 
words, rather than examining individual instances of consciousness, the 
entirety of the trade press is seen as a more global textual system generating 
consciousness, made up of different “regions” of film consciousness that need 
to be seen and analyzed individually but along a continuum. 
Perhaps the most straightforward starting point for beginning to think about 
“film consciousness” in the context of early publications is to consider the 
differences in the way early journal writers apprehended the film 
phenomenon. This will serve as both an example of the type of problem early 
film publications present that required novel conceptualization, but also as an 
                                            
49 Paul Moore, “A ‘Distant Reading’ of the ‘Chaser Theory’: Local Views and the Digital 
Generation of New Cinema History,” currently unpublished, with expected publication in 
Technology and Film Scholarship: Experience, Study, History, edited by André Gaudreault 
and Santiago Hidalgo (Amsterdam University Press, 2016).  
50 Franco Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature,” New Left Review 1 (2000): 54-68, 
quoted in Paul Moore, “A ‘Distant Reading’ of the ‘Chaser Theory’. 
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example of the way the formulation ‘film consciousness’ becomes an idea or 
concept in historiography. When first launched, early film journals tended 
toward writing about film as if it were a “transparent window” that presented 
an unmediated view of profilmic reality.51 For these writers, the idea of film 
consisted of an apparatus that recorded reality, rather than participating in 
the construction of this reality. This concept of film corresponds with one of 
the “film paradigms” André Gaudreault discusses in his own work on early 
cinema, which he defines as “capturing and restoring,” 52  in which the 
cinematographer or camera operator records the profilmic reality found before 
the camera, neither manipulating the camera, nor interfering with the 
profilmic reality.  
This paradigm, according to Gaudreault, is characteristic of early Lumière 
“actualities,” but also of other films from the beginnings of cinema. The other 
two paradigms that Gaudreault presents, “monstration” and “narration,” 
include some level of manipulation at the filmographic level, although not 
always in the case of “monstration.” 53  For Gaudreault, filmographic 
manipulations consist of “fragmentations” in the film. Although more 
commonly understood as “editing,” the notion of fragmentation is a more 
                                            
51 Branigan uses the metaphor of a “window” to characterize two contrasting spectatorship 
positions, those who see through “the frame of the ‘window’” and those who see that the frame 
“constrains and shapes” the reality. Projecting a Camera, 106.   
52 Gaudreault, Film and Attraction, 56 
53 Ibid., 58. 
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technical distinction, in that it accounts for any kind of break in the film, 
whether placed there through in-camera editing, negative cutting, or film 
print cutting. It is also intended as a neutral distinction that avoids laying 
claim to the invention of editing as a narrative practice. Gaudreault concludes 
that “from this perspective, we might see the paradigm of capturing as a sort 
of horizon category, a zero degree of filming, without in the process asserting, 
historically speaking, that such an activity ever existed in a pure state.”54 
We might imagine, then, that the way the first early journal writers regarded 
film is analogous to the “capturing and restoring” paradigm. This is true 
whether or not there were actual filmographic operations in the films in 
question. From the perspective of the writer (or spectator), it was as if the 
manipulations were invisible to consciousness. These manipulations included 
not only fragmentation, but also any sort of manipulation, including camera 
movements, rack focusing, panning, framing, and so forth. To the extent that 
these manipulations are implicated in the construction of a narrative, or in 
any kind of film effect, they are filmographic operations to the same degree as 
editing. The point, however, is that these operations were not conceptualized 
as filmic operations, but rather were seen as unconnected to the narrative. 
Rather, these elements were reflections of “mechanical perfection,” which was 
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a standard distinct from the quality of the film itself.55 Therefore, a tendency 
in early writing about film was to focus on the story or content of the film, to 
the exclusion of the filmographic operations, as if the camera captured these 
events without any other interventions. It is possible, then, to define this 
“lack of consciousness” of the filmographic as “zero degree film consciousness.” 
It is the mirror image of Gaudreault’s “capturing and restoring” in that the 
writer or spectator does not display or communicate an awareness of the 
filmographic operations.  
Once this operating premise is applied to the study of early film publications, 
the publications are analyzable from the perspective of “increasing film 
consciousness,” according to the criteria mentioned. This consciousness 
appeared to recognize the connection between the filmographic and the film 
effects (whether the effect was tied to a narrative or not). In this sense, the 
transparent window of the frame became visible to many writers and evolved 
into a central theme, although not always communicated explicitly. Rather 
than imagining film as consisting of two different categories of effects, a 
recording device effect and a filmographic effect – there was a sense of 
appreciation and awareness that these effects formed a single, unified 
phenomenon named “film.” It is at this very point that one could make the 
statement, “here was the beginning of film consciousness,” even if, again, it is 
                                            
55 “The Picture the Audience Likes,” Moving Picture World (11 February 1911): 310. 
 31 
an arbitrary and ambiguous determination. It should be seen, merely, as a 
means of drawing out certain evidence that would support this idea. That it 
coincides with another change in film consciousness, a new “a way of existing 
towards film” that involves the study of audiences, further supports this 
hypothesis (film study and film scholarship are examples of ways of existing 
towards film as defined in Chapter 5, “Film Culture Awareness” as “A Way Of 
Existing Towards Film.”).56   
There is, nevertheless, a larger context that provides a justification to the idea 
of regarding early writing about film from the perspective of film 
consciousness, which is the terminology that some film scholars have applied 
to the writing. As Gaudreault writes, “the names historians give to their 
object of study often reveal their position on it.”57 In this regard, we can 
distinguish “objective historical facts” from the names that are applied to 
them, in order to see “the position” the historian has adopted. What is 
revealed, in some examples, is a position that denies consciousness in these 
writings, or at least, an interesting consciousness.  
The objective facts are that between 1906 and 1910, dozens of trade film 
publications were launched in the United States, starting with Views and 
                                            
56 The evidence supporting the assertion that film critics studied audiences, from which they 
derived some theoretical conclusions, is in Chapter 1, in the section named “Regions of Self-
Consciousness.” 
57 Gaudreault, Film and Attraction, 2. 
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Film Index in April 26, 1906.58 In the next few years, several new trade 
journals, such as Moving Picture World (1907), Show World (1907), Motion 
Picture News (1908), Nickelodeon (1909) 59  and Film Reports (ca. 1910) 
entered the market. Additionally, already established journals such as 
Variety and the New York Dramatic Mirror, both of which opened film 
criticism departments during these years,60 turned their attention to film. On 
the whole, these publications can be regarded as a film trade press or 
institution (and not just a series of individual publications).  
While these journals varied in length, content, and interests, all contained 
various sorts of writing about film. The following are examples of scholars 
defining this writing (my emphases):  
Example 1 (David Bordwell): 
Film criticism was born from reviewing, and the earliest prototypes 
of the “film critic” were journalists charged with discussing, on a 
weekly basis, the current output of the film industry.61 
                                            
58 Renamed Film Index in September 1908 and acquired by Moving Picture World in June 
1911. Annette D’Agostino, Filmmakers in the Moving Picture World: An Index of Articles, 
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59 Renamed Motography on August 1, 1910. 
60 New York Dramatic Mirror started publishing film criticism on May 30, 1908; Variety 
opened a section on January 19, 1907 but discontinued it between March 1911 and January 
1913; Moving Picture World started publishing criticism under the heading of “Comments on 
the Film Subjects” on October 10, 1908. Moving Picture World is among the most prolific 
American trade journals in terms of quantity of articles and criticism on film and is one of the 
reasons it is cited often among early film trade journals. 
61 David Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema 
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Example 2 (Tim Bywater and Thomas Sobchack):  
The development of journalistic reviewing and its evolution into 
serious criticism is tied to the development of film showings to a 
theatre audience […] Early pieces of this so-called criticism were, in 
reality, a combination of reportage (describing the film event in 
factual terms) and review (giving the audience, yet to see the film, 
advice as to its entertainment value).62 
Example 3 (Myron Lounsbury):  
These “reviews” … were simply plot summaries of recent films from 
the major companies. Printed as useful journalistic information, the 
reviews did not apply any critical standards but left the reader to 
judge the scenario from the liveliness or sentiment of the action 
described by the reporter.63  
Example 4 (Anthony Slide): 
[M]ost early film criticism was little more than a detailed synopsis of 
a new film, with no opinion whatsoever expressed.64 
While these perspectives do not constitute the entirety of opinion on these 
writings, they are perhaps – or at least were – representative of a 
conventional view on these writings. At the very least they share a 
perspective and terminology that raises questions of the sort Gaudreault asks, 
                                                                                                                                   
(Harvard University Press, 1989), 21. 
62  Tim Bywater and Thomas Sobchack, Introduction to Film Criticism: Major Critical 
Approaches to Narrative Film (New York: Longman, 1989), 5. 
63 Myron Osborn Lounsbury, The Origins of American Film Criticism, 1909–1939 (New York: 
Arno Press, 1973), 8. 
64Anthony Slide, ed., Selected Film Criticism 1896–1911 (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1982), 
x. 
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about a potential meaning in the “names historians give.” I will simply note 
that a “film critic” is definable as a specialist who analyzes films and offers 
personal opinions, insights and criticism. The film critic displays curiosity 
about the nature of film, and calls attention to details a public viewer usually 
misses. A “reporter” or “journalist,” on the other hand, is definable as a 
“generalist.” The nature of the profession requires a certain detached 
disposition, such as the desire to provide an objective account of facts, without 
the inclusion of personal opinions. Unlike the narrow specialization of the film 
critic, the reporter or journalist will only have a surface understanding of film 
and produce discourse that is consequent with that identity, which is to say, 
not “criticism.” Thus, the vocabulary adopted in the above accounts seems 
oriented towards erasing the presence of consciousness on the side of the 
discourse itself – “no opinions,” “no critical standards,” “reportage,” 
“discussing” “descriptions” – and on the side of the author – “journalist,” 
“reporter” and also “film critic” (which are placed in scare quotes). The 
underlying argument in the language itself is that this is a period without an 
interesting consciousness, and more especially, without self-consciousness. 
Wittgenstein might refer to it as a “language-game” intended to deny 
consciousness, in which all of the terms and characterizations line up in the 
same direction.65  
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Without confronting the criteria used for arriving at these labels and 
classifications directly, or examining the discourse in question, I would like to 
present a second set of objective facts: the way these very writers described 
themselves and described their writing. The following are all articles 
published during this period: “Film Criticism in the Lay Press;” 66 
“Suggestions to a Worried Critic;” 67  “Advertising and Criticising;” 68 
“Advertising, Boosting and Criticism;”69 “Reviews of Films Commended: ‘The 
Mirror’ is Complimented for its Impartial Criticisms – Improvement in Film 
Advocated;”70 “Critic, Producer and Exhibitor;”71 “Film Criticism in the Lay 
Press;”72 “Film Criticism;”73 “The Art of Criticism;”74 “Mr. Critic;”75 “Film and 
Critics;”76 “Criticising Moving Pictures.”77 Each of these articles include some 
variation of “criticism” or “critic” in the title. This is the terminology of the 
period – the same period that is being described with the opposite 
terminology.  
                                                                                                                                   
repr., Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §7. 
66 Moving Picture World 9, no. 20 (May 20, 1911): 1113 
67 W. Stephen Bush, Moving Picture World 10, no. 10 (December 9, 1911). 
68 W. Stephen Bush, Moving Picture World 14, no. 8 (November 23, 1912): 750. 
69 Louis Reeves Harrison, Moving Picture World 15, no. 14 (March 29, 1913): 1313.  
70 New York Dramatic Mirror 59, no. 1540 (June 27, 1908): 7. 
71 W. Stephen Bush, Moving Picture World 14, no. 7 (November 17, 1912): 637. 
72 Moving Picture World 8, no. 18 (May 20, 1911): 1113. 
73 Motography (August 1911): 56, repr. in Slide, Selected Film Criticism, 116. 
74 Louis Reeves Harrison, Moving Picture World 19, no. 5 (January 30, 1914): 521. 
75 Louis Reeves Harrison, Moving Picture World 10, no. 4 (October 28, 1911): 274. 
76 Film Reports (October 1, 1910): 8, repr. in Slide, Selected Film  Criticism, 115. 
77 Nickelodeon 2, no. 4 (October 1909): 103. 
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When differences arise in the way a given reality is named – and especially 
when the difference is between the historian’s language and the language of 
the group being described – questions are obviously raised about the 
reasoning involved. Is it a question of criteria? Is it a question of not sharing 
the same understanding of the terminology? Is it a question of not having 
access to certain facts? More to the point, is the terminology more or less the 
same anyway – which is to say, does it really matter? These are all valid 
questions – and perhaps each of them is resolvable objectively, at least in 
theory. Maybe what the early writer imagined as “film critic” and “film 
criticism” is different than what is imagined as the same today. We do not 
want to fall into the trap Gaudreault describes as “the naive assumption of 
historicism, namely that we must set ourselves within the spirit of the age, 
and think with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own, and thus advance 
towards historical objectivity.”78   
At the same time, there is an interesting clash of descriptions, even if 
adopting the terminology of the time might be regarded as misleading from 
our perspective. Maybe it is the case that these were not “film critics” and 
that they did not produce “film criticism” according to some criteria. 
Moreover, Gaudreault advances the methodology – perhaps more than anyone 
within early cinema studies, or film studies more broadly – that adopting the 
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terminology of the period is relevant. Gaudreault’s most recent formulation of 
the concept of “cinema of attractions,” that of “kine-attractography,” 
emphasizes the question of language both from the perspective of the 
historian and of the period, when writing about the “alien quality” of early 
films: 
The irreducibility of this alien quality becomes apparent when we 
seek to remain conscious of the extent of the break in continuity 
being proposed here and succeed in making its various aspects 
materially present. When describing early cinema, one of the 
techniques we could use to clearly distinguish between the two 
paradigms would be systematically to use the terms and expressions 
current in the period in question. Spelled out, this would mean 
saying, for example, “manufacturer of animated pictures” instead of 
“film producer,” “kinematographer” instead of “cineaste,” etc., in 
keeping with usage of the day. The mental effort needed each time 
we are forced to make a lexical choice of this kind is a form of 
intellectual gymnastics that enables us to get a better and more 
tangible grasp of the alien quality of early cinema. Seeing Méliès 
and Porter, for example, as kinematographers (which they were) 
rather than as cineastes (which they were not) does not at all 
involve the same critical and theoretical framework.79  
Of course, the problem with early film criticism and the way it has been 
defined is different than Gaudreault’s. The point of departure is that early 
films have unique and interesting qualities that are effaced through modern 
concepts. Moreover, our terminology, Gaudreault argues, tends to produce a 
teleological narrative and false continuity of intentions, as he and Tom 
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Gunning make clear in their later retrospective on the concept of “cinema of 
attractions” in “Early Cinema as a Challenge to Film History:” 
Historians of previous generations . . . had the irritating habit of 
considering and judging early cinema on the basis of not yet extant 
norms, of the only kind of cinema worthy, in their eyes, of the 
label “specifically cinematic quality.” It is precisely this vision that 
has been qualified as teleological because it has a tendency to 
privilege a logic of finality in the assessment of a reality, namely the 
cinema of 1895 to 1915 which, on the contrary, should be measured 
on the basis of its own successive finalities, year after year, or at 
least period after period.80 
Thus, adopting the language from the time, and applying a disconcerting, 
mind-bending term to the historical object (“kine-attractography”), serves the 
function of rendering the films unfamiliar to our normal descriptions. 
Gaudreault thus “redescribes” the historical object with the language of the 
time in order to emphasize the “alien quality” in the films. But it also 
rehabilitates the consciousness of the filmmakers, by seeing them as 
intending to make the films in question with a specific purpose in mind, in 
consideration of the aesthetic style and exhibition context of the period, rather 
than “on the basis of not yet extant norms.”  
Given this context, the purpose of applying a term such as “film 
consciousness” to early film criticism is threefold. First, it avoids the issue of 
                                            
80 André Gaudreault and Tom Gunning, “Early Cinema as a Challenge to Film History,” in 
The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded edited by Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam University 
Press, 2006), 369. 
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linguistic equivalency between the object of study and the historian by 
introducing a different standard against which to judge the discourse. 
Secondly, it responds to the denial of consciousness by automatically inserting 
the term into the problematic – the language itself now redescribes the 
problem and directs the attention onto a broader pattern of behaviour that 
includes discerning the consciousness that is motivating seemingly ordinary 
writing. Thirdly, it takes “intention” as a serious element in the act of 
historical interpretation. Whether or not “film critic” or “film criticism” are 
accurate descriptions, the fact of the matter is that this sort of terminology 
was used with regularity and therefore reflects self-consciousness, which 
again casts the question back onto the need for a vocabulary, such as “film 
consciousness,” that brings this “alien quality” into focus. It is rather the 
approach to history that Hayden White defines as “formist”, which “aims at 
the identification of the unique characteristics of objects inhabiting the 
historical field.” 81 While these lines of argument are presented in Chapter 1, 
“Film consciousness in Early Film Trade Publications,” they are reoccurring 
argumentative threads throughout the body of the thesis.  
 
 
                                            
81 White, Metahistory, 13-15. 
 40 
B. Film and Consciousness 
The second field this thesis contributes to, I believe, is one Murray Smith 
defines in his survey of research on consciousness and film, when he 
concludes, “the relationship between consciousness and film remains largely 
uncharted territory.” 82  Smith’s survey is intended to provide a better 
understanding of the current state of research on the relationship between 
film and consciousness, but also to illustrate that film, both in the sense of 
filmmaking and film study, hardly seems to have contributed to the territory 
he imagines. The use of “imagines” is not intended as a pejorative comment in 
this case; it merely emphasizes that the “territory” Smith refers to lacks an 
institutional status. It is a territory imagined differently according to the 
particular definitions or ideas that someone assigns to “consciousness” and to 
its relationship with “film.” Smith appears somewhat certain about the fact 
that the territory and the types of research questions he surveys are self-
evident, but this seems far from conclusive considering the diversity of 
definitions of “consciousness.” Still, Smith’s piece is extremely important 
towards establishing some necessary starting points for beginning to think 
about this relationship. 
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edited by Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 40. 
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The first notable fact of Smith’s survey is that two different sets of film-
related evidence are seen as germane to the study of the relationship between 
film and consciousness. The first film-related evidence Smith presents is 
taken from film studies, but very little research is cited. Smith includes a few 
recent studies which, more than being particularly noteworthy, are exemplary 
of the type of research Smith considers as fitting within his definition of the 
field of film and consciousness: the experience of sound, the experience of 
memory, and subliminal perceptions in the act of film viewing.83 Aside from 
these recent examples, only Hugo Münsterberg’s 1916 The Photoplay; A 
Psychological Study is included from the pantheon of film theory. 
Münsterberg is included because he “focused on the way in which the 
development of technique and form over the first two decades of cinema 
sought (on his view) to mimic the mental mechanisms of attention, memory, 
and emotion.”84 According to Smith, the “real successors to Münsterberg are 
not to be found in any body of film theory, but in particular traditions of 
filmmaking,” 85 therefore the only other “film scholars” included within his 
survey pertain to those offering biographical or contextual commentary about 
the filmmaking. 
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According to Smith, the most important and unique contributions come from 
unconventional cinema, arguing that the “most obvious stamping ground for 
the representation and exploration of the conscious mind has been the 
tradition of art cinema,” especially avant-garde filmmaking, which, according 
to Smith, has been seen as a “metaphor for consciousness.”86 The argument in 
this case is persuasive: the experience of viewing experimental films is 
analogous to the way consciousness is experienced. It can be argued that 
experimental films manage to represent the experience of consciousness on 
screen. Since conscious experience is partially an experience of sensations and 
images, then filmmaking emerges as particularly suited to capturing and 
representing this quality of experience. This is perhaps most evident in the 
portrayal of dream consciousness in the case of surrealist and avant-garde 
films that portray oneiric worlds (such as Maya Deren’s films).   
However, while Smith identifies a “gap” in research on the question of film 
and consciousness, which seems a reasonable justification for pursuing 
further research on the subject, such as in this thesis, the real issues his brief 
survey seems to raise is the lack of conceptualization of the relationship 
between film and consciousness. Two avenues are presented: either research 
is pursued in the way Smith conceptualizes the “unchartered territory,” or the 
territory is defined otherwise, in a way that conceptualizes the relationship 
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between film and consciousness according to different categories, especially in 
terms fitting with a historical perspective. This latter alternative is the one 
followed in this thesis because the aim is more toward developing concepts 
that are operational within the historical field.  
The “lack of conceptualization” mentioned above is not necessarily wrong or 
particular to Smith. He approaches the relationship from a valid perspective, 
which is from the field of “consciousness studies.”87  As a field, it tends to 
regard consciousness as an inherent biological phenomenon. But it is also 
possible to approach consciousness from a cultural perspective that includes 
an interest in studying the relationship between consciousness and 
technologies, societies, and histories. While consciousness studies is 
interested in the biological origins and innate structures of consciousness, the 
humanities and social sciences tend to focus on the way consciousness 
develops or is experienced in particular circumstances. These paradigms 
(consciousness studies and humanities) employ the term ‘consciousness’ very 
differently, which complicates establishing a common ground between them. 
Does neuroscience study the same “consciousness” as does the philosopher, 
the psychologist, the historian or the anthropologist? Intuitively, the answer 
would seem “no” – yet each of these disciplines applies the term 
                                            
87 This is a relatively new hybrid field combining philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, 
and neuroscience.  Some of the leading philosopher figures include Daniel Dennett, David 
Chalmers, John Searle, and Thomas Nagel. Discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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‘consciousness’ in different circumstances; each lays claim to studying a 
phenomenon named ‘consciousness’ (this is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, 
“‘Talking Past Each Other,’” which is a quote from philosopher David 
Chalmers about the word ‘consciousness’.)88 A pragmatic perspective, such as 
the one favoured in this thesis, disregards whether any of these disciplines 
offers a “privileged context”89 that employs the term “correctly.” Rather, the 
goal is to consider points taken from each context in order to build a more 
global understanding of the possibilities of the term, and therefore, the 
possibilities of ‘film consciousness’ as a means of exploring the field of 
research Smith defines. 
It is perhaps indicative of the problem of conceptualization that the volume in 
which Smith publishes his survey, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
and Film, has a separate section for “Phenomenology,” written by Vivian 
Sobchack, which is widely seen within philosophy as an approach to the study 
of consciousness.90 There is only a cursory, most likely editorially motivated, 
reference to Sobchack in Smith’s section, which is unusual considering Vivian 
Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience fits 
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the definition – on the surface at least – of a major film studies work on the 
“unchartered territory” that is the relationship between film and 
consciousness. As Sobchack writes, “Experience comes to description in acts of 
reflection: consciousness turning reflexively on itself to become conscious of 
consciousness.”91 This seemingly circular statement is in fact clear enough: 
the act of turning attention towards conscious experience, which includes the 
conscious experience of film, consists in the study of consciousness. Thus, the 
study of film experience, on the terms Sobchack defines, is the study of a 
relationship between film and consciousness.  
However, there is good reason to exclude Sobchack’s work from a survey of the 
relationship between film and consciousness from the perspective Smith 
adopts (that of “consciousness studies.”). The reason is similar for it being 
mostly excluded from this thesis, except in the chapter that is specifically 
about film experience (Chapter 6, which outlines six different meanings of 
film experience). As explained in Chapters 2 and 6, Sobchack’s approach – 
and those like it – represents a challenge to the approaches adopted within 
consciousness studies and pragmatic philosophy more generally (which rather 
occupies the philosophical portion of “consciousness studies.”) This is because 
so-called “phenomenological approaches” destabilize language; stated 
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otherwise, it is an approach that is difficult to reconcile with, or at least relate 
with, non-phenomenological approaches. As Sobchack writes about her own 
writing: 
My prose is also engaged in serious punning and in a kind of 
dialectical play, inversions and parallelisms underscored in order to 
model and highlight in language the transitivity and reversibility 
experienced in subject-object relations in general, and vision in 
particular.92 
The prose Sobchack defines is not specific to her, but rather seems 
emblematic of a genre of writing that “phenomenological approaches” espouse 
for methodological or epistemological reasons.  There is a sense in which the 
writing is intended to challenge the precept of linguistic objectivity; however, 
in doing so, it renders the text itself difficult to comprehend. Spencer Shaw, 
author of Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze, another work 
mostly excluded from this thesis, describes “doing phenomenology” as a 
“descriptive pursuit in which, as much as possible, one immerses oneself in an 
experience to analyze and understand it.” 93 The assumption – which is mostly 
true – is that language shapes or determines the way experience is described, 
although the two things (consciousness and language) seem mostly 
inseparable. The phenomenological solution to this dilemma, at least in the 
way these two particular authors approach it (but which is also sometimes 
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described as “deconstructionist” for similar reasons),94 is to use language in an 
idiosyncratic, destabilizing manner.  The end result is that this approach, 
however much it seems to fit squarely within the study of consciousness, is 
irreconcilable with a more pragmatic approach that depends on ordinary 
language, and ordinary examples, in order to describe conscious experience.95 
Therefore, there is space for conceptualizing the relationship between film 
and consciousness from a more pragmatic approach, which includes 
acknowledging the relative place that a phenomenological approach occupies 
within a broader context. Shaw’s approach is one way of conceptualizing “film 
consciousness” – as a faculty or quasi-faculty (“a way of seeing”). 
Unfortunately, because of Shaw’s self-described phenomenological approach, 
it is a discourse that is limited in its ability to “maintain a conversation” (as 
Rorty suggests).  
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2. Structure 
As mentioned, the thesis is structured according to the thesis process that 
was followed, rather than retroactively reorganizing the thesis from a general 
theory to a specific case study. This is not to say that this structure was not 
attempted at different points – there is always the question of which 
information is relevant first in order to understand later arguments. I 
realized rather late in the thesis writing process that the general picture was 
best understood on the basis of the early film criticism study, where the idea 
of film consciousness was formed. Therefore, this is presented in Chapter 1, 
“Film Consciousness in Early Film Publications.” 
However, the remainder of the thesis follows a more traditional structure. 
Chapter 2, “Talking Past Each Other,” begins by examining some of the 
problems encountered in defining the word ‘consciousness’. As philosopher 
David Chalmers writes,  “those who talk about ‘consciousness’ are frequently 
talking past each other.” 96  This for the simple reason that the word 
‘consciousness’ defines something slightly different for each person, such that 
a conversation that includes this term as a central component always contains 
some level of misunderstanding. Moreover, there are many “referential 
contexts,” in which ‘consciousness’ obtains meaning: the humanities, the 
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social sciences, the hard sciences, medicine, and ordinary, everyday life. 
Depending on the particular referential context in which a given person 
presents an argument or discussion, certain expectations and understandings 
will already be present that problematize defining the word’s ambiguity. Most 
referential contexts, by nature, assume the status of “privileged context” in 
which other contexts are rendered secondary (hence the importance in this 
thesis in relying on a dictionary in order to outline as many contexts as 
possible, not just a single one). The main problem is that ‘consciousness’ is 
polysemic in nature, consisting of many homonyms. It also shares 
resemblances in meaning with other words that refer to similar phenomenon, 
such as “mind,” which further compounds the problem. Thus, conversations 
about consciousness consist of several parallel discussions that require 
recognizing differences in the meaning of ‘consciousness’, as well as 
similarities between different terminologies.  
Chapter 3, “‘Consciousness’ Defined,” begins by defining the “semantic field of 
consciousness,” which, as mentioned earlier, consists of the sum total of ways 
in which the word ‘consciousness’ is used intelligibly. Relying on the Oxford 
Dictionary of English for guidance, among other texts, this chapter presents 
six different definitions of consciousness. The first of these is the state of 
“wakefulness,” found mostly in medical contexts, which defines the behaviour 
of responsiveness in relation to certain criteria. Therefore it is not necessarily 
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pertinent to a discussion about film consciousness, but important as a point of 
reference.  The other five categories – “awareness of something” (being 
conscious of an external object and its properties, or an internal object, such 
as an image, idea or sensation), “shared defining ideas and beliefs” (similar to 
“ethos”),  “personal consciousness” (the conscious phenomena that is seen as 
constituting personal identity), “global consciousness” (the faculty of 
consciousness, the presumed system from which consciousness emerges), and 
“conscious experience” (the unbroken stream of ongoing thoughts, feelings, 
sensations, and their qualitative nature) – are pertinent to the construction of 
film consciousness categories; therefore these are given more attention and 
applied in subsequent chapters. This chapter also includes discussion of 
existing expressions that use the word ‘consciousness’ in order to demonstrate 
that words combine with ‘consciousness’ in a particular manner in the context 
of an expression, and that these expressions serves as templates for 
constructing new expressions.   
One of the most historiographically relevant “film consciousness” categories is 
that of “film awareness,” presented in Chapter 4 (‘Film Consciousness’ as 
“Film Awareness.”) This category derives from the definition of ‘consciousness’ 
that means “awareness of something,” which when combined with ‘film’, and 
the different objects this term represents, forms different ideas of “film 
awareness,” all of which are found in existing discourse. These ideas, or 
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subcategories, include “film aesthetic awareness,” and “film production 
awareness” (“film culture awareness” is discussed in the subsequent chapter). 
When studying these awarenesses in the historical field, such as in relation to 
a set of writers, or institutions, these categories have the advantage of already 
containing a “historiographic” grammar, in the sense that “awareness of 
something” (as opposed to “personal consciousness”) is characterized in terms 
of increasing and decreasing; levels; stages; ranges; turning points; and so 
forth. This sense of consciousness may be present in some institution or 
group, but remain unreported for different reasons, which therefore requires 
an ability to study the “indirect expression of awareness,” such as that 
reflected in ordinary language-use.  
Used informally by such scholars as Dudley Andrew, David Bordwell and 
Kristen Thompson, Chapter 5 examines yet another sense of ‘film 
consciousness’, which falls along a continuum between “film culture 
awareness” and “a way of existing towards film.” Film consciousness in this 
chapter is defined primarily as behaviour towards film, such as film study, 
archiving, and preservation, which is nevertheless constituted in awareness of 
the cultural value of film. In fact, ‘consciousness’ in this sense is broader than 
just “ideas” and “beliefs” and incorporates other more elusive attributes, such 
as “sensibilities” and “convictions.” François Albera’s concept of “cinematic 
episteme” offers a point of comparison for defining the specificity of this sense 
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of film consciousness, 97 since it addresses that which underlies a knowledge of 
film, in the same way that “film consciousness” defines that which underlies a 
film movement and other concerted activities towards film. Ultimately, this 
definition of film consciousness was intended to describe some of the activity 
of early film critics, who began studying audiences, and recognizing the 
context-dependent nature of film effects, but without yet rationalizing this 
understanding into a theory (this data is also covered in Chapter 1).  
Chapter 6, “The Meaning of ‘Film Experience’,” will seem, perhaps, like a 
detour on the way to defining “film consciousness” as an entity, but it serves 
several important functions. One is to review literature that is already 
ostensibly about film consciousness, but which uses a different terminology, 
namely that of ‘film experience.’ Secondly, as mentioned, an axiomatic 
premise in this thesis is that film consciousness, in whatever form, “belongs to 
a world in which film experiences occur,” therefore it is important to clarify 
the meaning of ‘film experience’ in this latter sense. As this chapter shows, 
there are many different uses of ‘film experience’ within film discourse, each 
designating a different area on a “continuum” of film experience. We will see 
that the term ‘film experience’ has at least six different meanings: “the film-
viewing event,” “the psychological film-viewing experience,” “the subjective 
                                            
97 François Albera’s notion of “cinematic episteme” is presented in “First Discourses on Film 
and the Construction of a ‘Cinematic Episteme’,” in The Blackwell Companion to Early 
Cinema, 121-140. 
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film-viewing experience,” “the remainders of film-viewing experience” 
(memories, sensations, feelings), the quasi-institutional category known as 
“the film experience,” and finally, all of the “imagined points of contact” 
between consciousness and film. For our interest, the last of these is the most 
relevant to understanding the premise that film consciousness belongs to a 
world in which film experiences occur, and from which “subjective film 
consciousness” arises, but “subjective film experience” and “film remainders” 
also provide useful entry points into discussions about film consciousness.   
The thesis concludes with Chapter 7, “‘Film Consciousness’ as an Entity in 
Consciousness,” which deviates from the initial, more objective aims of the 
historiographic model this thesis was attempting to devise in relation to early 
film publications. These categories are nevertheless logical outcomes of the 
process of assembling different meanings of ‘film’ and ‘consciousness’. We 
might think of them as being more “subjective” in nature, since they require a 
different set of evidence in order to validate (what one scholar defines as 
“subjective first person reports,”98 and deal more directly with a first person 
perspective. Thus, as an entity in consciousness, ‘film consciousness’ may 
refer to a “sense of self” or “identity” (explored from the perspective of Annette 
                                            
98 Beja Margithazi, “‘Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows…’ The Role of Body and 
Senses in Various ‘First Contact’ Narratives,” Ősz (December 10, 2012). 
http://uj.apertura.hu/2012/osz/margithazi-the-role-of-body-and-senses/ 
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Kuhn’s notion of “cinema memory”),99 a “place” in consciousness in which film 
memories and film experiences are stored (such as in Martin Lefebvre’s 
concept of “imaginary museum”),100 a “faculty” (as with Francesco Casetti’s 
notion of “film gaze),101 and “subjective film consciousness,” which is defined 
as a kind of conscious experience that each individual will define differently. 
It is characterized by moods, sensations, feelings, thoughts, or emotions 
intimately linked with past film experiences. From the perspective of the 
person defining subjective film consciousness, the experience feels “film-like” 
in some regard. This latter category of ‘film consciousness’ adopts Thomas 
Nagel’s famous question regarding conscious experience (“What is it like to be 
a bat?”),102 but reformulates it as “What is it like to have experienced film?” 
Any answer to this question is then a candidate for being “subjective film 
consciousness.”  
 
 
                                            
99 Annette Kuhn, “What to do with Cinema Memory?” in Explorations in New Cinema 
History: Approaches and Case Studies, edited by Richard Maltby, Daniël Biltereyst, and 
Philippe Meers. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 85-98. 
100 Martin Lefebvre, “On Memory and Imagination in the Cinema,” New Literary History: 
Cultural Inquiries 2, no. 2 (1999): 479-98 
101 Francesco Casetti, Eye of the Century: Film, Experience, Modernity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008). 
102 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review no. 83 (4: 1973): 
435-450. 
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CHAPTER 1: FILM CONSCIOUSNESS IN EARLY 
FILM TRADE PUBLICATIONS  
One of the struggles evident in early writing about cinema was that of finding 
an effective language for defining and talking about the increasingly complex 
phenomenon of film. The proliferation of words designating film or aspects of 
film during the period of early cinema is a potential source of confusion for 
historians interpreting this writing. Even film historians from the time – 
those living among and using the terms – demonstrated a similar level of 
disorientation, if not impatience. In 1899, Henry V. Hopwood referred to the 
abundance of names for film-related technologies as “etymological 
monstrosities.”1 This struggle was most apparent in the many American film 
trade journals that began publishing in 1907. The journals collectively 
produced the vast majority of written attention toward cinema during these 
early years. Commenting on the outburst of film terminologies emerging 
across the globe, G. Dureau, in his 1910 article “The Moving Picture Babel,” 
noted: “our cousins torture themselves to understand us and we don’t 
understand ourselves.” 2  Complicating matters for those trying to follow 
discussions in early film discourse is that many key words in our film 
vocabulary, such as “director,” “shot,” “editing,” “cinematography,” “camera 
                                            
1 Henry V. Hopwood, Living Pictures: Their History, Photo-Production, and Practical Working 
(1899; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1970), 187. 
2 G. Dureau, “The Moving Picture Babel,” Nickelodeon 3, no. 6 (March 15, 1910): 35. 
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movement” and “art” either did not exist or were used in ways that often do 
not conform to our understanding of the words today. Even some terms for 
designating existing discourse about film follow this pattern. It is possible, for 
instance, to peruse a film journal from 1907, either Moving Picture World or 
Views and Film Index, and encounter a section named “film reviews” with 
texts resembling “reviews,” but consisting instead of catalogue descriptions of 
films published by the journal for exhibitors.3 There are, in fact, signs that 
some film scholars have confused these pieces of writing for film reviews,4 and 
the evidence suggests that even contemporaries found this heading confusing, 
with both of these sections renamed in the following years to more 
representative designations (Moving Picture World to “Stories of the Films” 
and Views and Film Index to “Descriptions of New Films”). 
                                            
3 These texts can be thought of as precursors to film trailers, since the goal was to represent 
the story in the most persuasive and exciting form possible, often including information not 
present in the actual films. André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion have defined them as 
“novelizations” of films. “Les catalogues des premiers fabricants de vues animées: une 
première forme de novellisation?,” La novellisation. Du film au livre / Novelization From Film 
to Novel, eds. Jan Baetens and Marc Lits (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 41–59. 
4 Stanley Kauffmann published one of these catalogue descriptions in his anthology on early 
American film criticism (of D.W. Griffith’s The Adventures of Dollie) as an example of early 
film reviews, noting: “Here is a review of [Griffith’s] first film, nothing more than a synopsis 
but included here because, unknowingly, it is a milestone in world cultural history.” My 
emphasis. Stanley Kauffmann, with Bruce Henstell, eds. American Film Criticism, from the 
Beginnings to Citizen Kane: Reviews of Significant Films at the Time They First Appeared 
(New York: Liveright, 1972), 6. Terms like “synopsis,” “descriptions,” and “summaries” have 
been applied on occasion to describe early film criticism, perhaps in part because of an 
inclusion of such texts into the category. 
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The distinction between two broad, sometimes conflicting conceptualizations 
of film determined much of early writing about film: one as a recording device, 
giving rise to the view that film is a transparent window onto a profilmic 
reality considered the locus of significance, and the other as a constructed 
object, an opaque window which draws attention, implicated in the process of 
creating narratives, effects and meaning.5 Although the latter concept of film 
is often described through the language of art and aesthetics, it is not 
necessary to the recognition of film as a constructed object, even if these 
vocabularies play a role in casting attention on certain features of film that 
highlight this nature.6 An example of this type of awareness of film would be 
the recognition that editing creates a particular set of effects or meaning, or 
that the image itself is an object of aesthetic interest because of a procedure – 
such as framing – the photographer undertook. Seeing film as a recording 
device implies focusing attention on the story as if it were a play that had 
                                            
5 Several types of observations potentially display awareness of film as a constructed object. 
For example, noticing that discrete aesthetic elements – such as photography, setting, 
editing, lighting, acting and story – form part of a unified design; recognizing that such 
elements are purposely selected by the author (or artist) as opposed to being arbitrary; 
observing that images (and sounds) are aesthetically pleasurable and follow similar 
compositional rules as other art forms (such as painting or theater); believing the film is 
created and invested with powerful feelings that convey important cultural values, including 
transcendent notions like “truth,” “goodness” and “beauty”; and finally, that films may 
conceal deeper meanings not necessarily accessibly to the general public (thus necessitating 
explanation from specialized critics). This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
6 In discussing Wittgenstein, Edward Branigan notes: “The purpose of aesthetic descriptions 
is to draw attention to specific features . . . rather than to explain the features.” In Projecting 
a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory (London: Routledge, 2006), 322, fn 69. 
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been merely recorded, or on photography in terms of its ability to provide a 
clear view of the profilmic reality (sufficiently lit, in focus, and so forth). Much 
of the changing terrain of language, the appearance or disappearance of 
certain words, the emergence of a metaphorical way of talking about film, the 
development of a language of authorship, can be explained as a function of 
these different ways of imagining film, in which an awareness of film as a 
constructed object becomes increasingly manifest between 1909 and 1914. 
Concurrent with this awareness of film apparent in language use was a 
growing self-awareness among those using and creating the language, arising 
from an attention to discursive activities, such as film criticism, an attention 
to the way films were experienced in different contexts, and an attention to 
the language being used for talking about film. It is unclear to what degree 
these distinct “regions of awareness” are related – an awareness of the 
constructed nature of film and self-awareness linked to the experience of 
writing and thinking about film – but some intersecting points seem clear 
enough. For instance, an understanding of film, or of any object, can be 
achieved through the study of the language used to define it. This is a 
common approach to analysis in pragmatic philosophy, and which in fact 
occurred in at least one example of early film discourse from 1909.7 Also 
pertinent is the way film itself, as a technology, communication device and 
                                            
7 David S. Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” Nickelodeon 1, no. 5 (May 1909): 139–40. 
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aesthetic form, participated in creating experiences that resulted in a 
different way of understanding oneself in relation to the world, as the work of 
Francesco Casetti illustrates in his analysis of “film gazes.”8 Ultimately, there 
is of course the essential fact that the same individuals – early writers about 
film – partook in both sets of awareness, creating a dialectical, back and forth 
relationship in which a realization in one region of awareness becomes 
evident in another. For this reason, this chapter is the study of a 
consciousness emerging in activities centering on film. The activities are 
divided into distinct regions for the purposes of examining some of their 
constituent parts, but not because such divisions actually form part of the 
emerging consciousness. 
The concepts of film that writers used in journal discourse were usually not 
explicitly discussed. It is rather from an attention to the movement of 
language occurring in a variety of discursive domains – headings, titles, 
articles and reviews – that such concepts are partially revealed. It is also this 
same language from which arises a field of conceptual possibilities for 
thinking about film;9 thus, charting the movement of language is, in effect, 
                                            
8 Francesco Casetti, Eye of the Century: Film, Experience, Modernity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008). Casetti discusses five types of film gazes that arise in the interaction 
between spectator and film: “partial,” “composite,” “penetrating,” “excited” and “immersive.” 
These gazes collectively enable individuals to negotiate the paradoxical experiences of 
modernity. 
9 The concept of “linguistic relativity,” as discussed in the Introduction, has been explored in 
various ways by such authors as George Lakoff, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, and 
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charting the range of possible thoughts – the cinematic episteme to use a 
current term10 – available to someone in a certain historical and institutional 
context. It is possible to think about the collective changes occurring at the 
level of language, then, which includes the regular activity, the “steady forms 
of life” from which such language grows, as the emergence of a kind of film 
consciousness.11 The statements of individual writers, which serve as the 
evidence for constructing an understanding of the way film was thought about 
at a given time, ought to be considered as forming part of an institutional or 
social life, with concomitant activities, interests and ways of talking, that 
strongly determine the particular character of the statements. This is 
significant because sometimes these statements are mistakenly taken as 
factual representations of someone’s thoughts or, more problematically, of 
public thought.  
                                                                                                                                   
more recently in film studies, Edward Branigan. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); George Lakoff, Women, 
Fire, and Dangerous Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (1953; repr., 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1967); Richard Rorty, “Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-dualist 
Account of Interpretation,” in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93–110; Edward Branigan, Projecting a 
Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory (London: Routledge, 2006). 
10 François Albera’s notion of “cinematic episteme” is presented in “First Discourses on Film 
and the Construction of a ‘Cinematic Episteme’,” in André Gaudreault, Nicolas Dulac and 
Santiago Hidalgo, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Early Cinema (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012); 121-140. 
11 “I want to say: it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows 
consists in steady forms of life, regular activity. Its function is determined above all by the 
action it accompanies.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness,” ed. 
Rush Rhees, trans. Peter Winch, Philosophia 6, nos. 3–4 (1976): 404. 
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This chapter is interested in charting two distinct but overlapping sets of 
awareness apparent in early film publications between 1909 and 1914, the 
awareness writers displayed of film as a constructed object, and the 
awareness these same writers began showing of their own role in the process 
of determining the way film was to be thought about. The impetus of the 
study lies in showing that direct statements about film must include an 
understanding of how such statements are situated within a larger pattern of 
institutional thinking, a part of which is only accessible through an analysis 
of the way language was used in a variety of contexts. In effect, to understand 
the statement one must understand the social activity in which the statement 
occurs. 
 
1. The Four Language Traits of Early Film Publications 
As explained in the Introduction, the advent of film publications in the United 
States was probably April 26, 1906, when Views and Film Index was 
launched.12 Early film publications addressed members of the film industry, 
exhibitors, exchanges and filmmakers. But they appealed as well to the 
public, which avidly read the journals.13 They reported on nearly all aspects of 
                                            
12 Renamed Film Index in September 1908 and acquired by Moving Picture World in June 
1911. See Annette D’Agostino, Filmmakers in the Moving Picture World: An Index of Articles, 
1907–1927 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1997), 13. 
13 Frank Woods, in the November 27, 1909 edition of the New York Dramatic Mirror: “The 
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film: equipment and technology, patent litigations, films available for rental, 
pre-production information, exhibitions, production companies and 
personalities. They also functioned as a forum for discussion by means of 
readers submitting weekly questions and comments, critics analyzing aspects 
of the industry, and editors adamantly defending film from public criticism. 
They mediated one of film’s most intense periods of transformation – between 
roughly 1907 and 1914 – with the move from single reel to feature length 
films, and with significant changes to film aesthetics, narrative construction, 
production practices, exhibition conditions and audience spectatorship.14 The 
public status of cinema underwent a dramatic change during this time as 
                                                                                                                                   
Mirror, at any rate, is published not alone for managers and the profession but also for the 
great element of the public which desires authoritative information” (quoted in Kauffmann, 
American Film Criticism, 38). Other evidence suggests journals served as guides for 
understanding films, demonstrating their influence on reception: “we have amongst our 
readers a very considerable number of the general public . . . we have been told that a visitor 
to a theatre has actually taken a copy of the Moving Picture World with him or her and 
endeavoured to follow the film by the story.” “The Stories of the Films,” Moving Picture World 
6, no. 14 (April 2, 1910): 502. 
14 Many works cover this period of transition, but perhaps the most extensive and detailed 
analyses of the relationship between trade publications and the film industry during these 
years are: Charlie Keil, Early American Cinema in Transition: Story, Style, and Filmmaking, 
1907–1913 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001); and Richard Abel, The Red 
Rooster Scare: Making Cinema American, 1900–1910 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999), especially pages 80–7 which provide a history of trade publications and a sense 
of their biases. Although focusing on daily print, Jan Olsson emphasizes the value of 
concentrating on film journalism as “a discursive domain calling for analysis as a 
phenomenon in its own right status apart from being yet another trove of source material 
added to the panoply of paper sources otherwise mobilized by film historians for fleshing out 
film culture.” See Jan Olsson, Los Angeles before Hollywood: Journalism and American Film 
Culture, 1905 to 1915 (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2008), 18. 
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well, shifting from significant public disapproval to tentative endorsement, 
which the journals played a role in mediating.15 
In the midst of this volatility, early film publication writers took up the 
difficult task of defining cinema and delineating an object of film criticism by 
developing a practical and standardized language of criticism that served the 
aims of the journals, the film industry, and the interests of the public. While 
these objectives were sometimes presented as clear and businesslike, the 
result of this intersection of ideas and interests produced by writers from 
different backgrounds was a great deal of experimentation on how to talk 
about film. It was expressed in a number of forms, among them articles 
dealing with new ideas about cinema, or criticism that was not always easy to 
understand from the point of view of trade publication aims. Although the 
labour of film writers at this time was grounded in routine and everyday film 
concerns, these modest routines produced over time a formidable body of work 
that introduced many ideas and vocabularies about cinema into the public 
domain.16 
                                            
15  An impassioned editorial from 1911 calls on critics to “educate the public into the 
acceptance of the good, the artistic and the beautiful [in films].” “The Lay Press and the 
Picture,” The Moving Picture World 8, no. 2 (January 14, 1911): 60. 
16 Richard Abel indicates the circulation of the Moving Picture World  “reportedly had reached 
15,000” by 1914. “Moving Picture World,” in Encyclopedia of Early Cinema, ed. Richard Abel 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 647. 
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When compared to the rather limited sources of information that exist for 
studying the reception of the first decade of cinema (1896–1906), the interest 
of these trade journals becomes more evident. Starting in 1907, there was 
suddenly an abundance of evidence of how groups of people processed the 
experience of cinema – groups working within a definable trade structure to 
be sure, but groups nevertheless – which was diligently recorded, directly and 
indirectly in a variety of language forms, on a weekly and monthly basis. 
Significantly, the journals also operated in the first few years in the absence 
of any other regular publications on film. Such a presence gave writers 
freedom to experiment with format, content and style that might otherwise 
have been the domain of other publications or institutions. Contending with a 
fairly complex reality, and under the pressure of having to write something 
about film on a consistent basis, a sometimes open-ended, “thinking out loud” 
approach to writing about film emerged, which at times verged on 
philosophical or poetic reflections. In short, these film trade journals 
constituted a new film institution during these early years, and many of the 
writers embraced the opportunity to explore the film medium in ways one 
might not expect from a trade publication. 
The language used by writers of the early film trade journals constituted a 
movement in language and a changing awareness of film and self. It is a 
movement that makes them interesting texts for study. There are four 
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significant traits of this language whose usage demonstrates a changing 
consciousness of film. These are collectivity, established by groups of writers; 
regularity, constituted by weekly publications; extension, which is their 
publication over a period of time; and diversity, stimulated by the absence of 
conventions or other competing film institutions. In the analyses that follow, I 
show how film awareness was represented and communicated in two different 
regions of discourse and activity: film consciousness, as represented in 
“headings and titles,” “articles” and “film criticism,” and self-consciousness, as 
represented in “metacriticism,” “audience study,” and “discourse on 
language”. One of the challenges of studying early film publications is in 
connecting these regions to form a more unified understanding of the 
background world of the language of early film publications. In general, it is 
productive to imagine trade publications as “institution-like” in terms of the 
way knowledge circulated from one area to another and even across journals, 
making it possible to understand the activity in one region on the basis of the 
other. 
 
2. Regions of Film Consciousness 
Writers in early American film publications gradually displayed an awareness 
of the constructed nature of film, including the causes, creators and meaning 
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of films. This awareness was not usually communicated in explicit statements 
demonstrating such an understanding, rather it was expressed in the ways 
language was used over time and in specific contexts. To appreciate this 
awareness requires attention to the movement of language and a close 
analysis of terms in early film publications. 
One region is quite simply the “titles and headings” of journals and sections. 
Changes in titles and headings often occurred without announcement or 
explanation, and therefore may be interpreted as a reflection of an internal 
process of reasoning taking place among writers and editors. A coherent logic 
cannot always be discerned from one title to the next, especially since often 
only a single word was dropped or added. But over time, in combination with 
other evidence, a more unified process of thought becomes apparent. André 
Gaudreault provides a sense of how this movement took form in his 
observations of the constant renaming of one journal, which, through a series 
of additions and subtractions from 1889 to 1919, changed from Optical Magic 
Lantern Journal and Photographic Enlarger to Kinematograph Weekly.17 For 
Gaudreault, this transformation represents a move from one (or several) 
cultural series to another. Important changes also occurred within journals, 
communicating other similar internal processes of reasoning, such as the 
                                            
17 André Gaudreault, “The Culture Broth and the Froth of Cultures of So-Called Early 
Cinema,” in André Gaudreault, Nicolas Dulac and Santiago Hidalgo, eds., The Blackwell 
Companion to Early Cinema (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); 15-31. 
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“Film Reviews” section in Moving Picture World. In the very first issue, the 
section was named “Film Chats.” It then became “Film Reviews” and then, 
finally, “Stories of the Films.” Since none of these changes were ever 
explained, the reasoning may be interpreted, in part, through what we know 
occurred in other areas of the journal. For example, “Film Chats” conveys 
rather well the character of the eventual criticism that would be published in 
this journal, which was presented as “comments” (more below), and which 
sometimes resembled spoken language. The name “Film Chats” is continuous 
with our knowledge of what occurred elsewhere, suggesting this 
conceptualization of criticism existed from the outset, even if it was misused 
in this instance for presenting catalogue descriptions. The eventual change 
from “Reviews” to “Stories” is significant because of when it occurred – two 
weeks before the opening of the film criticism section in the same journal – 
suggesting there was already a sense of the coming confusion that would arise 
in presenting different kinds of texts under similar heading names. 
The naming of the film criticism section in Moving Picture World tells an even 
more meaningful story. When the “Comments on Film Subjects” section was 
launched there was no mention of the significance of “comments” in the title. 
The explanation offered was “Yielding to the requests of many readers to take 
up criticism of some of the film subjects, we invited two capable newspaper 
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men to make the rounds of theatres with us last week.”18 Once again, we 
learn about the background concept defining journal discourse in the heading 
and not the actual discourse. Finally, the other concept in the title – “film 
subjects” – is also significant because it is a terminology frequently used in 
other sections of the journal, particularly in the listings of the films available 
for rental. The term “film subject” seems to imply a distinction between the 
film and the content of the film, but this peculiarity does not become fully 
apparent until the journal finally settles on “Comments on the Films” in 1910. 
Thus, without even reading the comments or articles, or indeed any other 
form of discourse in the journals, a moment can be identified when a shift 
occurred in the way film was conceptualized as a unified object of criticism 
that no longer distinguished between film and story. 
A second region of discourse is perhaps the most commonly cited among 
historians, that is, the actual group of articles that more or less directly 
addresses different subjects related to cinema, including the nature of cinema. 
There is an abundance of material in this area that can be easily read as more 
or less self-contained ideas which require little other context and which of 
course express varying degrees of awareness of film. A small sample of such 
articles includes “The Elusive Quality,” “Photodrama and the Child,” 
                                            
18 “Comments on the Film Subjects,” Moving Picture World 3, no. 15 (October 10, 1908): 279. 
My emphasis. 
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“Realism,” “Photoplay Realism: An Optimistic View,” “New Functions of the 
Motion Picture,” “Problems in Pictures,” “The Compelling Harmony of the 
Whole,” and “Art in Moving Pictures.” 19  Although these arguments are 
interesting in themselves as film discourse, offering reflections on film as art, 
the purpose of cinema, and its future, I would like to emphasize here other 
features that point to the issue of language use becoming a pressing concern 
for writers. As many film historians know, especially those interested in 
finding interesting examples of early film discourse, article titles are often 
misleading in terms of actual content. Sometimes an ambitious idea indicated 
in the title is barely mentioned in the article, suggesting in some cases the 
presence of an intuition that has not yet found a means of expression (and 
thus, like journal titles and section headings, article titles also suggest a 
conscious process not apparent in the discourse). The preponderance of 
invented terms or the formulation of compound terms is a reflection of a 
search, sometimes conveyed with a tone of frustration directed at others 
(filmmakers, journals, the public), for a vocabulary or conceptual framework 
necessary for the expression of an underlying idea. A good example is Thomas 
                                            
19 Louis Reeves Harrison, “The Elusive Quality,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 8 (August 20, 
1910): 398; “Photodrama and the Child,” Moving Picture World (July 27, 1912): 322; and 
“Realism,” Moving Picture World 18, no. 10 (December 6, 1913): 1125; Jay Gove, “Photoplay 
Realism: An Optimistic View,” Moving Picture World 8, no. 13 (July 8, 1911): 1556–7; W. 
Stephen Bush, “New Functions of the Motion Picture,” Moving Picture World 13, no. 1 (July 
6, 1912): 21; “Problems in Pictures,” Moving Picture World 10, no. 11 (December 16, 1911): 
877; and “The Compelling Harmony of the Whole,” Moving Picture World 9, no. 2 (July 22, 
1911): 103; Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures.” 
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Bedding’s concept “moving picture photographs” (discussed more below) which 
combines two terms (“moving pictures” and “photographs”) in search of a third 
idea – film understood as a recording device.20 It is apparent in these texts 
that writers experimented, and struggled, with new ways of talking about 
film. This struggle sometimes met with failure or even ridicule, as Bedding 
himself noted (“I am often chided for my use of uncommon words”), 21 
illustrating the extent to which language was a source of attention and 
concern for both writers and readers. 
Another feature of these articles is the introduction of terms that do not follow 
standard definitions of their time, or that the authors intended in their 
context. The usage points to an intention that has not fully taken shape. A 
word that captures this tension well is “art,” which normally carried the 
meaning of “craft,” but which in some contexts seems to connote something 
more, namely the idea of “creation” essential to the definition of art today. To 
return to an article discussed in the Introduction, perhaps no text displays 
this better than Hulfish’s oft-cited “Art in Moving Pictures,” which reveals a 
conflict between the conceptual frameworks of art as “craft” or “creation,” and 
that of film as recording device or constructed object. Hulfish opens his 
                                            
20  Thomas Bedding, “Pictorialism and the Picture,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 11 
(September 10, 1910): 566–7. 
21 Thomas Bedding, “The Sentiment of the Moving Picture,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 10 
(September 3, 1910): 509. 
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discussion by presenting a dictionary definition of the word “art” in order to 
determine whether film fits into this category. However, the definition he 
presents does not yet include the notion of “creation,” something which 
Hulfish seems to sense is necessary. He writes, for example, of pictures 
expressing “thoughts” and of having “authors” – clear allusions to the idea 
that films are creations, not transparent windows, conveying some form of 
intentional meaning. But even as the article employs suggestive terms that 
touch on the idea of “film as art,” Hulfish’s argument is grounded in the 
concept of “film as a recording device.” He affirms this contradictory idea 
when he writes, “[Photography] should be considered in motography [roughly 
meaning “the recording side of filmmaking should be considered”] as merely 
the means for placing before the audience the thoughts of the author of the 
picture as embodied in changing scenes, the art of the picture being developed 
fully in the scenes themselves before the motion picture camera is placed 
before them.” 22  This excerpt also nicely illustrates the struggle writers 
displayed in finding an effective language for talking about film. Although 
each of the terms, once parsed, seem to indicate distinct things – 
“photography” is the process through which “motion picture cameras” produce 
“moving pictures,” each of which form part of “motography” (something on the 
order of “filmmaking”) – later in the article the same terms come to mean 
                                            
22 Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” 139. My emphasis. 
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different things. For instance, at one point Hulfish suggests “art in a motion 
picture must exist prior to the photographing of the picture.”23 Further on, he 
says, “the picture to be motographed must be studied in values of neutral 
shade.”24 Both of these examples define “picture” as something that exists 
before and after the photographic process, contradicting his earlier 
distinction. The term “motography” is also transformed into a verb (“to 
motograph”) and used in a similar sense as “to photograph.” In such a 
linguistic situation, where many overlapping terms are presented, it is not 
always easy to identify the concept the author has in mind when using a 
particular term. This is the challenge of reading early writing about film. A 
linguistic terrain in constant movement is one that contains exciting 
conceptual possibilities, revealing in the differences, slippages and misuses, a 
conscious process not only of gradually becoming aware of the complex nature 
of film but also of actively inventing ways of thinking and talking about it. 
The third region – film criticism – is perhaps the most complex because much 
of what occurs in this realm of language is, like the first region, stated 
without explanation, but additionally consists of far more complex attempts at 
describing films. Since conceptualizations of film are usually not mentioned in 
the descriptions, an analysis of the concepts requires a sort of appreciation of 
                                            
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 140. 
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the “cluster” of words entering the description that seem to share a common 
notion or intention, what Edward Branigan refers to as a “grammar of an 
ensemble of words.”25 For instance, starting in 1909, there appear many key 
words we associate with the act of interpretation, such as “illustrates,” 
“represents,” “theme,” “suggests,” “central thought,” “inference,” “purpose,” 
“intention.” 26 Thus, a change in approach to criticism, that is, a tendency 
toward interpretation, is an indication of a particular type of film awareness.   
Thomas Bedding’s article “Pictorialism and the Picture” (1910) offers an 
interesting case study. In this article, Bedding attempts to distinguish 
between the two already-mentioned dominant paradigms that defined much 
of the criticism from the period, that is, the “moving picture photograph” (film 
as a recording device) and the “moving picture” (film as a constructed 
object).27 For Bedding, the creator of a “moving picture” is someone “imbued 
with the sentiment of his subject,” meaning a person able to understand the 
subject of the film through the process of feelings, which are then introduced 
                                            
25 “I believe that a ‘theory of film’ may be thought of as the grammar of an ensemble of words, 
such as frame, shot, camera, point of view, editing, style, realism, auteur, performance, 
spectatorship, and medium specificity, accompanied by selected radial extensions of these 
words. I believe that a film theory is not simply a set of objective propositions about film, 
because “film” – that is, the grammar (the vocabulary) of the words that described film – is 
not fixed, but is tied to culture, value and a consensus about, for example, the present 
boundaries of the medium (i.e., the properties we select that presently interest us relating to 
the materials of the medium) as well as the present ideas that are used to ‘clarify our 
experience of film’.” Branigan, Projecting a Camera, 115–16. 
26 Taken from a number of reviews from 1909–10, including the one quoted below. 
27 Bedding, “Pictorialism and the Picture.” 
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into the image as a sort of truth waiting to be discovered.28 A second feature of 
“moving pictures” is that such pictures comply with “the definite laws of 
composition, balance and all the rest of the elements that go to make up a 
picture of any kind.” 29 This is in “contradistinction,” Bedding argues, to 
photographs, which merely offer impartial recordings of things, described as 
“a cartographical transcript of the original.” 30 The third feature of “moving 
pictures” is that they are noticeably absent of “staginess and theatricality,” 
tending towards a “naturalistic effect.” 31 To illustrate this idea, Bedding 
offers a description of D.W. Griffith’s A Summer Idyl (1910), highlighting a 
scene that represents pictorialism, which indeed seems to have triggered his 
thinking about the idea: “A city man of Bohemian proclivities is rejected by 
the coquettish woman of his choice. He hikes to the country to forget his 
sorrow and meets and falls in love with the daughter of a well-to-do farmer. 
To continue his wooing he seeks and obtains employment on the farm, and 
here the photographer shows us many interesting views of farm life, with 
Cupid in attendance.”32 
The use of “photographer” in this context calls attention for a number of 
reasons. It was quite rare for critics at the time to make reference to any kind 
                                            
28 Ibid., 566. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 567. 
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of “causal-figure” (artist, author, creator, etc.) in the context of describing a 
situation occurring in a film, in the way that today one attributes the 
appearance of a scene to a director, which constitutes an implicit 
acknowledgment that the scene is the product of someone’s intentions. It also 
calls our attention because if one considers that Bedding is describing the film 
from the vantage point of a viewer watching the scenes unfold, the 
photographer is not responsible for the appearance of the images that follow 
at that very moment, whether considered in the present, which is to say, 
during the screening, or when considered as an entity implicated in the 
production of the film at a previous point in time. We might consider it a 
logical use if, say, there was a pan, and therefore a change in framing that 
occurred as a direct consequence of the photographer’s actions. But since 
there is a cut in the scene and an ellipse in time, it means the photographer 
must shift in place and time to arrive at the point where “here the 
photographer shows us” a new scene (unless the edit took place in the camera, 
or he was himself the director, which is another story). Eventually, through 
this process of reasoning, although one tends to see this intuitively, one 
arrives at the conclusion that the term “photographer,” in this context, does 
not make sense as a literal statement since the appearance of the scene at 
that moment is not directly attributable to the photographer, at least in the 
sense outlined. 
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Nevertheless, there is a way in which this usage is not entirely incoherent 
either, at least, it should not strike modern readers as necessarily strange. 
This is because “photographer” in this passage assumes a metaphorical 
function, not dissimilar to the way “camera,” as Branigan argues, is 
sometimes used precisely in moments where one attributes a change in scene 
to something, not necessarily a technical apparatus, but rather to a presence 
of some kind, often with human-like traits, such as intentions, which, 
precisely again, shows us images that are presumably presented as 
meaningful.33 Like the “camera,” the photographer in this passage comes into 
existence in the process of describing the scene, since, as noted, the 
photographer is neither present during the screening, nor does the 
photographer cause the appearance of the images at that moment. Some other 
process of manipulation has ostensibly taken place, namely editing, between 
the time the photographer shot the images and the time the sequence was 
constructed in the manner Bedding describes. Branigan suggests that “the 
use of the word ‘camera’ by a spectator shows only that he or she knows a film 
is a construction that should not be confused with reality.”34 This observation 
                                            
33 Branigan quotes Dudley Andrew’s analysis of F.W. Murnau’s Sunrise (1927) to illustrate 
how “camera” is employed as having human-like agency and intentions: “Later, the man, back 
to us, wanders toward the marsh, and the camera, full of our desire, initiates one of the most 
complex and thrilling movements in all of cinema.” Another example, this time from Kaja 
Silverman and Harun Farocki’s comments on Godard’s Le mépris (Contempt, 1963): “The 
camera seems to want to show us how distant it is from him [Paul], in every sense of the 
word.” Branigan, Projecting a Camera, 59, 83. 
34 Ibid., 93. 
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fits with the general line of argument that certain words communicate 
awareness without necessarily stating this explicitly. What is revealed here in 
a sense is a “way of talking” about film, but more precisely, a way of talking 
about the causes of things occurring in films, which requires an intention of 
some kind to be logically congruent with the idea that these things are 
meaningful. In fact, the particular scene Bedding highlights is quite 
meaningful to him because it illustrates (and also seems to be the origins of) 
his reflection on pictorialism discussed in the same article in which this 
description appears. 
Bedding’s example can be contrasted with another example from the period, 
one which introduces another word that has much the same function 
(formulated almost in the same way), but which suggests a different kind of 
awareness of film causes. In the criticism of D.W. Griffith’s A Country Cupid 
(1911), the critic uses the term “scenario writer” on three occasions to refer to 
the cause of a particular event: 
He enters and points the revolver at her; tells her that he intends to 
shoot her and himself and that both will be found together. It is not 
until here that the scenario writer puts in a scene showing that the 
hero has the letter from the school teacher making-up after the 
quarrel. . . . 
But, and here again the scenario writer showed wisdom, the idiot 
has no fear of the revolver and the teacher doesn’t want to shoot 
him. . . . 
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Here the scenario writer is a little weak; for measuring the time 
that the hero had to come to the schoolhouse in by the time the idiot 
spent talking to the teacher, we feel that he wouldn’t have got 
there.35 
The use of “scenario writer” and “photographer” in these contexts points to 
contrasting ways of imagining the causes of a particular effect observed on 
screen – “scenario writer” refers to a cause occurring at an earlier moment in 
the film production process, while “photographer” refers to an immediate 
cause which seems to exclude the production process, as if the film was 
presented at that moment as a live performance.  
 
3. Regions of Self-consciousness 
In addition to these various levels of film awareness, early film publication 
writers displayed significant self-awareness including their identity as writers 
and thinkers, the place they occupied in relation to the public, exhibition and 
film, and their language used for the purposes of defining and making sense 
of film. Such awareness is evident in three distinct regions of discourse and 
activity. The first, alluded to in the Introduction, can be characterized as a 
“metacritical” discourse on film criticism. Starting in 1909, critics turned their 
attention to the emerging practice of writing about film, which continued as a 
                                            
35 Moving Picture World 13, no. 15 (August 12, 1911): 375. 
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topic of discussion for the years to follow.36 In their articles, the logic, purpose 
and nature of the criticism and, most interestingly, the obstacles encountered 
as writers, are explained. Stephen Bush’s “Advertising and Criticising” 
directly addressed the question of objectivity raised by the fact that film 
producers advertised in the very journals in which their films received 
criticism, warning “if producers of films are under the impression that liberal 
use of advertising columns will in any way influence the criticisms of this 
paper, they are harbouring a misconception.”37 Maintaining independence 
from the interests of the industry was important because, as Bush explained 
in another article, “to attain its highest usefulness criticism must point out 
ethical errors,” such as the making of “sectarian pictures” or attempts by 
“producers of one nationality to portray either the social life or the history of 
                                            
36 In addition to the articles of this category mentioned below, the following are examples of 
this tendency: “The Press and the Moving Picture,” The Moving Picture World 4, no. 12 
(March 20, 1909): 325; “The Press and the Picture,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 20 
(November 12, 1910): 1124; “The Critic,” Moving Picture World 6, no. 2 (January 15, 1910): 
48; “Film Criticism in the Lay Press,” Moving Picture World 9, no. 20 (May 20, 1911): 1113; 
W. Stephen Bush,  “Suggestions to a Worried Critic,” Moving Picture World 10, no. 10 
(December 9, 1911). 
37 W. Stephen Bush, “Advertising and Criticising,” Moving Picture World 14, no. 8 (November 
23, 1912): 750. See also Louis Reeves Harrison, “Advertising, Boosting and Criticism,” Moving 
Picture World 15, no. 14 (March 29, 1913): 1313. These articles were also a means of 
affirming the status of trade publications, as The New York Dramatic Mirror illustrates: “But 
most important. . . . is the policy The Mirror has adopted, of impartially criticising new films 
as they are presented to the public.” “Reviews of Films Commended: ‘The Mirror’ is 
Complimented for its Impartial Criticisms – Improvement in Film Advocated,” New York 
Dramatic Mirror 59, no. 1540 (June 27, 1908): 7. Frank Woods, under the pseudonym 
“Spectator” regularly raised this issue in his columns “Spectator’s Comments,” for example, 
vol. 61, no. 1586 (May 15, 1909): 15. 
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another nationality.”38 However, despite such calls for the utility of criticism, 
there was significant uncertainty about the precise means through which 
criticism was to effect change, especially considering that film was both a 
fixed and easily replaced object compared to other forms of entertainment. As 
one frustrated film critic noted: “Perhaps the film critic of a metropolitan 
paper will never be able to work as much havoc in the picture trade as he has 
done before in the theatrical line. By this edict the dramatic critic has done, or 
undone in the past, many productions costing thousands of dollars.”39 It was 
on such grounds that Motography announced the closure of its film criticism 
department, concluding “criticism of a film after that film has been released, 
or at best just before it is released, can by no possible means help that 
particular subject.”40 Although most critics understood that the effect of film 
criticism occurred over time, by affecting the production of future films, it was 
Louis Reeves Harrison who first clearly articulated another definition of 
criticism, which remains today one of its primary and more specialized 
functions. 
Over a series of articles, “Mr. Critic” (1911), “The Art of Criticism” (1914) and 
“Reviewing Photoplays” (1914), Harrison argued in favor of a more 
                                            
38 W. Stephen Bush, “Critic, Producer and Exhibitor,” Moving Picture World 14, no. 7 
(November 17, 1912): 637. 
39 “Film Criticism in the Lay Press,” Moving Picture World 8, no. 18 (May 20, 1911): 1113. 
40 “Film Criticism,” Motography (August 1911): 56, repr. in Anthony Slide, ed., Selected Film 
Criticism 1896–1911 (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press), 116. 
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interpretive approach to film criticism, which included discovering a film’s 
“vital meaning.”41 The turn represented a radical change in orientation. In the 
first years of trade journal criticism, between roughly 1907 and 1910, critics 
placed a strong emphasis on representing public opinion, which obviously 
supported a prescriptive approach.42 The film industry had a vested interest 
in responding to public preferences and in this regard took critics seriously. 
Harrison challenged this imperative, arguing that “it is no longer necessary to 
consider the audience.” 43   Instead, he envisioned a more personal, 
impressionistic criticism that emphasized “the discovery of a true spiritual 
element in the story.”44 This was a significant public statement, especially 
coming from a critic writing in a trade journal whose main function was 
ostensibly to evaluate the commercial viability of films. In any case, Harrison 
was on safe ground at this point. The turn toward interpretation, which began 
in earnest around 1910, may have been precipitated by Harrison himself, 
                                            
41 Louis Reeves Harrison, “The Art of Criticism,” Moving Picture World 19, no. 5 (January 30, 
1914): 521. See also “Mr. Critic,” Moving Picture World 10, no. 4 (October 28, 1911): 274 and 
“Reviewing Photoplays,” Moving Picture World 22, no. 13 (December 19, 1914): 1652. 
42 “In many instances the critics seek to establish their impressions as those of the audience 
about them.” “Film and Critics,” Film Reports (October 1, 1910): 8, repr. in Slide, Selected 
Film Criticism, 115. Another example: “In defence of the critiques we say that they must be 
taken as an expression of public opinion.” “Comments on Film Subjects,” Moving Picture 
World 3, no. 15 (October 10, 1908): 279. Nickelodeon was perhaps most adamant on this 
point: “There is but one true test of any moving picture. If it pleases the public, it is an 
unqualified success. It matters not whether the subject be comic, dramatic, or educational.” 
“Criticising Moving Pictures,” Nickelodeon 2, no. 4 (October 1909): 103. 
43 Harrison, “Reviewing Photoplays,” 1652. 
44 Ibid. 
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although we cannot know for sure since most critics published reviews 
anonymously. 
Of course, not everyone expressed agreement with Harrison’s views on film 
criticism. Their expressions not only give us valuable insight into the way 
critics at the time imagined the practice of writing about film, but also insight 
into the significant awareness critics had of each other. In one especially 
salient example, a writer from Film Reports actually quoted a review from 
another journal (Moving Picture World), calling the author “an amusing 
instance of a useless critic.”45 The reasons he offers for holding such an 
opinion tell a revealing story about the situation of film criticism around 
1910. On the surface, the case is clear-cut: the Film Reports writer is bothered 
by the fact the review makes neither reference to the production quality of the 
film nor whether an audience might actually enjoy the film. An exhibitor, the 
writer notes, would not find such a review useful (which was one of the 
explicit functions of reviews). The review focuses instead on the potentially 
dangerous message of a particular scene – a duel – described as representing 
“an exaggerated notion of honor.”46 The fact the film is French (Entre le devoir 
et l’honneur [Between Duty and Honor, Éclair, 1910]) has obvious impact on 
the reviewer’s opinion. When he writes “such pictures have little meaning in 
                                            
45 “Film and Critics,” 115. 
46 Quoted in “Film and Critics,” 115. 
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this country” it is presented more as advice to American readers than an 
objective observation. 47  Nevertheless, the reviewer is satisfied that the 
message of the film will do “comparatively little harm”; since both men are 
killed, “the glamor of the bravado which goes with a duel” is “destroyed.”48 
The critique of the review reveals the rules governing early film criticism and 
the inherent tension Harrison identified, that is, references to the commercial 
viability of films and to audience appreciation were the essential functions of 
criticism; the meaning or messages of films much less so. The fact such 
distinctions were so clearly apparent in 1910 is a strong indication of the self-
consciousness of critics. But the truly fascinating aspect of the Film Reports 
criticism of the Moving Picture World review lies elsewhere. What most 
annoyed the writer, and the likely source of the scathing tone, is that the 
reviewer was seen as getting the interpretation of the duel wrong: “Some 
people, however, like to see a duel represented, and disagree with the critic as 
to the merits of the custom. As a matter of fact, a view of a real French duel is 
interesting as a study of foreign customs.” 49 Leaving aside that the Film 
Reports writer sees the duel in a fiction film as “real” (which tells us 
something about the writer’s film and cultural awareness); and leaving aside 
that both seem to be arguing about categorically different things (the reviewer 
                                            
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 116. 
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is commenting on the message of the duel, whereas the Film Reports writer is 
more interested in its educational value), the intrigue lies in what is disclosed 
as institutional activity: the public criticism of the opinion of another critic on 
the meaning or value of a particular scene in a film. There are many examples 
of critics of the time having different opinions about the same film, and 
several examples of critics referring to one another, but it is very likely this is 
the only example of a writer from the period actually citing the entirety of a 
review and engaging in this type of detailed analytical attention. 
While these articles engaged in a fairly open debate about the sometimes 
noble purposes of film criticism, there was obviously an underlying economic 
imperative of affirming the value of criticism, and especially of film critics, 
who stood to gain more stability by engaging in a type of discourse that 
required expertise, and which gradually served as a founding premise for the 
institutionalization of film studies (becoming a building block of academic 
discourse, as scholars like Bordwell have identified).50 Finally, it should be 
noted that these writers referred to their practice as film criticism and to 
themselves as film critics, details sometimes omitted by scholars who have 
implicitly denied these critics the type of self-awareness illustrated in these 
                                            
50 David Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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texts, often through a form of labeling the critics “reporters” or their texts 
“plot summaries”.51 
The second region of self-awareness emerges from the critics’ practice of 
studying audience reception, which not only seems radically to change the 
form of film criticism in these years, but also the way the writers conceived of 
themselves in relation to film, context and audience. As representatives of 
public opinion, critics were initially expected to survey audience reception and 
to accurately report responses, but in doing so, the task proved more 
complicated than imagined. As one critic wrote, “it is extremely difficult for 
experienced critics to tell what those in front think of this or that 
presentation.”52 This difficulty may have been partially the result of narrative 
cinema becoming a more absorbing experience, and films being exhibited in 
more upscale theaters as opposed to the rowdier nickelodeons.53 Along the 
same lines, another Moving Picture World article attributed it to the 
internalization of reactions, noting that the audience was “in a more 
thoughtful mood, and their enjoyment and appreciation cannot be translated 
                                            
51 Myron Osborn Lounsbury, The Origins of American Film Criticism, 1909–1939 (New York: 
Arno Press, 1973), 3. 
52 Louis Reeves Harrison, “The Highbrow,” Moving Picture World 9, no. 10 (September 16, 
1911): 775. 
53 “A picture that is received in stony silence at one theatre is very often applauded in 
another. There are many reasons for this. The temperament and mental calibre vary with 
different localities.” “Commenting on the Films,” Moving Picture World 8, no. 15 (April 15, 
1911): 814. 
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into applause.”54 Moreover, not only were gestures of appreciation changing, 
but sometimes the same film produced radically divergent reactions, 
something which awakened critics to the complex reality of film exhibition. 
The following excerpt displays the level of attention critics exercised during 
exhibitions, almost performing the role of a researcher controlling the 
variables to ensure the conclusion – that audience reaction was unpredictable 
– was valid: “In illustration of this I may cite a peculiar instance, rarely 
found, of two plays by the same author, performed by the same company 
under the same director, and both favourably reported by the critics. The first 
was received in silence and evoked faint applause. The second awakened 
enthusiasm from the outset and an unusual demonstration at the end. The 
natural conclusion was that one was partially successful, while the other met 
with emphatic approval, yet careful inquiry among members of the audience 
discovered widespread preference for the unapplauded piece.”55 
Thus, the notion of an accessible spectator who could be easily understood and 
described clashed with the data discovered in the field. In fact, awareness of 
the reception context extended beyond just realizing that audience reaction, 
once internalized, could no longer be investigated, other than through 
interviews, as Harrison remarks. It also included realizing that film reception 
                                            
54 “The Picture the Audience Likes,” Moving Picture World 8, no. 6 (February 11, 1911): 310. 
55 Harrison, “The Highbrow,” 775. 
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was partially determined by the context and by the order in which the film 
was presented in the program: “Where vaudeville is interspersed with the 
pictures, the act preceding a picture has an effect on its reception. If it was a 
good act and applauded, the picture following may suffer by comparison. Just 
as frequently the contrary is the case.” 56  Furthermore, it included 
understanding that repeated viewing of the same film in diverse contexts 
produced a distinctive type of film experience, thus “[the critic] often finds it 
impossible to agree with himself after seeing a picture again under different 
circumstances.”57 
These experiences in the field impacted film criticism in various ways. 
Understandably, references to audience reactions became less frequent in the 
criticism. Consequently, the opinions of critics, grounded in personal 
impressions, were emphasized. Additionally, the two main reasons for 
pursuing film criticism, informing exhibitors about the entertainment value of 
films (which depended on understanding the audience) and prescribing 
changes to filmmaking practices (which required having a grasp of whether 
the film was good or bad, something these multiple viewings and contexts 
confounded) encountered some logistical difficulties. These circumstances 
explain, to some degree, the turn towards criticism (illustrated in the previous 
                                            
56 “Commenting on the Films,” 814. 
57 Ibid. 
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section) that combined an interpretive approach with an awareness of the 
audience, although not attempting to represent audience opinions. 
Significantly, it also turned critics’ attention towards themselves as the 
source of justification for offering criticism. In short, awareness of film 
reception affirmed the identity of the critic as a relevant part of the process of 
determining the way film was going to be thought about. 
Finally, there are signs of a third region of self-awareness in which some 
writers commented on the language used for defining cinema, such as when 
Bedding mentions being “chided” for his use of “uncommon words.” It is 
already common knowledge among film historians that early cinema 
participants used a multitude of terms to designate “film” (or aspects of film), 
some derived from the technology involved in the recording of the images (for 
example, “kinematograph,” “motography”), others derived from the motion 
picture effect (“moving pictures,” “animated pictures,” “motion pictures”). All 
seemed to have been used at one point in journal titles. As narrative films 
became more important, one of the first consciously created terms to gain 
currency was “photoplay,”58  although it never managed to replace other 
                                            
58 In “There Is Everything in a Name: What the Essanay Contest Means,” Moving Picture 
World encouraged the selection of a name that was going to be “clean, good, ennobling […] 
and if possible, universally understood.” Moving Picture World remained convinced that “the 
very life of a business [was] going to be helped or prejudiced by the result.” Moving Picture 
World 7, no. 8 (August 20, 1910): 400. See also “The New Name, Photoplay,” Moving Picture 
World 7, no. 17 (October 22, 1910): 933. 
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terms, only adding to the array of already existing designations. G. Dureau, 
who noted that the abundance of film terminology was contributing to a 
situation where “we don’t understand ourselves,” argued the point, initially, 
from a commercial perspective, writing “the words that express these things 
are today insufficient to cover the necessities of commercial relations . . . we 
do not even know how to name correctly the instruments, the vital mechanical 
parts of the apparatus of motography.”59 Particularly interesting is that, in 
addition to arguing for the implementation of a universal, cross-cultural 
vocabulary, the article is an English translation of someone making all these 
points in his native French language, highlighting more precisely the 
different ways of conceptualizing aspects of film, something which has 
remained true between French and English to this day. One thinks of “gros 
plan” (large shot) and “close-up,” which are two different ways of 
conceptualizing the same basic element of film, one from the point of view of 
the size of the image, and the other from the proximity of the camera to the 
object. Thus, many French terms do not necessarily find equivalents in the 
English translation, creating a kind of “third language” of mistranslated 
terms (a genre of discourse in itself). In lamenting the number of terms for 
“film,” Dureau remarks: “The purchasers of ‘films’. . . . employ without 
distinction the most varied expressions. . . . ‘Have you any pellicles [sic] for 
                                            
59 Dureau, “Moving Picture Babel,” 35. 
 90 
sale?’ or ‘strips of pictures,’ or ‘reels,’ or ‘tableau ribbons,’ etc.”60 All of these 
are literal translations of the French terms. Dureau especially takes issue 
with the “incoherence” of the professional titles of “workers in motography” 
such as calling the “projector” (by which he means the photographer) an 
“operator” (the French term for “taker of views”), a situation he found “both 
ridiculous and barbarous.”61 
Other writers similarly turned their attention to language, either in an 
attempt to clarify the meaning of a particular term, or to understand the 
object of cinema on the basis of analyzing the existing words for talking about 
it. As noted, this was the case with Hulfish’s “Art in Moving Pictures” who, on 
the basis of examining the dictionary definition of the word “art” in relation to 
film, came to understand something about what made cinema specific, such as 
its almost magical ability to transport audiences: “The motion camera is the 
audience, and the audience, therefore, may be taken by the artist into any 
viewpoint, at any distance from cities or civilization.”62 We might define this 
tendency as a “pragmatic” element in early film discourse, which gradually 
concerns itself more with aesthetic terms, and which is extremely valuable for 
                                            
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” 139. The dictionary he cites is A Standard Dictionary of 
the English Language (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1905). There are other examples of this 
type of attention to words, such as Bedding’s early quote regarding being chided for his use of 
uncommon words. 
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historians interested in understanding the meaning of language at very 
particular historical junctures and contexts – something which normally 
would have to be reconstructed, especially with ambiguous terms like “art” 
that varied significantly in meaning. Hulfish’s own reflection on the word 
“art” in relation to cinema was prompted precisely because of his attention to 
language, noting that it was a term “used from time to time” in relation to 
film. This is an intriguing statement because we have very few documents 
today that demonstrate Hulfish’s observation. Thus, Hulfish’s attention to the 
language use offers us an entrance point toward describing a language reality 
that remains, to a significant degree, invisible to us, other than through these 
types of observations. 
 
4. Methodological Implications  
This chapter has attempted to establish a different approach toward thinking 
about early film publications. There has been a tendency to think of these 
journals, especially because of their status as “trade” publications, as adopting 
a particular set of commercially motivated concerns, conventions and 
approaches to film. In this scenario, criticism is often seen as consisting of 
summaries and critics as fairly passive reporters. Trade publications generate 
less excitement than, let us say, coming across the oft-cited works of Ricciotto 
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Canudo.63 While this is indeed a productive interpretive framework, the fact 
these early journals consist of a collectivity of individuals, who produce 
regular comments, extending over a period of many years, and which display 
a diverse use of language, means the journals constitute a body of evidence for 
studying a “movement of consciousness.” 64   In such an interpretive 
framework, everything appearing in a journal – not just the more attractive 
components, such as articles – is a potential sign indicating a conscious 
process. An explanation, comment or even the use of a single word in one 
journal will enable us to understand the logic for using a particular way of 
thinking or approach in another. In looking at these texts together, in seeing 
them as representing a social world or institution, we gain a sense of a 
consciousness emerging along side of film. Significantly, assertions about this 
consciousness are justified through a substantial set of material evidence. Far 
too often, references are made to “experiences” in early cinema that stand on 
comparatively little evidence: the first hand report of a witness at a screening 
(the critic or reporter) or a single piece of text that provides one data point, 
one individual’s experience, but from which an explanation of public reception 
is derived.  
                                            
63 Especially his 1911 “The Birth of a Sixth Art,” in French Film Theory and Criticism: A 
History/Anthology 1907–1939, edited by Richard Abel (Princeton University Press, 1993), 58–
66. 
64 See footnote 48 in the Introduction for quote and reference from Nigel Rapport and Joanna 
Overing.  
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An example of this latter use of evidence occurs in Janet Staiger’s study 
Interpreting Films: Studies in the Historical Reception of Cinema, an 
important methodological guide for film historians interested in early film 
discourses that insists on a contextual and empirically based approach for the 
study of film reception, but which seems to diverge from this model in one 
especially interesting passage that illustrates the fragility of early film 
criticism evidence in advancing any type of general claim about public 
experience.65 In this passage, Staiger draws a general conclusion based on a 
film review of The “Teddy” Bears (Edwin Porter, 1907): 
Evidence indicates that when those [early cinema] audiences failed 
to recognize an intertextual reference necessary for the plot, they 
might evaluate the film as unsuccessful. For example, in discussing 
current cultural allusions in the 1907 film The “Teddy” Bears, 
[Charles] Musser believes the conclusion of the film is a satirical 
reference to Teddy Roosevelt’s hunting exploits in which Roosevelt 
was accused of going after easy targets. Musser points out that a 
Variety critic seems to have missed this joke.”66  
The infamous story of President Theodore Roosevelt’s hunting trip occurred in 
1902, in which he was later portrayed, most notably in a political cartoon, as 
having refused to shoot a defenceless bear, though nevertheless condoning its 
merciful killing. It was apparently this cartoon, and especially the endearing 
drawing of the bear, that spurned the phenomenon of teddy bears, to which 
                                            
65 Janet Staiger, Interpreting Films: Studies in the Historical Reception of Cinema (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).  
66 Staiger, Interpreting Films, 121. 
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Roosevelt’s name and legend would henceforward be associated.67 Because 
The “Teddy” Bears combines several unrelated texts, requiring spectators to 
make connections beyond the information supplied by the film itself, it is 
understandable that Staiger sees the reception of the film as being especially 
revealing of the way early audiences negotiated intertexuality. In notes 
prepared for the DVD release of The “Teddy” Bears, Scott Simmon’s offers a 
compelling account of the challenging spectator position the film appears to 
create:  
Part charming fairy tale, part violent political satire, and part 
accomplished puppet animation, The “Teddy” Bears may strike us 
now as a bizarre mix. 
In a sense, this film asked its audience to provide its unity. Many 
early films relied for full comprehension on viewers’ knowledge of 
preexisting stories and popular fashions. But this one stretched the 
audience to the limit, asking for knowledge of the English fairy tale 
“Goldilocks and the Three Bears” and an the [sic] incident in 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s life as a hunter that led to the Teddy 
bear craze in the first place. According to the story, Roosevelt had 
gallantly refused to shoot a small wounded bear during a 1902 
hunting trip.68 
A viewing of the film clearly supports Simmon’s assertion. Roosevelt is never 
directly mentioned or referred to, neither in titles, nor in a familiar visual icon 
(such as the White House) that would signal such a fact, though one notes 
                                            
67 Linda Mullins, The Teddy Bear Men: Theodore Roosevelt & Clifford Berryman, Historical 
Guide for Collectors (Cumberland, MD: Hobby House Press, Inc, 1987). 
68 Martin Marks, http://www.filmpreservation.org/dvds-and-books/clips/the-teddy-bears-1907. 
Originally published in the booklet accompanying the DVD More treasures from American 
film archives 1894-1931 (United States: Image Entertainment, 2004). 
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that the hunter in the film does bear Roosevelt’s likeness. Near the end of the 
film, as Goldilocks is chased down a path by bears (obviously costumed 
actors), a moustached hunter, appearing for the first time in the film, 
suddenly enters the scene from off-screen, framed in long shot and profile, 
shooting several bears, and sparing the youngest at Goldilocks’ request. If this 
scene is indeed a reference to the Roosevelt story, one could certainly conclude 
the film produces an information gap requiring “pre-existing” knowledge from 
the viewer in order to understand its connection to Roosevelt.  
Therefore, Staiger’s assertion that “evidence indicates that when those [early 
cinema] audiences failed to recognize an intertextual reference necessary for 
the plot, they might evaluate the film as unsuccessful” appears to depend on 
the following set of premises: one, that the evidence shows audiences failed to 
recognize the reference to Roosevelt; two, that based on this fact the film is 
evaluated as unsuccessful; and three, that such a conclusion offers a 
characterization of early audiences that is particular enough not to apply to 
all audiences. This is to say, why would early cinema audiences, as opposed to 
modern audiences, evaluate films as “unsuccessful” based on missing 
intertextual evidence? It seems a truism that missing the intended satire or 
parody of a story, whether in 1907 or 2015, will produce a vastly different 
reading of the film than should satire be detected.  Nevertheless, this 
sequence of premises reveals the process through which a brief text from 1907 
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becomes knowledge about early film spectatorship generally. The swiftness 
with which this conclusion is drawn is an indication of the attitude taken 
towards these texts, and perhaps an assumption about the naïve 
consciousness producing this evidence (which renders it transposable onto the 
population at large).  
The evidence Staiger refers to, as mentioned, is a Variety critic’s review of the 
film (signed “Simi”, most probably Sime Silverman, the editor), which offered 
the following evaluation of the hunter scene in question: 
The closing pictures showing the pursuit of the child by the bear 
family [sic] is spoiled through a hunter appearing on the scene and 
shooting two. Children will rebel against this position. Considerable 
comedy is had through a chase in the snow, but the live bears 
seemed so domesticated that the deliberate murder in an obviously 
“faked” series left a wrong taste of the picture as a whole.69 
Although this excerpt can be construed as evidence of someone in 1907 
missing the intertextual reference to Roosevelt, it is only because Roosevelt is 
not specifically mentioned, which is not necessarily evidence of this latter fact. 
However, even if one accepts that this shows that someone in 1907 missed an 
intertextual reference, even if one interprets this fact as leading to a poor 
evaluation of the film, and even if, it should be noted, one accepts the actual 
comments of the reviewer as constituting the idea of “unsuccessful”, all of 
which are necessary to support the initial claim, on what grounds does this 
                                            
69 Quoted in Staiger, Interpreting Films, 121. 
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evidence represent anything other than this reviewer’s point of view, keeping 
in mind the absence of corroborating evidence? In other words, is it possible to 
make a general statement about audiences based on this review? This 
methodological step may be justifiable in some reception studies, especially 
when corroborated by other similar pieces of evidence that suggests the 
audience saw the film in the same way, but it would also seem quite 
important to consider the particular institutional conditions that might 
motivate a critic to emphasize certain features of film, which would obviously 
result in a different film experience, compared to say the public.70 
It is, after all, the point of view of a single writer, constrained by the 
institutional standards influencing trade journal criticism at the time, which 
included a tendency, in the United States, toward prescriptive criticism and 
moralizing;71 that is, the trade press began envisioning itself as a sort of 
                                            
70 This point about whether it is possible to take a review as a representation of general 
spectatorship is nevertheless complicated by one important fact: critics were tasked with the 
job of conveying public opinion. A 1910 article observed, for example: “In many instances the 
critics seek to establish their impressions as those of the audience about them.” However, 
references to the public diminished quickly, and never really achieved the type of impressions 
referred to by this writer. “Film and Critics,” Film Reports (1 October 1910); 8-9. Quoted in 
Anthony Slide, ed., Selected Film Criticism 1896–1911 (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1982), 
116. 
71 Charlie Keil observes this “prescriptive” tendency in early film criticism in his study Early 
American Cinema in Transition: Story, Style, and Filmmaking, 1907-1913, Wisconsin Studies 
in Film (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001). I also discuss it in “Film Theory 
as Practice: Criticism and Interpretation in the Early American Trade Press,” in Proceedings 
of the XVI International Film Studies Conference-Permanent Seminar on History of Film 
Theories: In the Very Beginning, at the Very End, 2009, edited by Francesco Casetti and Jane 
Gaines (Udine: Forum, 2010): 83-93.     
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censorship bureau with the goal of undercutting the need for government 
intervention in the burgeoning film industry, to which the economic survival 
of journals was manifestly connected.72 Therefore, part of the goal of early 
film criticism was to indicate to the film industry those aspects of film that 
ought to be censored in future films in light of the larger strategy of 
maintaining the industry independent and profitable. Thus, the emphasis on 
the way children might negatively receive the film seems to correspond with 
the intended objective that certain moral standards needed to be met in order 
to legitimize cinema. In fact, Sime Silverman was likely the leading expert on 
the impact of film on children. His seven-year-old son, Skigie, had already 
been “publishing” a successful, though short-lived, column of film reviews in 
Variety since December 1905. Just a week after launching his well-known 
trade publication, the elder Silverman sensed an opportunity to symbolically 
enact the motto of his magazine—that reviews would “be written 
conscientiously, and the truth only told…if it hurts it is at least said in 
fairness and impartiality” — by making his son the subject of an unusual 
experiment. Silverman sent his son, presumably accompanied by an adult, to 
vaudeville shows, which at the time included film screenings as part of the 
act. Afterwards, Skigie would recount his experiences to family members, 
                                            
72 This interest is explicitly explained in W. Stephen Bush, “The Question of Censorship,” 
Moving Picture World (9 January 1909): 32, in which Bush provides a list of scenes that 
should be avoided, implicitly calling on film critics to take such scenes to task.  
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which would be published, verbatim, in a column titled “‘Skigie’. “The World’s 
Youngest Critic.” While intended to be humorous, another objective of the 
column was “to enable the artist to determine the impression he or his work 
leaves on the infantile mind.”73 (Incidentally, Skigie’s columns apparently 
enraged the subjects of his criticism).74  
Thus, “Simi” was actually quite a knowledgeable movie-goer, rather than a 
naïf, who regarded the film from the perspective of a child rather than an 
adult given its infantile subject matter. Moreover, it would have been 
surprising to find a film review of any kind in 1907 that acknowledged 
intertextual references or even paid attention to “implied meaning,” including 
the type presumably missed in this example, since it tended to concentrate on 
more immediate or explicit moral icons, which is to say shocking images or 
scenes, illicit affairs, violence, and so forth.75   
Secondly, and following from this point, one questions whether it is in fact 
possible for Simi to have missed this reference. Mentioned earlier is the fact 
that the film produces an “information gap” since it does not provide explicit 
                                            
73 These articles appear mostly in 1906 and include “‘Skigie’ Goes to Syracuse. Sees the Show 
at the Grand Opera House. Says it Smells Bad. Wants to Come Home” (January 6, 1906: 10), 
“‘Skigie’ at the Alhambra. Approves the Bill, But Dodges the Three Diamonds” (January 20, 
1906: 10) and “‘Skigie’ The Youngest Critic in the World, Goes to the Family Theatre — 
Says the Show There is Good” (February 17, 1906: 7). 
74 “‘Skigie Wants to Know. Are his Articles Offensive?”, Variety (January 13, 1906): 10. 
75 As W. Stephen Bush implies in his lengthy list of censorable scenes in “The Question of 
Censorship,” 32 
 100 
mention that the hunter scene refers to Roosevelt, thus creating the 
possibility that one could miss the reference, and consequently, not be aware 
the film is a satire. However, this information could have been, and almost 
certainly was, obtained by spectators through other channels. We already 
know that film lecturers at the time were responsible for filling-in just these 
types of narrative gaps for audiences, so it is likely that audiences were aware 
of the film was a satire of Roosevelt based simply on this practice existing at 
the time; but since no knowledge exists about the reception of this film in 
particular, one cannot safely conclude this information was made available 
through such means.  
The title also provides important clues about the intended genre and possible 
allusions. The mere fact teddy bears are featured in the film (in particular 
during a spectacular animation scene) and linked to Theodore Roosevelt in 
public consciousness seems compelling evidence in itself that the reference 
would be difficult to miss, although the degree to which the public was aware 
of the story would obviously need to be studied. “Teddy” is also conspicuously 
placed in quotation marks, announcing a double meaning, especially since 
Roosevelt was publically known as “Teddy” and not “Theodore.” However, the 
truly compelling evidence is located in the very field of discourse from which 
the review emerged, film trade publications, which makes a lack of awareness 
of this reference highly improbable. As argued in this chapter, all regions of a 
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journal provide clues about the awareness of writers, even if a text in 
particular fails to make mention of a given point. Indeed, it is in studying and 
understanding this fairly complex field of evidence, its rules, habits, language, 
and range of awareness, that isolated pieces of criticism become useful 
historical evidence in other ways.    
In this case, the most compelling evidence that it was nearly impossible for a 
critic operating within a film trade publication to have missed the fact the 
film was satire is the following: it is precisely in this way that the film was 
promoted. In an advertisement in the Moving Picture World, the film was 
promoted with the following text: “The “Teddy” Bears: A Laughable Satire on 
the Popular Craze” (See Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The “Teddy” Bears, Moving Picture World (March 16, 1907): 31 
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The promotion clearly announces the intended genre and topic of the film. 
Still, it remains a possibility that “satire” in this context refers strictly to the 
way teddy bears are represented in the film. But combined with another text, 
also appearing in the Moving Picture World, this possibility becomes unlikely. 
This is how the “Film Review” (which at this time, as mentioned earlier, were 
plot summaries manufacturers provided to the journal) described the scene in 
question: 
An exciting chase leads over hills, through deep snow, until finally 
Goldilocks strikes a road, which she follows. She soon has the good 
fortune to meet the great hunter, “Teddy”, to whom she hurriedly 
explains her predicament. The bears soon come within range. Teddy 
takes good aim, fires, and kills old father Bruin. . .76 
Considering that the hunter’s name is “Teddy” (even placed in quotation 
marks, thus completing the meaning of the title), the evidence conclusively 
shows that the film was promoted as a satire of the Roosevelt hunting story 
that initiated the teddy bear “craze”. It is unlikely that a spectator at the 
time, especially critics, would not have been aware of this extra-textual 
information. 
The point of examining this case study, as mentioned, is not to “correct” a 
historical fact, that is, to establish whether or not Simi was aware of the 
reference to Roosevelt in The “Teddy” Bears, but merely to illustrate the 
                                            
76 Moving Picture World (March 16, 1907), 31. 
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rather lengthy and complex process, the premises and logical steps that are 
required, to eventually transform a simple piece of film criticism into a 
substantive, albeit provisional, claim about early film spectatorship. As a 
portal into public experience, early film criticism stands as opaque evidence 
that cannot be easily separated from its original context, at least in terms of 
the type of consciousness it represents.  
Furthermore, I believe this case study illustrates the value of focusing on 
consciousness. In these journals we have literally hundreds of thousands of 
data points that can be traced, all of which are functions of “film experience,” 
and which when contextualized and interpreted offer a picture of an exciting 
“collective experience” that displays a “movement of consciousness.” It is 
partially because Staiger assumes a naïve consciousness behind the review 
she analyzes, separated from this movement, that she proceeds to draw vast 
conclusions. In focusing attention on the film consciousness and self-
consciousness that begins to emerge in early film publications, this broader 
context is foregrounded, discouraging isolated analyses.  
Finally, I have identified the ways writers formulated a language and practice 
for understanding film. Collectively, their activities and publications show 
two broad trends: one was a process of becoming aware that film was an 
aesthetic, constructed object that contained implicit meaning, likely placed 
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there by a (film) creator. The other was self-awareness, an understanding of 
the role of the critic and of the trade press institution in the construction of 
the object of cinema. It is in their language that the conceptual 
transformation of cinema takes place, not just in the material, industrial 
changes occurring at the level of film production. The early publications 
produced a semantic field of possibilities, words invented, applied, used and 
sometimes discarded in a multitude of arrangements and contexts, from 
which theoretical possibilities and inferences about cinema emerged. Any 
theorizing about film depends, above all, on an existing vocabulary, an 
existing language, with concomitant conceptual possibilities that can be used 
as either references, building blocks or analytical tools. It would be accurate 
to suggest that in these journals can be found the advent of film theory and 
film study since, even though direct lines of cause and effect may not be 
visible, the multitude of terms and ways of talking about film entered the 
public domain through them, even if never fully acknowledged or referenced. 
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CHAPTER 2: ESTABLISHING A 
CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘CONSCIOUSNESS’ 
With this study of early film publications now considered, in which the 
original idea of film consciousness was developed, it is now time to attempt a 
broader definition of film consciousness – a field consisting of different 
categories – in which the intuitive sense of “film consciousness” presented in 
the preceding chapter is developed and contextualized among other categories 
of film consciousness.  However, in order to achieve this, it is first necessary to 
define the range of ways in which ‘consciousness’ is used to mean something.   
The approach to defining the word ‘consciousness’ (and associated ideas and 
concepts) in this thesis is best described as “pragmatic.”1 Learning about 
“consciousness” entails understanding the meaning of the word 
‘consciousness’ in different contexts. Since the word ‘consciousness’ designates 
the phenomenon under discussion, these definitions provide – in sum – a 
broad picture of the ways of talking about consciousness, and perhaps, the 
ways of thinking about consciousness. One way of regarding these definitions 
is as a “semantic field,” which Pamela Faber and Ricardo Usón define as “a 
                                            
1 The term “pragmatics” covers a broad range of approaches and interests roughly covering 
“the cognitive, social and cultural science of language and communication.” In the case of this 
thesis, the emphasis is towards defining language-use according to different contexts, 
whether public or academic. Jef Verschueren, “Introduction: The pragmatic perspective,” in 
Key Notions for Pragmatics, edited by Jef Verschueren and Jan-Ola Östman (Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Pub., 2009), 1. 
 106 
set of lexemes which cover a certain conceptual area and which bear certain 
specifiable semantic relations to one another.”2 In spite of the “vagueness of 
the concept itself,”3 I believe “semantic field” is a useful starting point for 
thinking about the project proposed in this chapter and the next, which is to 
catalogue different ways of using the word ‘consciousness’ to mean a 
particular thing, especially in combination with an object such as ‘film’. A 
complete “semantic field of ‘consciousness’” – which this thesis does not offer – 
would consist of every way in which someone might use the word 
‘consciousness’.   
A second element in defining the word ‘consciousness’ is that its meaning 
changes according to the expressions in which it is found. If the aim of this 
thesis is to consider the different ways in which someone could, if interested, 
imagine the relationship between “film” and “consciousness” on the basis of a 
semantic field of ‘consciousness’, it would then be important, as well, to 
consider the ways in which other words (which represent a variety of objects) 
relate to the word ‘consciousness’. Consider, for example, the expression 
“national consciousness.”4 Does the “national” possess the “consciousness,” or 
does the expression refer to a type of consciousness, such as “a consciousness 
                                            
2 Pamela B. Faber and Ricardo Mairal Usón, Constructing a Lexicon of English Verbs (New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 67. 
3 Ibid. 
4 This expression is discussed in more detail next chapter, section 7 (“Compound nature.”)  
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of the national” or “nationhood” that a particular person or population 
possesses? There is also the issue of the meaning of the word ‘consciousness’ 
in this expression – does it mean something as simple as “a set of shared 
defining ideas and beliefs,”5 or is it a more complicated statement that refers 
to a living, collective sense of self, or even, an aggregate of all consciousness 
found within a nation. While the context usually – though not always – 
specifies the particular meaning of the expression, the issue is that 
expressions provide different possibilities of meaning for the word 
‘consciousness’ than when the word is used alone. Moreover, it is on the basis 
of these sorts of established expressions that new expressions, such as “film 
consciousness,” are imagined and implemented. Therefore, expressions offer 
templates, or models, for using the word ‘consciousness’ in relation to an 
object.  
Finally, there is the fact the word ‘consciousness’ appears within many 
ongoing debates and fields of research, such as “consciousness studies.”6 This 
                                            
5  “consciousness, n.”, OED Online, June 2015 (Oxford University Press). 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 01, 
2015). 
6  There are many university programs with this name. There is also a Center for 
Consciousness Studies (at the University of Arizona) and the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, launched in 1994. Formed in 1998, the Center of Consciousness Studies is 
representative of the field itself and aims to “bring together the perspectives of philosophy, 
the cognitive sciences, neuroscience, the social sciences, medicine, and the physical sciences, 
the arts and humanities, to move toward an integrated understanding of human 
consciousness.” “Mission: Background,” Center for Consciousness Studies, at University of 
Arizona. http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu/mission.htm (accessed on June 30, 2015). 
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field of research, at first glance, might seem an obvious starting point for 
defining ‘consciousness’. Yet, while this field, and the debates it includes, are 
quite important, and relevant, it is not necessarily the best starting point for 
defining the semantic field of ‘consciousness’. This is because it is only one 
place – one referential context – in which the word has meaning. Moreover, 
even within that single field, there are many different ways of using the word, 
such that philosopher, and consciousness scholar, David Chalmers once wrote, 
“those who talk about ‘consciousness’ are frequently talking past each other.”7  
Rather, the approach adopted in this thesis is inspired from a passage from 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, when he writes, “If I am 
supposed to describe how an object looks from far off, I don’t make the 
description more accurate by saying what can be noticed about the object on 
closer inspection.”8 I believe Wittgenstein’s words captures the essence of the 
approach, which entails looking at ‘consciousness’ from “far off,” in order to 
determine its referential meaning in more than one context (the general thing 
the word ostensibly refers to in some straightforward sense, even if the 
phenomena itself is shown to be very complex, perhaps even indescribable). 
More practically, it will entail categorizing the different meanings of 
                                            
7 David Chalmers, “The Hard Problem of Consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to 
Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2007), 226. 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §171. 
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‘consciousness’, which will then serve as the basis for constructing “film 
consciousness” categories.  
 
1. Referential Contexts 
Nevertheless, it is important to further clarify the reason “consciousness 
studies” – or some corresponding field that is assumed as significant in 
relation to this word – is not the starting point, since these fields are obvious 
places to begin such a project. Wittgenstein, in his cryptic way, is again useful 
here, when he says, “Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one 
side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another 
side and no longer know your way about.”9 The problem with starting in any 
given field – and not in the neutral space imagined in this thesis, that “far off” 
place that some will think is an attempt at an Archimedean perspective 
(which I believe it is not, since I admit to being befuddled by the word in 
question) – is that it establishes a path, which, because of the logic of the 
path, masks the meaning of the word ‘consciousness’. Instead, the attention 
becomes focused on the issues or “problems” (more on this below) that are 
seen as encompassed within the parameters of the word.  
                                            
9 Ibid., §203. 
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This is analogous to the situation Adam Kuper identifies in relation to the 
word ‘culture’, which overlaps with “consciousness” and is similarly difficult to 
define. In some definitions ‘culture’ encompasses all human reality, and in 
others, only a segment of that reality (such as when it refers to high 
culture).10 Therefore, the word creates a series of slippages of meaning that 
makes it difficult to actually define ‘culture’ in any practical sense. Kuper 
even advocates for dispensing with the word altogether, in favour of 
concentrating on those elements seen as constituting “culture”: 
[T]he more one considers the best modern work on culture by 
anthropologists, the more advisable it must appear to avoid the 
hyper-referential word altogether, and to talk more precisely of 
knowledge, or belief, or art, or technology, or tradition, or even of 
ideology (though similar problems are raised by that multivalent 
concept.)11  
                                            
10 This divide between “culture” as an all encompassing term for describing human reality, or 
as term that describes only a part of that human reality, as Kuper explains, has a long 
history, beginning with the German term “Kultur” – which represented intellectual, artistic 
and religious facts, in contrast to political, economic and social facts. Adam Kuper, Culture: 
The Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 31. However, 
these different meanings of “culture” can also be dated to two well-known definitions from the 
19th Century. The first comes from Edward Tylor, an anthropologist, who in 1871 defined 
culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, 
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”  Edward B. 
Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, 
Religion, Art, and Custom (London,: J. Murray, 1871), 1 The second definition comes from the 
preface of Mathew Arnold’s 1869 Culture and Anarchy; an Essay in Political and Social 
Criticism, which stated that culture was the “pursuit of our total perfection by means of 
getting to know . . . the best which has been thought and said in the world,” (London: Smith, 
Elder, 1875 [1869]), viii. 
11 Kuper, Culture, x.  
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In entering a particular debate, or field, designated by the term “culture,” or 
“consciousness,” discussion carries forward to the particular issues that are 
seen as falling under the umbrella of the term. In the case of the word 
‘culture’, Kuper suggest focusing instead on “knowledge,” “belief,” “art,” or 
“technology,” which fall under the general heading of ‘culture’, the word itself 
too “hyper-referential” to pin down in a practical definition. Likewise, the field 
of “consciousness studies” offers a series of “problems” – which then become 
the focus of interest. This is exemplified in a volume such as the Blackwell 
Companion to Consciousness, consisting of over fifty articles on the subject 
from such fields as religious studies, philosophy, psychology, and biology, 
including an opening section entitled “Problems of Consciousness.”12  The 
problems concern, among others, the study of consciousness in infants,13 the 
study of consciousness in animals,14 the origins of consciousness,15 artificial 
intelligence (or consciousness in machines), 16  the unity of conscious 
experience,17 “the mind-body problem” (how an immaterial phenomenon such 
                                            
12 Velmans and Schneider, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. 
13 Colwyn Trevarthen and Vasudevi Reddy, “Consciousness in infants,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Consciousness, 41-57. 
14 Colin Allen and Mark Bekoff, “Animal consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to 
Consciousness, 58-71. 
15 Thomas Polger, “Rethinking the evolution of consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion 
to Consciousness, 72-86. 
16 Igor Aleksander, “Machine consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 
87-98. 
17 Barry Dainton, “Coming together: the unity of conscious experience,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Consciousness, 209-222.  
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as consciousness emerges from a physical phenomenon), 18  “self-
consciousness,”19 and the one that seems to most concern recent philosophers, 
the quality or character of consciousness, which David Chalmers has referred 
to as “the hard problem of consciousness.”20   
The Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona provides a 
similar list of problems, under the heading “The Problem of Consciousness,” 
which includes the following questions:  
•What is consciousness? 
•Can subjective experience be explained in physical terms? 
•What are appropriate and potentially fruitful methods for studying 
consciousness? 
•Can new methods of brain imaging help clarify the nature and 
mechanisms of consciousness? 
•What is the relationship between conscious and unconscious 
processes in perception, memory, learning, and other domains? 
•What are the properties of conscious experience in specific domains 
such as vision, emotion, and metacognition? 
•Does consciousness play a functional role, and if so what is that 
role? 
                                            
18 John Searle, “Biological naturalism,” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 325-
334. 
19 José Luis Bermúrdez, “Self-consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness 
456-467. 
20 Chalmers, “The hard problem of consciousness,” 225-235.  
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•Can we develop rigorous methods for investigating and formalizing 
data about conscious experience from the first-person perspective? 
•What role does subjective experience play in existing theories 
within modern science? 
•What would be the implications of a science of consciousness for 
ethics and society?21 
While these questions are representative of the field of consciousness studies, 
they also provide an opportunity to situate this thesis in relation to them. For 
one, there is the first question, which would seem in line with the interest of 
this chapter and thesis: “What is consciousness?” From the perspective of the 
pragmatic approach adopted in this thesis, this sort of open question is not 
answerable without a specific linguistic context. As the next chapter shows, 
there are at least five different ways of using the word ‘consciousness’, each of 
which display variability, even while sharing a continuity of meaning. For 
example, definition 4b of the Oxford English Dictionary, “a set of shared 
defining ideas and beliefs,”22 does not seem to answer to the above question, 
at least directly. It is rather like encountering the question “what is cinema?” 
– answers will vary according to whatever a person understands this concept 
to mean. This “pre-understanding” is then a requisite for defining 
“consciousness.”  
                                            
21 “Problem of Consciousness,” Center for Consciousness Studies, accessed June 30, 2015, 
http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu/problem.htm 
22  “consciousness, n.”, OED Online, June 2015 (Oxford University Press). 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 01, 
2015). 
 114 
The pragmatic approach is oriented toward defining each of the “pre-
understandings” that provide the conditions for answering the question. The 
Center for Consciousness Studies appears to concentrate on two main areas of 
definition: that of “subjective experience” or “conscious experience,” and “the 
faculty of consciousness” (which are two distinct definitions – one is the 
experience of consciousness and the other is the cause, structure and 
functioning of consciousness).  Both of these areas of definition are presented 
next chapter (in section 5 and 6). I say “area of definition” because, as 
Wittgenstein writes, concepts sometimes point to a “rough area,” rather than 
a specific area; therefore it is sometimes the function of words to define a 
rough area (which does not yet provide us a definition, or sets of definitions, 
only the possibility that such a definition might be discovered within that 
area).23 This is why it is often difficult to get a handle on the meaning of the 
word ‘consciousness’ when operating within any given referential context – 
the presumptions about the “general area of definition” are already settled, 
which requires some distance in order to describe.  
Nevertheless, one of the questions in the above list seems to fit comfortably 
with the general tone of this thesis: “Can we develop rigorous methods for 
investigating and formalizing data about conscious experience from the first-
person perspective?” I would argue that this thesis is an attempt to develop 
                                            
23 Wittgenstein, PI, §71. 
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such a method through various approaches. One, in defining a vocabulary for 
thinking about the relationship between consciousness and film (Chapters 4 
to 7, which concern “film consciousness”); two, in categorizing different senses 
of the term ‘film experience’ (Chapter 6), which are categories through which 
film and consciousness have been typically explored; and, three, in 
“formalizing data about conscious experience,” by labeling different, elusive 
subjective experiences that seem meaningfully related to film (mainly in 
Chapter 7). It will seem then that the overarching objective of this thesis is to 
develop a means of talking about the relationship between film and 
consciousness, by developing a linguistic tool, and implementing this tool 
through an approach I define as “thinking in terms of film consciousness” 
(exemplified in Chapter 8 but used throughout this thesis).  
One of Wittgenstein’s points in his “labyrinth” passage (and in his body of 
work generally) was to show that even if ordinary language-use was easy to 
understand, it was difficult to explain.24 Thus, the ability to explain and 
understand depends on the particular way one enters the conversation; 
particularly the way a context orients such understanding. In this regard, 
rather than attempt to identify each and every way the word ‘consciousness’ is 
                                            
24 This echoes Christian Metz’s view that a “film is difficult to explain because it is easy to 
understand.”24 This passage serves as a guiding philosophy in this thesis, except that it is 
applied to language instead of film. Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the 
Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 69. 
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used in the Blackwell Companion on Consciousness, or within consciousness 
studies, it will sometimes make sense to identify the general “referential 
context” in which the word is found – the pre-understanding that is given – as 
the basis for defining the word. This is to say, a word is sometimes both 
ambiguous and clear given the particular distance adopted in relation to the 
word. It is clear when it points to a general “area of definition” and ambiguous 
when it attempts to define precisely the particular phenomena in question. 
Many will understand the meaning of “film studies” while at the same time 
observing those immersed in the field rarely agree on the meaning of “film” 
(yet, from a safe distance, we know that ‘film’ does not refer to “celluloid,” or 
“thin layers;” but we also know it means more than “movies”).  
When Chalmers refers to ‘consciousness’, it is embedded within the referential 
context of “consciousness studies.” This does not mean the word is clear and 
unambiguous, only that the referential context provides a first level 
orientation, a horizon of problems and discussions in which the meaning of 
the term is considered. Therefore, defining ‘consciousness’ more broadly, to 
include as many contexts as possible, requires recognizing the different 
referential contexts in which the word ‘consciousness’ has a “life.” 25 It is also 
important to see that ambiguity exists even within a specific referential 
                                            
25 Wittgenstein, PI, §203. “Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?—In use it is 
alive. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the use its life.” 
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context. The standard assumption – at least from the perspective of academics 
– is that when ‘consciousness’ is presented as a subject of interest, the 
referential context is more or less “consciousness studies.” Murray Smith’s 
chapter on consciousness in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and 
Film (as discussed in the Introduction) is a convincing example, since the 
chapter – a survey of the study of consciousness in relation to film – is limited 
in scope only to the concerns of consciousness studies.26 But a definition of the 
word ‘consciousness’ does not necessarily have to come from within that 
specific referential context, or from within the referential context of any one 
discipline. Nor does the referential context have to include the particular 
problems that most regularly appear as salient from the perspective of 
consciousness studies, such as in the list of questions presented at the Center 
for Consciousness Studies.  
Many uses of the term ‘consciousness’ take place in every day speech. 
Understanding the meaning of the term does not depend on an “academic 
referential context” (to name the sum of all the different academic referential 
contexts). Most language users understand the meaning of “being conscious of 
your actions” or “loss of consciousness” or even more abstract ideas such as 
“public consciousness.” Popular psychology has also introduced the 
                                            
26 Murray Smith, “Consciousness,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, 
edited by Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 39-51. 
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“subconscious” into ordinary speech. None of these “ordinary” uses of 
‘consciousness’ (or ‘conscious’) produce much confusion, at least at the level of 
comprehension, yet each contributes to the broad semantic field of 
consciousness. If the objective is to define the meaning of ‘consciousness’, then 
ordinary referential contexts are important too. 
Nevertheless, within the world of academics, it is possible to identify at least 
two main referential contexts, which corresponds with other epistemological 
tendencies and orientations as well. These two contexts can be characterized 
as “universalist” – which corresponds with consciousness studies – and 
“contextualist” – which corresponds with the humanities and social sciences. 
These are not irreconcilable contexts, but depending on the perspective 
adopted, a different set of problems or interests becomes relevant. 
The universalist context – whether or not explicitly acknowledged – is 
generally about consciousness in some larger, abstract sense, such as in the 
above list of questions from consciousness studies. It is also sometimes seen, 
as with Chalmers, as the only important or relevant questions about 
consciousness. In fact, if ‘consciousness’ is presented without further 
qualification (such as in the title of Murray Smith’s chapter, “Consciousness”), 
the assumption is that ‘consciousness’ is going to be discussed, imagined, and 
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analyzed from a universalist perspective.27 Thus, the problems that will be 
seen as interesting include “the mind-body problem” (Descartes’ dualism is 
often cited as the starting point), the evolutionary and biological origins of 
consciousness, the structure and categories of consciousness (memory, 
attention, awareness, qualia, and so forth), and the epistemological problems 
associated with the subjective character of conscious experience.  
Contextualist approaches to consciousness – which is more in line with this 
thesis – describe, study and identify those things that either appear to have 
some bearing on consciousness, or appear to reveal something about the 
nature of a specific situation of consciousness, defined according to a culture, 
history, institution, nation, language, art, environment, or technology. It 
sometimes, but not always, answers to the question “what it is like” to have a 
particular consciousness (that of early film writers, the 1950s, a specific 
culture, women, children, film viewers, etc).28 Consciousness in this regard is 
also defined in terms of a “way of seeing” or “experiencing” the world. The aim 
is more toward characterizing consciousness than it is toward defining those 
features that appear universal or essential, although the end result often 
places universal assumptions into question. Consciousness also has another 
                                            
27 Smith, “Consciousness,” 39-51. 
28 The “what it is like” question comes from Thomas Nagel’s seminal article, “What Is It Like 
to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1975): 435-450. This article is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7, section 4 on “Subjective Film Consciousness.”  
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meaning in these situations that strongly overlaps with this one, but which is 
nevertheless distinct. The term is often employed to mean the shared 
sensibilities, values or beliefs of a particular population. 
We can contrast these approaches – and identify some parameters – by 
comparing two volumes that carry the name “consciousness” in the title, but 
which have a different understanding of consciousness in mind. As discussed 
earlier, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness presents over fifty 
chapters on the topic of consciousness, which presumably offer a 
representation of the field of consciousness studies. The disciplines included 
in this field are, among others, philosophy, biology, neuroscience, and 
psychology, each of which examine or study some aspect of consciousness.29 
Roughly speaking, it is possible define these research orientations as follows: 
neurosciences focuses on the brain and the physical causes of consciousness; 
psychology studies the way the mind “works”;30 and philosophy, initially 
through phenomenology, but now through pragmatics, philosophy of mind and 
philosophy of language, attempts to describe the experience of consciousness, 
                                            
29 According to Velmans and Schneider, “‘Consciousness studies’ is an umbrella term for the 
multidisciplinary study of consciousness in fields such as neuroscience, psychology, 
philosophy, artificial intelligence, and linguistics.” The Blackwell Companion on 
Consciousness, 1. 
30 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 11. 
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including those “structures” or properties that seem universal to all instances 
of consciousness.31  
The Companion excludes, without explanation, sociological, historical, and 
anthropological approaches to consciousness, indicating that, in spite of these 
other disciplines studying “consciousness,” the meaning of “consciousness” 
differs from that of the Blackwell Companion title. Consider, for example, 
Hayden White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe, which White defines as “a history of historical consciousness 
in nineteenth-century Europe…”32 Where does this ‘consciousness’ fit within 
“consciousness studies?” A more analogous example is Anthony P. Cohen and 
Nigel Rapport’s volume Questions of Consciousness, which adopts an 
anthropological perspective that clearly presents – as a standalone term – 
‘consciousness’ in the title. Cohen and Rapport define the subject of the 
volume as follows: 
A pioneering attempt to formulate an anthropological approach to 
consciousness, Questions of Consciousness explores the importance 
of the conscious self, and of the ‘conscious collectivity’, in the 
construction and interpretation of social relations and process. It 
raises questions the answers to which have been previously 
neglected in anthropology. How aware are people of their behaviour? 
To what extent is the consciousness of individuals modelled by the 
cultures and social structures within which they live? Is ‘collective 
                                            
31  John Searle, Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers are recognized examples of these 
philosophical approaches.  
32 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 1. 
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consciousness’ a fiction which may have misrepresented social 
process by obscuring the complexity of the social group? 33 
The difference between the Blackwell Companion on Consciousness and 
Questions of Consciousness is one of approach, which reveals, clearly, the 
existence of two different referential contexts: the universalist, represented in 
the Blackwell Companion, is centered on the origins, functioning and 
structures of consciousness, although divided internally according to the 
scientific and philosophical epistemologies that account for the problem of 
subjective experience (more on this below). The contextualist approach, 
represented in Questions of Consciousness, addresses consciousness in 
relation to specific social contexts or problems. The anthropological volume 
contains such chapters as “Amazing grace: meaning deficit, displacement and 
new consciousness in expressive interaction,” 34  “The novelist’s 
consciousness,” 35  and “Blank banners and Islamic consciousness in 
Zanzibar.”36 There is very little overlap between these two volumes, yet both 
are about “consciousness” – thus the difference lies at the level of referential 
context. The word ‘consciousness’ points to a different set of problems and 
concerns that close off those which are found in the other context, in spite of 
                                            
33 Anthony P. Cohen and Nigel Rapport, Questions of Consciousness (New York: Routledge, 
1995); forward. 
34  James W. Fernandez, “Amazing grace: meaning deficit, displacement and new 
consciousness in expressive interaction,” in Questions of Consciousness, 21-40. 
35 C.W. Watson, “The novelist’s consciousness,” in Questions of Consciousness, 77-100. 
36 David Parkin, “Blank banners and Islamic consciousness in Zanzibar,” in Questions of 
Consciousness, 198-216. 
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sharing the same name, and even the same vocabulary. It might seem this 
contrast is too reductive, too neatly segregated to actually be valid. 
Dichotomies should make any modern academic or reader naturally 
suspicious. Yet, consider the difference between the Blackwell Companion’s 
chapter “Consciousness in infants” and Questions of Consciousness’s “On 
being a child: the self, the group and the category” – which both seem 
concerned about consciousness within a similar age group. Both of these 
chapters operate with completely different bibliographies – not a single 
shared reference.  
In keeping with Wittgenstein’s labyrinth metaphor – an anthropologist will 
know his or her way about the anthropological volume on “consciousness” 
because the context and concerns are familiar, just as the philosopher will 
know his or her way about the Blackwell Companion for the same reason, yet 
the meaning of the word ‘consciousness’ remains in a sort of undefined 
position in either case, only the problems have changed.37  
                                            
37 It might seem this contrast is too reductive and neatly segregated to actually be valid. 
Dichotomies should make any modern academic or reader naturally suspicious. Yet, the 
Blackwell Companion’s “Consciousness in infants” and Questions of Consciousness’s “On 
being a child: the self, the group and the category” appear to draw from different sources and 
carry quite different conversations. Perhaps the most striking difference – and the one that 
needs the least context and argument – is that while both of these chapters are about 
consciousness and children, neither chapter shares a single reference in common. 
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I would like to return then to a point mentioned earlier, which is that despite 
representing the field of consciousness studies, the Blackwell Companion to 
Consciousness had two different advisory boards, one named “Science of 
Consciousness” and the other “Philosophy of Consciousness” (the two book 
editors, Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, share the corresponding titles of 
“Science Editor” and “Philosophy Editor,” respectively). There is no mention 
in the book itself about which chapters were reviewed by which advisory 
board, or the reasoning behind these different boards, but while this may 
seem self-evident in many cases, the dividing line between “science” and 
“philosophy” is not always clear (such as the chapter on “Machine 
consciousness,” to name one).38 Rather, the differences in advisory board – 
while not explicitly mentioned in the Introduction – is likely attributable to 
the following, objective fact about “consciousness”:  
One distinctive thing about consciousness is that it can be studied 
both from “the inside,” that is, from the perspective of the conscious 
subject, and from the “outside,” that is, by any of the academic fields 
that study the mind.39 
Thus, within the general referential context of “consciousness studies” there is 
a rather obvious, and sharp, dividing line between an approach that will 
examine consciousness from the “outside” and one that will examine it from 
                                            
38 Igor Aleksander, “Machine consciousness,” The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 87-
98. 
39 Velmans and Schneider, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 1. 
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the “inside” – and perhaps here lies the struggle with the word ‘consciousness’ 
itself.  Those who study consciousness from the inside do not really recognize 
that there are those who study it from the outside, for the simple fact that the 
existence of “consciousness” is only confirmable from the “inside” (what is 
observed from the outside is a behaviour and different areas of the brain that 
are activated according to certain stimulations). It does not exist other than 
as an experience. Nevertheless, I believe we can use this “inside” and 
“outside” division – as presented within a massive, comprehensive volume on 
consciousness that includes most of the well known authors on consciousness 
today – as a starting point towards thinking about the difficulty in defining 
the word ‘consciousness’.  
2. Polysemy, Brute Facts, and Synonymy 
One of the most challenging problems in defining ‘consciousness’ is the fact 
there is a “continuity” of meaning between the different uses of the word, 
which make it difficult to identify essential elements that belong to any one of 
them. This is the case even when the general meaning of the term seems 
apparent. As stated earlier, the meaning of the term, in many contexts, is 
often easy to grasp but difficult to explain and define. Many debates about 
“consciousness,” as alluded to in the above Chalmers quote (and chapter title), 
are de facto meta-discussions about the meaning of the word ‘consciousness’ – 
even if this issue is not explicitly stated. 
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In his Projecting a Camera: Language-games in Film Theory, Edward 
Branigan draws on the work of George Lakoff and Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
among others, to develop a model for thinking about the ambiguity of words. 
Although Branigan develops this model to define the different uses of the 
word ‘camera’, it also applies to the ambiguity of any word, including 
‘consciousness’ (although with certain problems that are particular to the 
definition of ‘consciousness’); therefore Branigan’s distinctions are quoted here 
at length: 
Linguists have distinguished several kinds of ambiguity, two of 
which are homonymy and polysemy. In the case of homonymy, two 
words spelled in the same way possess unrelated, or at least very 
distant, meanings (thus, separate lexical entries): 
1. She withdrew money from the bank. 
2. She was fishing in the river from the bank. 
1. The dog’s bite is worse than its bark. 
2. The tree’s leaves are lighter than its bark. 
By contrast, in polysemy a word has distinct, though related, 
meanings, or at least meanings that are fairly close (thus, a single 
lexical entry): 
1. She bought the newspaper. 
2. The editor was fired by the newspaper. 
1. He broke the bottle [container]. 
2. The baby finished the bottle [contents]. 
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In this book I will discuss only polysemy and will treat a polysemous 
word as opening onto a special type of category that George Lakoff 
calls a “radial” category — that is, a category in which ambiguous 
meanings of a word are linked, creating, as Wittgenstein says, “a 
continuous transition” from one group of things to another.40 
Otherwise stated, “homonymy” and “polysemy” refer to the “degree of 
relatedness” between definitions of the same word. This “degree of 
relatedness” is reflected, for example, in the way dictionaries organize entries. 
When relations are close, definitions are located under single lexical entries. 
When distant, or non-existent, separate lexical entries are created, each of 
which contain further sub-definitions. A word such as ‘bark’ has more than 
one lexical entry, for example, because the “rind or outer sheath of the 
trunk”41 and the “sharp explosive cry uttered by dogs”42 are unrelated things.  
The way the word ‘consciousness’ is presented in dictionaries offers an 
indication of the perceived “relatedness” of the different definitions. In the 
Oxford English Dictionary, all definitions of ‘consciousness’ appear under a 
single lexical entry. Therefore, unlike ‘bark’, every definition of ‘consciousness’ 
is perceived as related in some meaningful manner, even if usages of each 
                                            
40  Edward Branigan, Projecting a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 101-102. 
41  “bark, n.1” OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15567?rskey=3YUUzz&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
June 28, 2015). 
42  “bark, n.3”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15570?rskey=LXYfGY&result=4&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
June 28, 2015). 
 128 
homonym are quite different (consider the difference between “losing 
consciousness” and “lacking consciousness.”) Therefore, the starting point 
towards defining ‘consciousness’ must take into account that each and every 
usage is meaningfully related, which is to say, polysemous. In this sense, each 
homonym is potentially revealing of some dimension of “consciousness.”  
Branigan’s examples (‘bank’, ‘bark’, ‘newspaper’, ‘bottle’) of polysemous 
ambiguity also highlight a problem that is particular to the word 
‘consciousness’ (and terms of a similar nature), which alludes to the “inside” 
and “outside” problem in the study of consciousness. The reality that 
‘newspaper’ refers to is categorically different than the reality to which 
‘consciousness’ refers. Underlying any given usage of ‘newspaper’ is a 
material, physical reality, even if “newspaper” is sometimes abstract. Thus, 
newspapers are purchased as “news” printed on “paper,” but there is also the 
institution or general industry that produces these physical newspapers. In 
Branigan’s example, the newspaper “fires” the “editor.” For Branigan, this 
example shows that the ambiguity of ‘newspaper’ is polysemic, since both the 
material newspaper and the newspaper institution share a continuity of 
meaning. John Searle addresses this point from a different, though 
complementary, perspective, which further elaborates the problem: 
Years ago I baptized some of the facts dependent on human 
agreement as institutional facts, in contrast to noninstitutional or 
“brute” facts. Institutional facts are so called because they require 
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human institutions for their existence. In order that this piece of 
paper should be a five dollar bill, for example, there has to be the 
human institution of money. Brute facts require no human 
institutions for their existence. Of course, in order to state a brute 
fact we require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs 
to be distinguished from the statement of it.43 
For Searle, “paper” is an example of a “brute fact” and “money” is an example 
of an “institutional fact.” Humans agree to regard paper as “money” in certain 
contexts, just as humans agree to regard paper that contains “news” as 
“newspapers.” According to Searle, the process through which “brute facts” 
such as “paper” become “institutional facts” such as “newspapers” forms the 
basis of all social reality. Physical objects, including sounds and words, are 
assigned new functions based on human agreement, which then, through this 
same process, become candidates for new functions. The word ‘film’ is 
illustrative of this process. ‘Film’ initially referred to the celluloid material 
used in the making of “moving pictures.” The latter was eventually renamed 
‘film’. But ‘film’ also refers to the institution that produces the individual 
films, in addition to being an art, craft, practice or concept. We have then a 
series of objects named ‘film’ which build, gradually, from an initial brute fact 
(the chemicals used in making the celluloid): the celluloid, the projected 
phenomenon named ‘film’, and finally the concept, institution, or practice that 
results in these ‘films’. For Searle, every object in the world, however abstract 
or conceptual, is reducible, through this process, to a brute fact that is not 
                                            
43 John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 2. 
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dependent on institutions (or society) for its existence. Searle synthesizes the 
process through which words (or signs or objects) obtain functions as follows: 
“X counts as Y in context C.”44 In this expression, X stands for a word (or 
anything potentially symbolic); Y stands for X’s new meaning or function; and 
C defines the context in which X counts as Y. The function of any sign, word 
or object can be described according to this formula. Thus, the word ‘film’ will 
count as “moving pictures” in the context of “cinema” (or in the context of a 
particular journal or institution).   
Thus, the difficulty in defining ‘consciousness’ is not just that it is polysemic, 
but also that no “brute fact” underlies any given usage (at least not in the way 
that Searle defines “brute”). When it comes to consciousness, there is nothing 
comparable to “paper” and “celluloid” in the way it underlies “newspaper” and 
“film” (although consciousness is sometimes defined according to a hierarchy, 
as in the Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy, that begins with “sentience” and 
“wakefulness,” and moves to “self-consciousness,” which perhaps fits with 
Searle’s formula.)45 Nevertheless, no matter how deeply one burrows into 
defining consciousness, there is a moment when physical “brute facts,” such 
as the brain and neurons, disappear altogether – there is just “consciousness.” 
                                            
44 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 27. 
45 Robert Van Gulick, “Consciousness,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consciousness. 
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Some philosophers define this particular problem as one of “irreducibility.” 
Consciousness is not “reducible” to other phenomena – it cannot be explained 
as a function of other matter. As David Chalmers explains, 
Trying to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive 
notions is fruitless. One might as well try to define matter or space 
in terms of something more fundamental. The best we can do is to 
give illustrations and characterizations that lie at the same level.46 
Chalmers further elaborates on this point in a chapter named “Can 
Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?”: 
Our grounds for belief in consciousness derive solely from our own 
experience of it. Even if we knew every last detail about the physics 
of the universe—the configuration, causation, and evolution among 
all the fields and particles in the spatiotemporal manifold—
that information would not lead us to postulate the existence of 
conscious experience. My knowledge of consciousness, in the first 
instance, comes from my own case, not from any external 
observation. It is my first-person experience of consciousness that 
forces the problem on me. 
[…] One could determine all the facts about biological function, and 
about human behaviour and the brain mechanisms by which it is 
caused. But nothing in this vast causal story would lead one who 
had not experienced it directly to believe that there should be 
any consciousness...47 
It should be noted that for Chalmers, and many philosophers, the term 
‘consciousness’ refers to “conscious experience.”48 However, Chalmers’ point 
                                            
46 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 2. 
47 Ibid., 101 
48 Therefore, “conscious experience” is its own category of “consciousness,” as presented in 
Chapter 3, section 6 ( “Conscious Experience”), but ‘consciousness’ has other meanings as 
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applies to most usages of ‘consciousness’. There is inevitably a moment in any 
definition, or analysis, of consciousness that must confront the reality that the 
only confirmation for the existence of consciousness comes from “first-person 
experience.” This fact constitutes the “brute fact” underlying all definitions of 
consciousness – and it therefore recasts the problem onto the  
“brute facts” of the language used for describing, defining, or explaining 
consciousness.  
Some examples taken from actual discourse will hopefully highlight some of 
these points in practice. Each of the following excerpts, taken from the same 
volume, David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson’s Film History, employ the 
word ‘consciousness’ towards different ends. In observing these usages, some 
broader conclusions about the definition of ‘consciousness’ can be drawn 
(emphasis in the following examples is mine). 
1. [Emil Cohl’s] many films were often based on bizarre, stream-
of-consciousness transformations of a series of shapes, one into 
another.49 
2. The growth in international film consciousness spurred 
governments to fund archives that would take up the burden of 
systematically documenting and preserving the world’s film 
culture.50 
                                                                                                                                   
well.  
49 David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film History: An Introduction (Boston: McGraw-
Hill, 2003), 52. 
50 Ibid., 356. 
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3. [Satyajit] Ray’s 1980s work persists in asserting that any 
significant action, political or otherwise, can spring only from the 
consciousness and conscience of the sensitive individual.51 
4. In the country of Eldorado, a political myth is played out within 
the delirious consciousness of a revolutionary poet.52 
5. American newspapers and magazines began discussing avant-
garde art, and, with the arrival of Pop Art in 1962, the new 
experiments came to public consciousness as never before.53 
The first example uses ‘consciousness’ as part of the expression “stream-of-
consciousness.” Like the word  ‘consciousness’, the expression itself is 
polysemic. In this example, “stream-of-consciousness” is an expression that 
refers to the unformed contents of consciousness that seem to randomly 
appear in thoughts (images, words, ideas). But this example also makes clear 
that in addition to referring to an internal state, “stream-of-consciousness” 
refers to the behaviour of acting on this state. It is a type of activity; in this 
case an artistic one. 
The second example, “film consciousness,” is intended to mean “awareness of 
film.” But as will be explained in Chapters 3 and 4, “awareness of 
[something]” also has the connotation of “conviction.” It is for this reason that 
that the behaviour of “raising awareness” includes an element of conviction. 
The assumption is that “conviction” is sometimes the outcome of awareness. 
                                            
51 Ibid., 436. 
52 Ibid., 473. 
53 Ibid., 502. 
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Therefore, in the Bordwell and Thompson example, “film consciousness” 
refers to an appreciation of the cultural value of film, which leads to the 
behaviour of archiving and preservation. 
The third example is slightly more difficult to parse than the previous ones 
because of the addition of “conscience” (“the consciousness and conscience of 
the sensitive individual”). The context indicates ‘consciousness’ should be read 
both in terms of “moral consciousness” (a humanist appreciation of morality 
and ethics) and as a symbol of the individual in opposition to culture or 
society. Thus, “political action” requires moral consciousness in addition to an 
individual willing to struggle against societal norms, which is the way that 
Bordwell and Thompson see Satyajit Ray. 
In the fourth example, Bordwell and Thompson describe the poet in Glauber 
Rocha’s “Land in Anguish” (1967) as having a “delirious consciousness.” The 
meaning of ‘consciousness’ in this passage is somewhat determined by the fact 
the film is seen as “a surrealistic interrogation of the artist’s political role.”54 
There are two ways of defining “delirious consciousness” I think: one, as a 
temporary state of consciousness distinct from “non-delirious consciousness;” 
and two, as the normal consciousness that belongs to this poet. 
                                            
54 Ibid., 436. 
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In the last example, “public consciousness” refers to the public’s general state 
of awareness at a particular moment in time. The awareness is usually about 
current events or issues. Unlike “film consciousness,” as used in the second 
example, it does not necessarily have the added connotation of “conviction.” It 
is more a neutral statement about the public’s level of awareness. It does 
however have the connotation of “collective consciousness” in the sense of a 
unified perspective or outlook on the world that belongs to a population, as if 
the collective consciousness were of the same nature as that of individual 
consciousness. Other connotations are potentially attached to this 
transposition from individual consciousness to collective consciousness, such 
as the idea that the public is a living, breathing organism that shares common 
sensibilities, memories, and so forth. 
While these examples of ‘consciousness’ are unlikely to cause much confusion, 
they nevertheless show that even within a relatively small sample size (from 
the Bordwell and Thompson book alone), variation in meaning is significant. 
Secondly, despite differences in meaning, these examples also illustrate that 
definitions depend on a similar and overlapping vocabulary. Explaining the 
difference in meaning between different uses of ‘consciousness’ is not the same 
as explaining the difference in meaning between a dog bark and tree bark; or 
for that matter, the difference between bottle as container and bottle as 
contents. These words refer to physical objects with clearly differentiated 
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ontological features. The word ‘consciousness’, on the other hand, refers to 
various nonphysical phenomena that share resemblances and common traits 
that are not always distinguishable. This is true even when the meaning of 
the word is easily grasped in speech, as in the Bordwell and Thompson 
examples of ‘consciousness’. In short, explaining the meaning of different uses 
of ‘consciousness’ is more difficult than actually grasping the meaning, as 
mentioned earlier. 
Another important element in these Bordwell and Thompson examples is that 
each of the ‘consciousness’ usages presupposes a more “global consciousness” 
that stands behind them and “contains” them.55 This is a rather complicated 
problem in the realm of defining consciousness. Consider, for example, the 
notion of “stream-of-consciousness”. It is a process, or experience, occurring 
within consciousness. This latter ‘consciousness’ is the “global” consciousness 
mentioned (defined next chapter as one of the definition of the term). It is a 
necessary condition for there being a “stream-of-consciousness.” Another of 
the above examples was “film consciousness”, which refers to a particular 
awareness of film. This state of awareness is contained within a global 
consciousness. A “delirious consciousness” is a state of consciousness in which 
a person is temporarily mad. It might also characterize a certain kind of 
personality. Both of these, once again, are contained within a global 
                                            
55 I discuss Lakoff and Johnson’s “container metaphor” in more detail in Chapter 7, section 2. 
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consciousness. If global consciousness is imagined as a territory, then all of 
these usages of ‘consciousness’ consist of characterizations of this territory or 
elements of this territory. The fact that each of these usages occupies the 
same territory, and that this larger territory carries exactly the same name, is 
a contributing factor in the ambiguity that exists between them. 
There is, in fact, an equivalent to this particular semantic problem in 
philosophical approaches to consciousness. The “homunculus fallacy” occurs 
when, without necessarily realizing it, such as in an act of speech, another 
consciousness (a homunculus) is posited within consciousness.56 This other 
consciousness (the homunculus) is the witness of internal conscious events, 
such as streams of images, or steams of consciousness. The homunculus thus 
becomes the de facto holder of consciousness. Daniel Dennett refers to this 
particular concept of consciousness in more cinematographic terms, naming it 
the “Cartesian Theatre” because it constructs a dualist image of someone – a 
soul, a consciousness – witnessing conscious events occurring in the brain, 
thus dividing consciousness into apparently physical and non-physical parts. 
Because this fallacy is regressive, in that the homunculus also requires an 
inner consciousness that bears witness to the incoming images that are 
observed, Dennett presents an alternate model for thinking about 
consciousness that also has a cinematographic dimension: 
                                            
56 John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 213. 
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Here is a first version of the replacement, the Multiple Drafts model 
of consciousness. I expect it will seem quite alien and hard to 
visualize at first — that’s how entrenched the Cartesian Theater 
idea is. According to the Multiple Drafts model, all varieties of 
perception — indeed, all varieties of thought or mental activity – are 
accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of 
interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information 
entering the nervous system is under continuous “editorial revision.” 
For instance, since your head moves a bit and your eyes move a lot, 
the images on your retinas swim about constantly, rather like the 
images of home movies taken by people who can’t keep the camera 
from jiggling. But that is not how it seems to us. People are often 
surprised to learn that under normal conditions, their eyes dart 
about in rapid saccades, about five quick fixations a second, and that 
this motion, like the motion of their heads, is edited out early in the 
processing from eyeball to... consciousness.57 
The point that Daniel Dennett and others wish to make regarding the 
“Cartesian Theatre idea,” or “homunculus fallacy,” is that it is committed in 
ordinary speech acts, which is to say, when consciousness (in some large 
philosophical sense) is not under explicit discussion. Rather, it is implied in 
the way consciousness is spoken about in other contexts. It is a feature, one 
might say, of the “language of consciousness.” It is difficult to speak about 
things going on “in” consciousness without constructing a “container” – also 
named ‘consciousness’ – within which these things are taking place. It is as if 
both the glass and its contents were named the same. Because the standard, 
everyday usages of ‘consciousness’ are polysemic, and because these usages 
often imply a Cartesian Theatre idea, it becomes one of the challenges in 
                                            
57 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 111.  
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demarcating any given usage of ‘consciousness’ – of straightforwardly defining 
the word. 
Thus far, the challenge in defining ‘consciousness’ has been focused on the 
ambiguity of the word ‘consciousness,’ particularly at the level of polysemy, 
along with the fact “consciousness” does not have any brute facts underlying it 
(as John Searle writes, it is “ontologically subjective,” as opposed to rocks, 
which exist independently of our subjectivity).58 However, it is also possible to 
characterize this ambiguity from the perspective of “synonymy.” This 
approach to dealing with ambiguity has the advantage of providing a 
framework for making sense of academic discourse that is seemingly 
unrelated to the subject of consciousness, but which upon further analysis 
shows a strong connection. The “naïve” starting point, then, is to simply take 
stock of terms which definitions include either the word ‘consciousness’, a 
form of the word ‘consciousness’ (such as ‘conscious’), or a term which has 
been established as being equivalent to ‘consciousness’ in a separate definition 
(all emphases mine): 
Awareness: “The quality or state of being aware; consciousness.”59 
Mind: “The seat of awareness, thought, volition, feeling, and 
memory;”60 
                                            
58 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 8-10. 
59  “awareness, n.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13894?redirectedFrom=awareness (accessed July 02, 2015).  
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Perception: “The process of becoming aware or conscious of a 
thing or things in general; the state of being aware; 
consciousness.”61 
Cognition: “The action or faculty of knowing; knowledge, 
consciousness; acquaintance with a subject.”62 
Experience: “The fact of being consciously the subject of a state 
or condition, or of being consciously affected by an event. Also an 
instance of this; a state or condition viewed subjectively; an event by 
which one is affected.”63 
As will be shown next chapter, all of these terms – “experience,” “mind,” 
“awareness,” “perception” – appear in definitions of ‘consciousness’, creating a 
circularity of definitions. Normally, such circularity is broken through an 
appeal to a “brute fact” that demarcates one phenomenon from the other, but 
the lack of these limits the ability to draw clear boundaries between them. 
The following example, taken from The International Dictionary of 
Psychology (which David Chalmers uses in the introduction of The Conscious 
Mind), illustrates this problem: 
Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; 
awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are 
                                                                                                                                   
60  “mind, n.1: IV, 19a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/118732?rskey=AQEhca&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed July 02, 2015).  
61  “perception, n.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/140560?redirectedFrom=perception (accessed July 02, 2015). 
62  “cognition, n.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/35876?redirectedFrom=Cognition (accessed July 02, 2015). 
63  “experience, n.: 4a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66520?rskey=cuw6Xr&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
July 02, 2015). 
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unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many 
fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-
consciousness—to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of 
the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive 
phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or 
why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it.64 
Thus, “consciousness” is defined as “the having of perceptions” and 
“awareness.” As indicated above, both “awareness” and “perception” are 
sometimes defined as “consciousness.” Obviously this is a narrow and 
reductive way of looking at the problem since ‘perception’ is used differently in 
The International Dictionary of Psychology than when it means 
‘consciousness’.65 Secondly, this passage is an effective illustration of the 
problem of trying to define consciousness at all, since “the term 
[‘consciousness’] is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible 
without a grasp of what consciousness means.” Without a physical “brute fact” 
that grounds an understanding, the only way of confirming the validity of any 
given statement about consciousness is through first person experience (hence 
the reasons philosophers typically rely on ordinary experiences to prove facts 
                                            
64 Norman Stuart Sutherland, ed., The International Dictionary of Psychology (New 
York: Continuum, 1989), 95, quoted in Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 3. 
65 As with most family of words that define consciousness and mind, it is difficult to say 
precisely, but ‘perception’ in this case seems to fit with definition 3 of “perception” as found in 
the Oxford Dictionary of English: “The process of becoming aware of physical objects, 
phenomena, etc., through the senses; an instance of this.” “perception, n.”. OED Online. June 
2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/140560?redirectedFrom=perceptions (accessed July 03, 2015). 
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about consciousness in order that the reader, or listener, confirms the 
statement according to experience).66 
We have, then, a series of challenges in defining the word ‘consciousness’ – it 
exists in different referential contexts, it is polysemous, and it lacks an 
underlying brute fact that renders homonyms and synonyms objectively 
distinguishable from one another. This latter issue – of synonyms or 
analogous terms – will became important when examining film discourse that 
pertains to consciousness. These parallel discourses bearing different names 
than ‘consciousness’ are also given attention (such as “film gaze” or “film 
episteme”). The objective in the following chapter – and chapters – is to begin 
building the semantic field of consciousness, or rather, a particular semantic 
field of consciousness that is complementary with film.  
                                            
66 Whether David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett or John Searle (to name three of the major 
philosophers of consciousness), but also including Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson, and 
language philosophers such as George Lakoff and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the tendency is 
towards establishing facts about consciousness through ordinary, everyday examples that a 
reader can grasp and confirm through experience. 
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CHAPTER 3: ‘CONSCIOUSNESS’ DEFINED 
As explained last chapter, the “semantic field of ‘consciousness’” is imagined 
as consisting of the sum of statements in which the term ‘consciousness’ – 
including its variants (‘conscious’) and relatives (‘awareness’) – is used 
intelligibly. It is not, strictly speaking, a set of definitions. If it were possible 
to compile every statement that included ‘consciousness,” from dictionaries, 
encyclopaedias, theoretical texts, public discourse, ordinary language, 
institutional definitions, science, and so on – and if it were possible to see 
these statements as providing the semantic grounds from which future 
statements that include the term ‘consciousness’ were formed – then this 
would be the “semantic field of consciousness,” as defined in this thesis.  
In beginning the process of defining the semantic field of consciousness as a 
series of categories, I follow John Searle, who believes philosophical 
investigations should begin “naively” through a series of common sense, 
intuitive observations. 1  For this reason, this chapter uses the Oxford 
Dictionary of English as a starting point for developing categories of 
‘consciousness’. The operating assumption is that a dictionary offers a 
representative sample of the way the word ‘consciousness’ is used in different 
                                            
1 John Searle, Mind, language, and society: philosophy in the real world (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 2008), 114. 
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contexts.2 A dictionary also has the benefit of distilling complex ideas into 
brief, simple statements, which provide general areas of definition. We might 
contrast this approach with the specialized definition of consciousness that 
Chalmers quoted from The International Dictionary of Psychology, 3 which is 
an attempt at defining the complexity of consciousness, rather than providing 
a sense of the area of definition, as compared to other areas of definition also 
named ‘consciousness’.  
A first level, “naïve” observation is that two important features characterize 
the word ‘consciousness’: the first, as already discussed, is that the word is 
polysemic; the second is that the word is “combinable” with other words to 
form concepts or expressions. This latter characteristic should be regarded as 
its own area of definitional interest. The act of combining the word 
‘consciousness’ with other words produces a distinct range of meanings not 
                                            
2 In developing Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society, Raymond Williams adopts a 
similar approach in trying to grasps the different meanings of the term ‘culture’: “Then one 
day in the basement of the Public Library at Seaford, where we had gone to live, I looked up 
culture, almost casually, in one of thirteen volumes we now usually call the OED: the Oxford 
New English Dictionary on Historical Principles.” Raymond Williams, Key Words: A 
vocabulary of culture and society (London: Fontana/Croom Helm, 1976), 13. 
3 Already presented last chapter: “Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and 
feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible 
without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing 
consciousness with self-consciousness—to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the 
external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to 
specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written 
about it.” Norman Stuart Sutherland, ed, The International Dictionary of Psychology (New 
York: Continuum, 1989); 95, quoted in David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a 
Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press), 3. 
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necessarily grounded in the polysemic nature of the word ‘consciousness’. It 
produces a grammatical, rather than semantic, effect on the meaning. I will 
return to this issue in the following section. In the list of definitions below, not 
all of the entries found in the Oxford Dictionary of English are included, only 
those that, in retrospect, seems relevant or interesting in relation to the word 
‘film’. While the brief definitions at the beginning of each category are taken 
from the Oxford Dictionary of English, the discussion below the entry, 
including all of the examples and conclusions, are my own attempt at 
elaborating the category in a manner fitting with the later objective of 
defining “film consciousness.” The first entry, as opposed to those that follow, 
is used more as a point of reference in defining the semantic field of 
consciousness.   
 
1. ‘Consciousness’ in terms of “state of being aware.” 
OED: “The state of being aware of and responsive to one’s 
surroundings, regarded as the normal condition of waking life.”4 
This is a fairly standard usage of ‘consciousness,’ sometimes referred to as 
“wakefulness.”5 This “consciousness” – which is construable as a type of 
                                            
4  “consciousness, n., entry 5”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
5 Van Gulick, Robert, “Consciousness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
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medical assessment – is an indicator, mainly, of certain behaviour that is 
regarded as normal and functional: 
The normal state of consciousness comprises either the state of 
wakefulness, awareness, or alertness in which most human beings 
function while not asleep or one of the recognized stages of normal 
sleep from which the person can be readily awakened.6 
The “abnormal state of consciousness”7 – deviations from this normality –– 
comprise a range of states that are “difficult to define and characterize,”8 
because the terms that are used for defining these states “mean different 
things to different people.”9 Such abnormal states of consciousness include 
“clouding of consciousness,” “confusional state,” “delirium,” “lethargy,” “coma,” 
and “brain death.”10 Definitions corresponding to these levels of consciousness 
are understandably vague. A “clouding of consciousness,” for example, “is a 
very mild form of altered mental status in which the patient has inattention 
and reduced wakefulness.”11 In addition to these states are other abnormal 
states of consciousness that are reflected in certain expressions such as 
“unconsciousness” or “not conscious” (“when a person is unable to respond to 
                                                                                                                                   
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consciousness/>. 
6 Suzie C. Tindall, “Level of Consciousness,” in Walker HK, Hall WD, Hurst JW, editors. 
Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, and Laboratory Examinations, 3rd edition (Boston: 
Butterworths; 1990); Chapter 57. Available from: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK380/ 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid. 
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people and activities”),12 or “being knocked unconscious” (a temporary state of 
“unconsciousness”).  
As a referential context, the medical usage of ‘consciousness’ is therefore quite 
different from other referential contexts, in spite of sharing precisely the same 
vocabulary and addressing some of the same concerns and problems. The 
overlap with other referential contexts is not just in the word itself, but also 
in the vagueness of the descriptions, which capture a range of wakefulness, or 
consciousness, without establishing fixed, rigid parameters.  
With this “medical” referential context as a point of comparison, it is possible 
to see why there is no contradiction in saying that someone is both “fully 
conscious” (which is to say, in a “normal state of consciousness”) but also 
“lacking consciousness.” The “lack” is not in reference to wakefulness, but 
rather to a lack of awareness of certain objects, ideas, contexts, or situations 
in the world. The medical use of ‘consciousness’ provides a clear example of a 
“language game” in which the word ‘consciousness’ differs in meaning and 
usage as compared to, for example, an academic referential context. Yet both 
contexts will draw on a similar vocabulary, and perhaps, on a similar set of 
distinctions, in spite of sharing very little in the way of argumentative or 
descriptive objectives. It is more difficult to distinguish between the different 
                                            
12 “Unconsciousness – first aid,” MedlinePlus, 
 http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000022.htm (Accessed July 10, 2015).  
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“academic referential contexts” because of overlap in interests, but as 
indicated last chapter, these differing aims and usages of ‘consciousness’ 
speak to a different overall concern, which nevertheless becomes relevant in 
the construction of “film consciousness” categories.  
 
2. ‘Consciousness’ in terms of “awareness (of something)” 
OED: “Internal knowledge or conviction; the state or fact of being 
mentally conscious or aware of something.”13 
This is a transitive form of ‘consciousness’ that requires an object. This 
character of consciousness is sometimes defined as intentionality, which John 
Searle defines as “that property of many mental states and events by which 
they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.”14 
The particular objects of awareness vary in ontological status. They can be 
external objects, such as a table, person or date; internal objects, such as an 
idea or memory; or affective objects, such as the sensation of pain or an 
anxious mood.15 There is of course the state of being aware of consciousness, 
                                            
13  “consciousness, n., entry 1”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
14 John Searle, Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 1. 
15 These are borrowed from Daniel Dennett’s descriptions of the different types of subjective 
experience, also presented in Chapter 6 on “film experience.” Daniel Dennett, Consciousness 
Explained  (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 45. 
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sometimes defined as “self-awareness” – where “self” assumes the status of 
one, or several meanings, of the term ‘consciousness’. As indicated below, in 
definition 4, ‘consciousness’ sometimes means “sense of self.” In other words, 
the expression “self-consciousness” means “consciousness of consciousness,” 
where these words ‘consciousness’ have different meanings. Therefore, this 
idea of “consciousness of consciousness” is a good illustration of the semantic 
challenges presented in the term ‘consciousness’. When analyzed, this 
expression actually contains four different senses of consciousness. The first 
‘consciousness’ in the statement means the state of being aware of something. 
The second ‘consciousness’ either means personal consciousness (defined 
below as the totality of things that make up the individual self, including 
memories, beliefs, and so forth) or global consciousness (the “faculty” of 
consciousness itself). Finally, the entirety of the expression is itself a 
definition of human consciousness (self-awareness, which is to say, the fact of 
being aware of having the property of consciousness). Some will see this as 
the only essential feature distinguishing human consciousness from other 
states of consciousness found in other organisms16 (for example, a cat is 
potentially describable in terms of being aware of its surroundings).  
                                            
16  “Self-consciousness. A third and yet more demanding sense might define conscious 
creatures as those that are not only aware but also aware that they are aware, thus treating 
creature consciousness as a form of self-consciousness. The self-awareness requirement might 
get interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would qualify as conscious in the 
relevant sense will vary accordingly. If it is taken to involve explicit conceptual self-
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As the OED mentions, this sense of consciousness is sometimes seen in terms 
of a “conviction.” The notion of “raising awareness,” for example, derives its 
intelligibility from the fact “conviction” is conditional on awareness. The 
connection between consciousness and conviction often remains implicit in 
certain linguistic contexts, such as when David Bordwell and Kristin 
Thompson see the rise of “film consciousness” as leading to the practice of 
preserving and archiving film.17  
This sense of consciousness is also particularly suited for historical 
description because it defines a relationship between consciousness and an 
object. This relationship is describable according to the following criteria: (1) 
“relative consciousness;” (2) “reportability;” (3) “relative strength and 
extension;” (4) and “stages.” 
Awareness of something can be described in terms of relative consciousness or 
attention, in the sense that it is possible to both be aware of something and at 
the same time not actively attend to this awareness, or necessarily be 
                                                                                                                                   
awareness, many non-human animals and even young children might fail to qualify, but if 
only more rudimentary implicit forms of self-awareness are required then a wide range of 
nonlinguistic creatures might count as self-conscious.” Van Gulick, “Consciousness.”  
17 “The growth in international film consciousness spurred governments to fund archives that 
would take up the burden of systematically documenting and preserving the world’s film 
culture.” David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film History: An Introduction (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 2003), 356. The Bordwell and Thompson example is presented in more detail in 
Chapter 4, “Film Culture Awareness.”  
 151 
conscious of it at all. Rocco Gennaro defines this as “nonsconcious awareness” 
or “behavioural awareness:” 
First, we can say of the day-dreaming long distance truck driver 
that he must be aware in some sense of the twists and turns in the 
road. Otherwise, how could he have successfully completed the 
journey? The idea is that the long distance driver has certain 
internal states which direct his behaviour… 
The long distance driver is ‘behaviorally aware’ of the turns in the 
road.18 
An example of “behavioural awareness” could be film discourse – or any 
writing about film – that implicitly acknowledges that the film object under 
description is “constructed” in nature (comprised of shots, angles, editing, and 
so forth), while not necessarily indicating this awareness explicitly. It is then 
possible to track this single line of behavioural awareness as it emerges over a 
period of time, manifested in writing that makes reference to different 
aesthetic elements, such as camera movements, or an implied camera or 
narrator.19 Although we could define just this single thread of consciousness 
as “film consciousness” — or  “the beginnings of film consciousness” – our 
description need not limit itself to this thread even while acknowledging its 
singularity and discreetness.  
                                            
18 Rocco J. Gennaro, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order 
Thought Theory of Consciousness (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub., 1996), 8. 
19  Thomas Bedding, “Pictorialism and the Picture,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 11 
(September 10, 1910): 566–7. I discuss this article in more detail next chapter in the section 
on “film aesthetic awareness.” 
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It seems clear that all entities – as with the day dreaming driver – act on 
different sorts of awareness that are not actively present to consciousness. 
Nevertheless, while it is impossible to know the thoughts and consciousness of 
historical actors who – for any number of reasons – may not express 
awareness of things that are interesting to the historian (for example, 
whether a spectator or critic regards the film as art, as interpretable, or 
whether the narrative is comprehended), it is possible that this awareness is 
reported indirectly through behaviour and discourse. We can then conceivably 
speak about awareness in terms of “reportability.” The day dreaming driver 
could – if asked – describe his or her behavioural awareness. Is the same true 
of the film critic or early spectator if asked about the constructedness of film, 
even while the discourse seems to depend on this awareness? As discussed in 
the introduction of this thesis and in Chapter 1, the headings and titles of 
journals, such as the dropping of “Subjects” from the Moving Picture World’s 
weekly “Comments on the Film Subjects” in 1910 is an example of 
“unreported awareness” in the sense that journal writers began to see film as 
a unified phenomenon. It points to an internal process of reasoning that is not 
available to the historian.  
“Consciousness of something” is also often described from the perspective of 
“intensity” and “extension.”20 For example, a person may be very aware about 
                                            
20 The expression “range of awareness” is extremely common20 – with over six million hits as 
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current events, or about the history of cinema, or about the way films are 
made. Another person may show relatively little awareness, but still possess 
some awareness. In both cases, awareness exists, and in both cases, the 
awareness might function as a causal mechanism determining a particular 
activity. This is the case when David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson describe 
the style of 1970s American filmmakers, who were “characterized by ‘movie 
consciousness,’ an intense awareness of film history and its continuing 
influence on contemporary culture.” 21  Thus, an aspect of this sense of 
consciousness is that it is quantifiable in some manner, unlike other concepts 
of consciousness, which are typically characterized or qualified.  
Finally, “awareness of something” can be described along a historical axis. 
The implication, as mentioned in the introduction, is that the beginning point 
along that axis constitutes “zero-degree awareness.” As this awareness is 
traced along a historical axis, the relationship between awareness and its 
object changes from zero-degree to something else (more intense, higher level, 
greater range, etc.) These moments of change (“transitions,” 
“transformations,” “shifts,” “turning points”), what Hayden White calls 
“motifs,”22 are obviously attractive from a historical perspective because it 
                                                                                                                                   
of August 18, 2015, which shows this tendency towards quantification and spatializaztion of 
consciousness.  
21 Bordwell and Thompson, Film History, 517. 
22 “This transformation of chronicle into story is effected by the characterization of some 
events in the chronicle in terms of inaugural motifs, of others in terms of terminating motifs, 
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enables a plotting of consciousness as a historical narrative, which can then 
be further characterized in terms of stages.  
 
3. Shared defining ideas and beliefs 
OED: “Attributed as a collective faculty to an aggregate of people, a 
period of time, etc.; a set of shared defining ideas and beliefs.” 23 
This definition of ‘consciousness’ corresponds to the one Hayden White uses in 
the Introduction to Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe, when he defines the work as “a history of historical 
consciousness in nineteenth-century Europe.”24 As with many expressions 
involving the word ‘consciousness’, “historical consciousness” can be read in 
several ways. For example, a “consciousness of the historical” – meaning, 
roughly, an awareness or understanding of history as a mode or practice of 
registering the past; a second interpretation is that it means an appreciation 
or awareness of history; finally, it can be understood as a particular approach 
to the writing or recording of “history,” based on “shared and defining beliefs,” 
attributed to a people, period or school. We know from the study that White 
                                                                                                                                   
and of yet others in terms of transitional motifs.” Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1973), 5. 
23  “consciousness, n., entry 4b”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
24 White, Metahistory, 1. 
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likely means the latter, but the intrigue of just these types of expressions is 
that they cover a spectrum of meanings, each drawing a series of overlapping 
pictures that conceal ambiguities even as the expression creates them. Other 
terms that cover a similar conceptual terrain as this sense of consciousness 
are zeitgeist,25 episteme,26 imaginary,27 and culture.28   
 
4. Personal consciousness 
OED: “The totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, which 
make up a person’s sense of self or define a person’s identity.”29 
                                            
25 “The spirit or genius which marks the thought or feeling of a period or age.” “Zeitgeist, n.”. 
OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/232756?redirectedFrom=zeitgeist (accessed August 12, 2015). 
26 “This term, which Foucault introduces in his book The Order of Things, refers to the 
orderly ‘unconscious’ structures underlying the production of scientific knowledge in a 
particular time and place. It is the ‘epistemological field’ which forms the conditions of 
possibility for knowledge in a given time and place.” Clare O’Farrell, “Episteme,” Michel-
Foucault.com http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/index.html (accessed September 24, 
2012). 
27 Charles Taylor defines it as “the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that 
are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations.” Furthermore, “the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes 
possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.” Charles Taylor, Modern 
Social Imaginaries (Duke University Press, 2004), 23. 
28 “The distinctive ideas, customs, social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular 
nation, society, people, or period.” “culture, n.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University 
Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45746?rskey=xbbSqz&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed August 12, 2015). 
29 “consciousness, n., entry 4a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
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While this entry mentions the “totality” of an individual’s sense of self, it is 
not yet the “consciousness” that “consciousness studies” takes as its object of 
study. In other words, it is a contextualized understanding of the term. While 
there is a global phenomenon named “consciousness” that belongs to each 
person by definition, each person also has his or her own consciousness which 
encompasses personal identity or sense of self, as opposed to referring to the 
faculty itself. This is evident in examining a common expression such as “a 
loss of consciousness.” In a situation of an accident or abnormal state of 
consciousness in which a person is no longer awake, a common expression is 
to say “I lost consciousness” and not the incoherent phrase “I lost my 
consciousness.” The reason for the incoherency is that “my” designates this 
sense of term, which are those conscious phenomena that constitute and 
defines the identity or sense of self of a person.  
It is also attributable to a collective on the same terms, the conscious 
phenomena that are seen as making up a larger collective identity (a group, 
culture, nation, etc). Moreover, the OED definition mentions three conscious 
phenomena – “impressions,” “thoughts” and “feelings” – but there are others. 
For example, “experiences,” “memories,” and “sensations.” In short, any 
conscious phenomena that is seen as essential to a particular instance of 
consciousness – belonging to a person or collective – will fit with this sense of 
‘consciousness’ (in order to avoid a tautology here I will simply point out that 
 157 
the ‘consciousness’ in the phrase “instance of consciousness” refers to the 
“global consciousness” defined below and not the personalized sense of the 
term indicated here). Whenever consciousness is spoken about in terms of “my 
consciousness” (or sometimes “our consciousness”), it is usually this sense of 
the word that is under discussion. 
 
5. Global consciousness 
OED: “The faculty or capacity from which awareness of thought, 
feeling, and volition and of the external world arises; the exercise of 
this.”30 
This is the generalized, global ‘consciousness’ of “consciousness studies.” 
However, it is important to underline the above definition actually contains 
two distinct definitions of consciousness. The first is the faculty from which 
conscious experiences arises. The second is the conscious experience itself, 
signified in the “exercise of this.” Thus, both the causal mechanism and the 
effect are named “consciousness.” A philosopher such as Daniel Dennett 
eliminates this ambiguity by simply defining the “faculty” part of the 
definition as “the brain.”31 Confusion arises because the mechanism through 
                                            
30  “consciousness, n., entry 2a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
31 Daniel Dennett, “Robert Wright interviews Daniel Dennett.” Meaningoflife.tv. (December 
16, 2008.) http://www.meaningoflife.tv/transcript.php?speaker=dennett. 
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which the brain generates consciousness is physically inexplicable; therefore 
an intervening mechanism is posited between the brain and the conscious 
experience – also named “consciousness” – that links the brain with the 
conscious experience.  This consciousness, as indicated above, is referred to as 
a “faculty.” 
 
6. Conscious Experience 
There is a usage of ‘consciousness’ that is not specified in the Oxford English 
Dictionary, at least not in the section on ‘consciousness’ (other than the above 
reference to “the exercise of this”), but which assumes a central place within 
consciousness studies and philosophy, that of “conscious experience.” The 
term ‘consciousness’ and the expression “conscious experience” are sometimes 
used interchangeably within certain referential contexts, as illustrated in 
Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind in a section entitled “What is 
Consciousness?”:   
Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world 
and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about 
more directly than consciousness, but it is far from clear how to 
reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What 
does it do? How could it possibly arise from lumpy gray matter? We 
know consciousness far more intimately than we know the rest of 
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the world, but we understand the rest of the world far better than 
we understand consciousness.32 
The distinction between consciousness in terms of faculty and conscious 
experience is precisely that of between a cause and an effect. The same term 
defines both domains.  
Although the philosophical current of phenomenology is the most closely 
associated with the study of conscious experience, it is also studied from the 
perspective of philosophy of mind, as illustrated in some notable works such 
as Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?”33 and Frank Jackson’s 
“Epiphenomenal Qualia,” which presented the well-known thought 
experiment “Mary the Scientist”.34 David Chalmers establishes “conscious 
experience” as the defining characteristic of being human.  
We can say that a being is conscious if there is something it is like to 
be that being, to use a phrase made famous by Thomas Nagel. 
Similarly, a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like 
to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that 
a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel — an 
associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also 
known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of 
explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of 
explaining consciousness. 
                                            
32 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 3. 
33 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 4, no. 83 (1974): 
436. 
34 Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, no. 32 (1982): 130. 
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I will return to the issue of “conscious experience” in the last two chapters, 
which concern the term “film experience” and “subjective film consciousness.”  
 
7. Compound nature: a “grammar” of ‘consciousness’ 
The most obvious grammatical feature of the term ‘consciousness’ – and one 
noted in the Oxford English dictionary – is that it can be combined with other 
terms, namely adjectives or modifiers, to form new ideas or expressions. 
However, this “combining process” takes at least three different forms, each of 
which create different readings of the expression and therefore different 
possibilities of meaning.  
The first of these is when ‘consciousness’ stands “as the second element of 
compounds with the sense ‘consciousness of ——, awareness of —— ‘.”35 This 
means that expressions like “class consciousness” can be rewritten as 
“consciousness of class.” It is rather like unpacking the expression and 
organizing it in its intended order. Any compound expression that uses 
‘consciousness’ will potentially have the character of being readable in terms 
of “consciousness of something” (“consciousness of the national”, 
                                            
35  “consciousness, n.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
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“consciousness of film,” and so forth). The meaning of ‘consciousness’ in this 
form corresponds with definition 2 (“awareness of something.”) 
However, an expression such as “public consciousness” is not usually read or 
unpackaged in the above form (although some contexts might suppose this 
meaning). It is not read as “consciousness of [the] public” (in which someone is 
described as being aware of the public, or whatever public represents, such as 
“publicness”). Rather, the first term signifies the entity “possessing” the 
consciousness. The same is true of the expression “collective consciousness” or 
even “national consciousness.” The first term represents an entity of some sort 
that possesses the “consciousness.” A corollary of this reading is that 
‘consciousness’ changes in meaning. It no longer corresponds with definition 2. 
It now means something in the spectrum of definition 4 (personal 
consciousness) and definition 5 (global consciousness).  
This variable meaning of ‘consciousness’ – fitting within a spectrum of 
definitions – is an aspect of the compound expression. It draws from bits of 
meaning that corresponds with several definitions of the word. This “slippage” 
of meaning between different definitions of ‘consciousness’ – in which a new 
sense or usage of the term becomes present in the context of an expression – 
thus forms part of the semantic field of consciousness and is potentially 
applicable in future expressions.   
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A third way of reading an expression with ‘consciousness’ is when it is used 
“with [an] adjective specifying an area of operation.”36 In such a case, the first 
term in the expression is no longer the possessor of the “consciousness,” as the 
case above; nor is the expression intended to mean “consciousness of 
something.” Rather, the expression itself stands for a “faculty” – a way of 
seeing, being, perceiving or thinking – that is regarded as forming part of 
consciousness, as if consciousness were dividable into discrete components 
committed to particular areas of concern. An example of this is “moral 
consciousness,” as used in the following context: 
Mature moral consciousness, central to negotiating the challenges of 
the 21st century, is understood as a way of being, an optimal path of 
human development, which exhibits a wholesome engagement with 
meaning and positive change in one’s social world and is 
characterized by ever-expanding circles of agency in the service 
of humanity.37 
This does not mean that “moral consciousness” will take this meaning in all 
contexts, only that one of its possible manifestations is as a faculty of some 
sort. The formulation ‘film consciousness’ – as defined in Chapter 7 – can 
assume precisely this significance.  
                                            
36  “consciousness, 4c.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
37 Elena Mustakova-Possardt, “Education for critical moral consciousness,” Journal of Moral 
Education 33, no. 3 (September 2004), 246. 
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In order to illustrate these three compound forms, we can examine a single 
expression – “national consciousness” – which relies on each form in order to 
create different intended meanings. It should also become clear that the 
meaning of ‘consciousness’ is never fully limited to any single definition. It 
becomes a “compound meaning,” in the sense of deriving its meaning from 
different senses of the word.  
 The first meaning of the expression is that of a “shared sense of national 
identity,”38 which is the definition Wikipedia uses (which I believe is sufficient 
as an example of this sense of the expression, especially since it is an 
expression without a fixed institutional definition). The Wikipedia entry 
draws from Thomas D. Musgrave’s “The Origins of National Consciousness” 
as its source: 
A national consciousness is a shared sense of national identity, that 
is a shared understanding that a people group shares a common 
ethnic/linguistic/cultural background. Historically, a rise in national 
consciousness has been the first step towards the creation of a 
nation.39 
                                            
38 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_consciousness. “National consciousness”, Wikipedia, 
The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_consciousness (accessed August 
10, 2015). 
39 Thomas D. Musgrave, “The Origins of National Consciousness,” in Self-Determination and 
National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 1997), 2-14. The same definition is given by 
Benedict Anderson in “The Origins of National Consciousness,” Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 37-46. 
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Because “national consciousness” means “shared sense of national identity” in 
this context, then ‘consciousness’ necessarily means “awareness of national 
identity,” thus conforming to the first compound form. It is an expression that 
defines a population with a strong sense of national identity and also an 
awareness of this national identity. But this definition also draws from the 
third compound form mentioned above, since “national consciousness” is 
imagined as a faculty, which is to say, an attribute of consciousness 
committed to this area of operation.   
 The second example of “national consciousness” reveals a different, though 
perfectly coherent sense of the expression. Taken from a website named 
Digital European Teacher Portfolio, which “aims to develop the sentiment of 
‘being a European teacher’ in our different communities,” 40  the glossary 
presents an entry entitled “national consciousness”, defined as follows: 
Attitudes thought typical of nation: the ideas, beliefs, and attitudes 
regarded as characteristic of a nation.41 
I would like to emphasize, once again, that these definitions are not presented 
as authoritative, but merely as examples of this way of using the expression – 
examples which rely on different definitions of ‘consciousness’ and different 
                                            
40 “Summary of the Project,” Digital European Teacher Portfolio, accessed August 20, 2015,  
https://detp.wordpress.com/category/summary-of-the-project/ 
41“European NAC Glossary,” Digital European Teacher Portfolio, accessed August 20, 2015,  
http://detp.wordpress.com/2009/11/08/european-nac-glossary 
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forms of relating the two terms. Contrary to the preceding definition, which 
pertained to a shared awareness of national identity, this expression focuses 
on a different area, which follows from definition 3 of ‘consciousness’:  “a set of 
shared defining ideas and beliefs . . . attributed as a collective faculty to an 
aggregate of people, a period of time.”42 The “national” – in this form of the 
expression – becomes the possessor of the consciousness, and in particular, 
the consciousness of definition 3.  
Finally, there is a usage of “national consciousness” that means, roughly, an 
ongoing collective sense of self and world, including of current events. This 
consciousness represents the moods, hopes and opinions of a nation and is 
used in the following type of contexts:  
It burst into the national consciousness last year. . .43 
Imagery that has entered the national consciousness through the 
media.44 
In the past several years our national consciousness has been tuned 
into torture.45 
                                            
42  “consciousness, n., entry 4b”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
43 Lucy Cavendish, “The 5:2 Diet: ‘My children force-fed me to stop my mood swings’,” The 
Telegraph, July 13, 2015, accessed August 20, 2015. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/wellbeing/diet/10177692/The-52-Diet-My-children-force-
fed-me-to-stop-my-mood-swings.html 
44 “consciousness, n.” Online OXFORD Collocation Dictionary. Accessed August 20, 2015, 
http://oxforddictionary.so8848.com/search1?word=consciousness 
45 Alexandra Kilduff, America’s torture fascination, The Tartan, February 19, 2007, accessed 
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The events have become part of the national consciousness.46 
The “national consciousness,” in this sense, is a transient and fluctuating 
consciousness that is susceptible to change according to new events (in the 
way moods change). This is more or less the sense Frantz Fanon assigns to 
“national consciousness” as well (which in this particular part of the 
argument he dismisses, but is nevertheless an acknowledgement of its public 
meaning).   
National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing 
crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of 
being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of 
the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and 
fragile travesty of what it might have been.47 
Thus, the national is once again the “possessor” of the consciousness; however, 
the ‘consciousness’ now pertains to definition 4, “personal consciousness,” 
which was defined as “the totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, 
which make up a person’s sense of self or define a person’s identity.” 
Moreover, it also adds a dash of definition 1, a general “state of being of 
aware,” which designates a living, breathing entity that is “in tune” to news 
and events.  
                                                                                                                                   
August 20, 2015, http://thetartan.org/2007/2/19/forum/torture 
46 “Consciousness, ”Merriam-Webster.com, accessed August 17, 2015. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/consciousness. [Dictionary’s emphasis] 
47 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 148.  
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Thus, the grammatical or compound nature of the word ‘consciousness’ allows 
for different sorts of relationships with the term with which it combines. This 
variability causes a potential moment of hesitation in trying to seize the 
meaning of the expression – through which grammatical form does the 
expression impart or create meaning? Does the first term possess the 
consciousness or is it the object of consciousness? Or is the expression a 
concept that refers to a presumed faculty that belongs to consciousness?  
Secondly, there is the fact the word ‘consciousness’ acquires “compound 
meaning,” which transforms the word into a referent that simultaneously 
points, or draws from, multiple definitions. The reason this is significant is 
that ‘consciousness’ is by nature semantically elusive. It rarely derives 
meaning from one definition alone. Once again, the process of apprehending 
the expression entails a further ambiguity-clarifying step: defining the 
meaning of ‘consciousness’.  
Thirdly, there is the fact these expressions lay the semantic groundwork for 
future expressions that involve the use of ‘consciousness’. In other words, 
existing expressions rather serve as schematic templates or models, for 
fashioning a new expression. I believe that understanding the underlying 
grammar that makes these expressions intelligible – and productively 
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ambiguous – can serve as tools for investigating the possibilities of ‘film 
consciousness.’ 
While many will find the boundaries between these six different definitions of 
consciousness difficult to sustain under analysis, and these compound forms 
too reductive or vague for the purposes of formulating new ideas, it is the 
means through which previous uses – and not just future uses – of ‘film 
consciousness’ become intelligible. Prior to Spencer Shaw’s Film 
Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze,48 which is perhaps the first 
text to consciously and deliberately present the formulation as a distinct 
concept (and one which is rather unproductive for the purposes of this thesis 
as explained in subsequent chapters), there were many instances of writers 
reaching for this formulation without a conceptual idea in mind; which is to 
say the formulation was not presented as a concept or term. Its meaning and 
function within the text derived solely from knowledge of the word 
‘consciousness’ and a sense of the way such a word combines with objects. 
Therefore, the project of this chapter has not been just to develop a series of 
categories – and measures – for “assembling” film consciousness categories, 
but also to understand aspect of film discourse that present ideas either on 
precisely these terms (‘film consciousness’) or similar concepts (“film 
experience”). 
                                            
48 Spencer Shaw, Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 2008). 
 169 
CHAPTER 4: ‘FILM CONSCIOUSNESS’ AS 
“FILM AWARENESS”  
One of the first definitions of ‘consciousness’ discussed in the preceding 
chapter (aside from the one named “state of being aware”) was “awareness of 
(something).” It is not awareness in some abstract sense, but rather in 
relation to something else (as mentioned, sometimes defined as 
“intentionality”).1 When this definition of ‘consciousness’ is combined with 
‘film’, it produces the basic construction “film awareness” or “awareness of 
film.”  
The term ‘film’ – like ‘consciousness’ – is ambiguous. It is not limited to an 
actual instance of “film” (such as a movie that physically stands before a 
viewer), but rather to various ideas or categories associated with the term. In 
defining the different approaches to cinematic specificity, Robert Stam’s Film 
theory: An Introduction offers a useful starting point for dividing ‘film’ into 
different areas, which can then be combined individually with ‘consciousness’.  
The question of cinematic specificity can be approached (a) 
technologically, in terms of the apparatus necessary to its 
production; (b) linguistically, in terms of film’s “materials of 
expression”; (c) historically, in terms of its origins (e.g. in 
daguerreotypes, dioramas, kinetoscopes); (d) institutionally, in 
terms of processes of production (collaborative rather than 
individual, industrial rather than artisanal); and (e) in terms of its 
                                            
1 John Searle, Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 1. 
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process of reception (individual reader versus gregarious movie 
theatre).2 
Therefore, drawing and expanding on this list, we can divide ‘film’ into the 
following subcategories for the purpose of combining it with “awareness.” The 
first is “materials of expression,” which I will define as “aesthetics,” and which 
comprises the ideas of “film language” (editing, framing, shot scales, and so 
forth). Next is the area Stam defines as the “process of production,” which are 
the different steps involved in the making of a film, which includes pre-
production, production, post-production, and usually collaborators. I will 
define this simply as “film production” and also include the technologies 
involved in the production as an aspect of this category. Thirdly is a category 
that is defined as “film culture” and incorporates Stam’s historical category. 
But it is much larger than this – it is “film history” broadly conceived, and 
also the perceived social and cultural value of film. Finally, there is a 
subcategory of film I will define as “self-consciousness,” which draws from 
different established categories, such as the “process of reception,” but also 
“film terminology” and “film discourse.” This subcategory is perhaps the most 
abstract, but the sense of it is that there are areas of operation that include 
non-filmmakers (critics, scholars, theorists, spectators) rather consciously 
participating in the process of defining the nature of film. This might take 
                                            
2 Robert Stam, Film theory: An Introduction (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2000), 13 
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place in discourse, terminology, and the means through which a film is 
exhibited and received.  
These categories are deliberately formed in order to combine with 
consciousness when conceived of as “awareness of something.” Of course, 
another film scholar might divide “film” into very different areas. The purpose 
of using an established film scholar like Robert Stam is to ensure that my own 
definitions remain within the realm of the institutionally accepted. The first 
three categories also follow from already existing usages of the term ‘film 
consciousness’ in academic discourse, although as mentioned in the 
introduction, not in a formal, conceptual manner.  
Based on these categories of film, it is then possible to define four different 
types “film awareness.” The idea, as was the case in Chapter 1, is that one can 
describe an individual, group or period on the basis of each of these 
awareness, and moreover, establish these awareness as “generative 
mechanisms,” 3 such as of types of discursive statements or film scholarship.4  
                                            
3 I use “generative mechanism” in the sense Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery apply in Film 
History: Theory and Practice when discussing the “realist” study of film history as “not 
[about] the historical event itself, but the generative (causal) mechanisms that brought the 
event about” (New York: Knopf, 1985), 16. 
4 I take “film scholarship” to constitute the set of activities presented in Jerzy Toeplitz’s “Film 
Scholarship: Present and Prospective,” which includes the study of aesthetics, theory, film 
history and archiving. Film Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1963): 27-37. In addition to these activities, I 
would also include the study of audiences (spectatorship and reception).  
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First there is film aesthetic awareness, which concerns awareness of the 
different aesthetic elements that constitute a film (editing, framing, etc). This 
was covered in some detail in Chapter 1, although not necessarily defined in 
this manner. This awareness can be contrasted, historically, with an 
understanding of film as a transparent window onto reality (which can 
therefore be described as a lack of aesthetic awareness). Secondly there is film 
production awareness, which concerns awareness of the technology and 
procedures that result in the making of a film. This includes everything 
entailed in ‘pre-production’ (writing, scouting, etc) and “post-production” 
(special effects) as well. As shown in Chapter 1, a lack of production 
awareness results in the mistaken attribution of causes to observed film 
effects (for example, attributing all final causes, including effects created in 
editing and photography, to the “scenario writer”). Film culture awareness, 
the third category, defines awareness of the history and social value of film. 
This awareness determines the collective movement towards archiving and 
preservation, as suggested in Bordwell and Thompson’s Film History: An 
Introduction.5 Finally, a remarkable fact of film history, as shown, is that 
early film critics displayed – from a film studies perspective – an interesting 
degree of self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is displayed in different 
domains, such as awareness of film reception, awareness of film criticism, and 
                                            
5 Discussed next chapter as “Film Culture Awareness.”  
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awareness of the impact of film terminology on the construction of the film 
object (since this was covered extensively in Chapter 1, it is excluded from 
this Chapter). It is important to note that each of one of these examples of 
“film awareness” is an example of “film consciousness.”  
 
1. Film Aesthetic Awareness 
While I covered this category already in Chapter 1, it is worth revisiting in 
the context of this chapter, which attempts to establish a series of categories 
in a more deliberately oriented fashion. In his Projecting a Camera, Edward 
Branigan uses the metaphor of a “window” to characterize two contrasting 
spectatorship positions:  
[F]raming in film might be likened to (i) what is witnessed through 
the frame of the “window,” or to (ii) what is seen to be constrained 
and shaped by the frame of the “window” . . . 6 
I would like to use this metaphor to begin thinking about “film aesthetic 
awareness” – which should be seen as both a category through which a 
particular set of evidence is studied for the purposes of drawing out this 
understanding, and also as a property we could assign to different historical 
actors, which is to say, a set of people, a writer, a period or institution that 
                                            
6  Edward Branigan, Projecting a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 106.  
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displays “film awareness.” The window frame metaphor is useful, as well, 
because – like the idea of “a zero degree of filming” 7 – it establishes a moment 
of “zero degree film awareness.” When one looks through film as if it were a 
window frame – “witnessing” the profilmic reality as if it were recorded and 
screened without any intervention – then it is a case of “zero degree film 
aesthetic awareness (or simply “no film awareness” in some contexts). When 
the window frame comes into view, when it is seen to “constrain” and “shape” 
the view of the film content, we have then a case of “film awareness.” In 
practical terms, this means understanding the constructedness of film – and 
the role of different aesthetic choices in determining film effects (what André 
Gaudreault refers to as the “filmographic” aspect of film in opposition to the 
“profilmic,” such as camera movements, editing, framing, and so forth).8  
In order to begin distinguishing the different film awareness from one another 
– and in order to define the material areas in which this awareness becomes 
manifest, such as in a journal – it is useful to think in terms of “regions of film 
consciousness.”9 The headings and titles of a journal is one region of film 
consciousness, but also it is sometimes useful to regard the totality of 
awareness as consisting of different regions, some of which become active, or 
                                            
7  André Gaudreault, Film and Attraction: From Kinematography to Cinema (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press), 58. This was discussed briefly in the Introduction and refers to 
the “paradigm of capturing.” 
8 Ibid., 57-58. 
9 The idea of regions is explained in the Introduction, in footnote number 2. 
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more active, in particular contexts. Thus, following the idea of film awareness 
as a “generative mechanism” in history, we can say that this “region” of film 
consciousness is significantly determinative of the nature of writing about 
film, among other sorts of behaviour toward film. If one possesses a high 
degree of film aesthetic awareness, it follows that it is reflected in some aspect 
of the writing, or in a particular conclusion. To give a precise example, a film 
criticism might make reference to the editing in the film as an element that is 
producing meaning, such as in the following 1912 example from the Moving 
Picture World published in the “Comments on the Films” section: 
The Highlanders’ Defiance (Selig). – While it is difficult to 
repress a feeling of pride that men should be as brave as those who 
play the principal parts in this drama, one cannot restrain the 
further feeling of sorrow for those at home, waiting silently and 
hopefully for the loved ones who gave up their lives to defend a 
position from an attack by the Boers. War is glorious, when one 
reads about the dashing bravery and wondrous gallantry of the 
soldiers who do the fighting, but it takes on quite a different 
appearance when one sees the men fall in battle. Perhaps along with 
its other beneficent offices the motion picture will help the peace 
society advocates in their crusade against war. The graphic 
representation of deaths in battle, followed almost instantly by the 
equally graphic reproductions of the broken-hearted mourners at 
home will emphasize, more than mere words can do, the horrors of 
war, with its waste of life and money. War pictures may be thrilling, 
but they may convey a deeper meaning, and exert a more powerful 
and beneficial influence than their makers suspected.10   
                                            
10 Moving Picture World (22 January 1910), 91. 
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The penultimate line of this criticism includes reference to a series of images, 
in the form of a “montage of attractions”11 – in which the film presents 
graphic images of war followed by “the broken-hearted mourners.” The critic 
explains that this “juxtaposition” produces the idea of “waste of life and 
money.” Where “film aesthetic awareness” comes into play is precisely at this 
juncture – the fact the criticism makes reference to editing, albeit through a 
different terminology, shows the critic is seeing “the constraints” of the frame; 
in other words, the critic is displaying “film aesthetic awareness.” Moreover, it 
is because of this category of analysis that this fact becomes evident. Taken in 
isolation, it might not seem convincing, but these references to filmographic 
operations were rare, and therefore stand in sharp relief against the patterns 
of the time.   
Of course, the idea of “film aesthetic awareness” already exists within film 
studies, although perhaps, as Branigan’s passages illustrates, under different 
names, metaphors or terminologies than the one presented here. Film 
scholars generally understand that there are relative differences in spectator 
awareness of film aesthetics. However, the purpose of specifying this idea in 
the terms mentioned, of providing it a unique category, is to give this precise 
                                            
11 I’m using Tom Gunning’s definition of Eisenstein’s “montage of attractions,” “as any 
aggressive moment designed for maximum emotional or psychological effect on the spectator.” 
Tom Gunning, “Cinema of Attractions,” in Encyclopedia of Early Cinema edited by Richard 
Abel (London: Routledge, 2005), 178. 
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type of awareness a name, in such a manner that it narrows the scope of 
research and becomes a useful analytic concept.  
 Indirect expressions of film awareness 
In discussing the importance of “cultural history,” Jacob Burckhardt writes in 
the Introduction to his late-nineteenth century volume, “The Greeks and 
Greek civilization:”  
Cultural history  . . . consists for the most part of material conveyed 
in an unintentional, disinterested or even involuntary way by 
sources and monuments; they betray their secrets unconsciously and 
even, paradoxically, quite apart from the material details they may 
set out to record and glorify, and are thus doubly instructive for the 
cultural historian. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, sometimes a certain kind of 
awareness is present within a given context, but not “reported” by the holder 
of the awareness. There might be different reasons for this. It could be that 
the person holding the awareness is not able to give the awareness a 
linguistic form, because the terminology or way of talking about this 
awareness does not yet exist. Or perhaps the structural conditions that drive 
awareness to the surface of attention may not be present. The editorial 
direction of early trade publications was oriented toward reporting about 
public interest in cinema and about the commercial value of certain 
productions (as illustrated in Chapter 1). Though, as argued elsewhere, early 
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writers certainly challenged this structure by writing about cinema from a 
variety of perspectives, including theoretically or conceptually, there was no 
outward pressure moving writers toward revealing knowledge of film 
aesthetics. Therefore, a methodology for studying “film awareness” must 
assume that – in some contexts at least – such awareness is expressed 
indirectly, as Burckhardt suggests, in an “unintentional, disinterested or even 
involuntary way,” either in a particular language choice, a set of behaviour, or 
in writings that reveal film awareness in spite of the nature of the direct 
evidence.  
Edward Branigan’s Projecting a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory is 
therefore, once again, an important source for developing such a methodology. 
As the title of his book indicates, Branigan believes the usage of the word 
‘camera’ reveals something important about the way the person sees and 
understands film: 
A camera comes into being — we are able to place it — as we discuss 
and appraise our reactions to a film. A camera will appear in many 
places, not just in the place occupied by the physical camera. 
Furthermore, I have argued that our talk should be understood in 
relation to moves within diverse language-games; that is, within 
selected vocabularies tied to the ways we speak about and construct, 
for example, critical practices, aesthetic discourses, film theories, 
narrative theories, folk theories, values, and everyday discourses. To 
frame a camera, we must understand the formal or informal 
language we use to see it.12 
                                            
12 Branigan, Projecting a Camera, 18. 
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There is a way of using the word ‘camera’, Branigan observes, that is strictly 
metaphorical; when a viewer makes reference to a ‘camera’, it is not the same 
camera as the one actually used during the filmmaking. Rather, in the 
absence of an actual narrator, the ‘camera’ substitutes for an implied author 
that narrates the film. Thus, when the camera is said to “show us” images or 
“moves” from one place to another, as if a disembodied entity, it is not the 
director or camera operator that is implied. Consequently, the camera 
assumes anthropomorphic characteristics, such as “curiosity” or “desire.” 
Branigan presents the example of Dudley Andrews’s analysis of F.W. 
Murnau’s Sunrise (1927) to illustrate this point: 
Later, the man, back to us, wanders toward the marsh, and the 
camera, full of our desire, initiates one of the most complex and 
thrilling movements in all of cinema.13 
While camera movements in particular appear to prompt this “way of 
talking,” in which the camera moves on its own, Branigan also offers an 
example in which even the fixed camera is given this treatment. Commenting 
on Godard’s Le mépris (Contempt, 1963), Kaja Silverman and Harun 
Farocki’s write: 
The camera seems to want to show us how distant it is from him 
[Paul], in every sense of the word.14 
                                            
13 Ibid., 59. 
14 Ibid., 83. 
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Whether one ultimately agrees with Branigan’s conclusions about the 
significance of these usages in revealing implied film theories, or “folk 
theories” (something less than a grand theory of film), Branigan’s least 
ambitious point – mentioned in Chapter 1 – is perhaps the most important 
and interesting from the perspective of language-use and consciousness: 
The use of the word ‘camera’ by a spectator shows only that he or 
she knows a film is a construction that should not be confused with 
reality.15 
This rather simple observation is profound in its implications, especially for 
developing a model of film consciousness that is useful in historical analysis. 
It says, in essence, that ordinary language-use, when applied to film, is an 
entrance point into consciousness, especially in situations in which the 
speaker is precisely not interested in advancing a complex statement about 
the nature of film. To be sure, there are other ways of investigating whether a 
commentator recognizes the constructedness of film, but in an evidentiary 
environment such as early film publications, in which the emphasis is on 
brevity and practical commentary, such attention to word usage is invaluable 
toward tracing film awareness – about whether “he or she knows a film is a 
construction that should not be confused with reality.” As Chapter 1 showed, 
this was the case with Thomas Bedding’s article “Pictorialism and the 
Picture” (1910), when he offers a description of a moment in A Summer Idyl  
                                            
15 Ibid., 93. 
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(D.W. Griffith) in which “here the photographer shows us many interesting 
views of farm life, with Cupid in attendance.”16 
But there are other interesting examples as well, although not necessarily of 
this type that matches with Branigan’s thesis. In fact, almost all of early film 
criticism fits within the paradigm of “indirect expressions of film awareness” – 
through changes in title heading, but also through the usage of certain key 
terms that obviously confound the author to some degree, but which in the 
process of addressing reveals signs of film awareness.  Although already 
discussed in Chapter 1, David S. Hulfish’s “Art in the Moving Pictures” 
presents an ideal case of this form of an indirect expression of awareness.17  
In this article, David S. Hulfish analyzes film according to a definition of 
“art,” which allows him to prescribe a series of recommendations for orienting 
moving pictures closer to his understanding of the concept as he understands 
it. This article, published in May 1909, offers several interesting pieces of 
information, not the least of which is a clear, direct title announcing an 
interest in exploring the relationship between art and cinema (as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, it was commonplace to find articles declaring certain ambitious 
ideas in the title, but which the article rather left unexplored, for different 
                                            
16  Thomas Bedding, “Pictorialism and the Picture,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 11 
(September 10, 1910): 567. 
17 David Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” Nickelodeon 1, no. 5 (May 1909): 139–40. 
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reason). One of the aspects of early film discourses we would like to 
understand is whether, despite many allusions made at the time, there was 
actually a discourse that can be identified as “film as art” in the sense we 
understand the concept of art today. We can point to the work of Canudo 
(1911), and even the legal judgement of Émile Maugras and Maurice Guégan 
(1907), which Gaudreault and Odin have analyzed,18 as early examples of 
attempts to evaluate the necessary and sufficient conditions for cinema to 
become art. Canudo’s 1911 article is particularly direct and powerful in that 
he announces the “birth of a sixth art”, arguing that cinema reconciles the 
plastic and temporal arts, while nevertheless concluding that “it is not yet an 
art” because film does not “interpret” reality but rather “copies” it.19 The 
concern with whether cinema copied or produced an altogether new 
representation of reality was a seemingly common concern of the trade press 
during these years, which often relied on comparisons with pictorial arts.20  
                                            
18 Émile Maugras, and Maurice Guégan., Le Cinématographe Devant Le Droit (V. Giard & E. 
Brière, 1908). André Gaudreault and Roger Odin, “Le Cinématographe, un « enfant prodige », 
ou l’enfance de l’art cinématographique”  Leonardo Quaresima et Laura Vichi (direction), La 
decima musa. Il cinema e le altre arti/The Tenth Muse (Cinema and other Arts, 
Udine/Gemona del Friuli, Forum, 2001): 67-81. 
19 Ricciotto Canudo, The Birth of the Sixth Art, quoted in Richard Abel, French Film Theory 
and Criticism: A History/Anthology, 1907-1939 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1988), 61. 
20 Charlie Keil presents many examples of this in Early American Cinema in Transition: 
Story, Style, and Filmmaking, 1907–1913 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 27-
44. 
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Returning to Hulfish’s analysis, one of the intriguing features is the method 
he employs to make his argument, using a dictionary to present a definition of 
art from the period and then comparing it with cinema – as he understands it. 
Observing that the word “art” was “used from time to time” (which fits with 
my own findings), Hulfish sets out to determine under which definition film 
might be considered art. What is interesting here is that Hulfish confirms our 
suspicion that – despite an equivalence in terminology and a near equivalence 
in meaning – the category of art manifest in this article is categorically 
different than the category of art manifest today; or rather, it is a category of 
art that is missing one of the most important senses of the modern concept. 
Although Hulfish’s definition of art includes “craft,” “skill,” “system of rules,” 
and “mastery,”21 it lacks the sense of “creation” most strongly connected to a 
modern definition, as today’s Oxford English Dictionary includes: 
The expression or application of creative skill and imagination, 
typically in a visual form such as painting, drawing, or sculpture, 
producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or 
emotional power.22  
The OED then offers this valuable clarification, observing that while this 
sense of art was present at the time, it was nevertheless rare: 
                                            
21 David Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” Nickelodeon 1, no. 5 (May 1909): 139. 
22  “art, n.1”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/11125?rskey=li66sq&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
September 01, 2015). 
 184 
Although this is the most usual modern sense of art when used 
without any qualification, it has not been found in English 
dictionaries until the 19th cent. Before then, it seems to have been 
used chiefly by painters and writers on painting.23 
Thus Hulfish’s definition of art lacks the sense of “creation” most strongly 
connected to a modern definition. It is this latter definition of art that has 
tended to excite film scholars because of the type of discourse it opens, and 
because it is on the basis of this category of art, one might propose, that film 
became culturally legitimated and academically institutionalized. Academic 
attention is directed at “film as art” discourse because it is in some ways the 
history of the institutionalization of film studies, at least in many 
departments in North America. 24  Nevertheless, we are interested in 
considering such conceptions of art in the context of trade journals. The 
consequences of a modern conception of art is partially found in the type of 
film analysis and criticism it enables, since the underlying assumption is that 
the meaning of film lies not so much at the surface, but rather in the 
imagination and feelings invested in the work. Although numerous scholars 
have addressed the issue of film and art, Branigan’s views are particularly 
interesting because they include a consideration of the way a viewer 
approaches such a concept of film, which he defines as an “expressionist 
                                            
23  “art, n.1”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/11125?rskey=li66sq&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
September 01, 2015). 
24 It is on this basis, André Gaudreault believes, that the cinema department at Université de 
Montréal was formed according to comments shared with me sometime in 2008.  
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theory of film” (as opposed to the more rational and literal “transmission 
model” David Bordwell proposes)25: 
The underlying process is termed expression, a word that derives 
from Latin and means literally “to press out,” namely, to force 
outward that which is concealed within. What is present on the 
screen is now the residue of some other person’s or entity’s private 
state of consciousness. Ultimately, our task as spectators in an 
expressionist theory is to reconstruct through “empathy” the hidden 
emotions and imagination [of the film]…. A special target of 
expressionist theories is the author – the so-called original and First 
Cause…. Expression theories grew from the Romantic movement of 
the first half of the nineteenth century and stressed the creative 
sensibilities of the lone individual.26  
Such a concept of cinema requires, then, the identification, or at least a 
provisional conceptualization, of a “first cause”, in the form of an 
author/director, which during these early years of the trade press was still not 
apparent in film writing (there were some exceptions as examined in the next 
section, “Film Production Awareness”). Therefore, neither was there a concept 
of art enabling such an approach, nor was there an actual terminology for 
carrying out such an analysis. We are reminded here of another passage from 
Branigan’s work (which I quote at length because its relevance to this thesis): 
                                            
25 As Bordwell explains, “The transmission model suggests that the text acquires meaning 
much as a conversational utterance does. The text passes from a sender to a receiver, who 
decodes it according to syntactic and semantic rules and according to assumptions about the 
speaker's intent in this context.” David Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in 
the Interpretation of Cinema (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 65. 
26  Edward Branigan, Projecting a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 80-81. 
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I believe that when a critic settles on a particular radial meaning of 
“frame” [note: Branigan is using “frame” as an example in this 
context, it could be some other word, like art, or director] as the 
most important and “literal” meaning, he or she will discover 
already in place a theory of film that addresses these questions 
along with a special rhetoric for employing the word “frame”. I 
believe that a “theory of film” may be thought of as the grammar of 
an ensemble of words, such as frame, shot, camera, point of view, 
editing, style, realism, auteur, performance, spectatorship, and 
medium specificity, accompanied by selected radial extensions of 
these words. I believe that a film theory is not simply a set of 
objective propositions about film, because “film” – that is, the 
grammar (the vocabulary) of the words that described film – is not 
fixed, but is tied to culture, value and a consensus about, for 
example, the present boundaries of the medium (i.e., the properties 
we select that presently interest us relating to the materials of the 
medium) as well as the present ideas that are used to ‘clarify our 
experience of film.’27 
Branigan’s comment illustrates the value of being aware of language that “fits 
together” in some discursive situation given an underlying theory, which 
sometimes depends on a key, organizing word – like “art,” or “author” – that is 
assumed to bear a strong relationship with reality (this is what Branigan 
means by settling on the most “literal” meaning, the meaning that comes 
closest to seeming natural, unchallenged to the user). Therefore, Branigan 
presents here a way of thinking about “film theory” or theory in general that 
focuses less on stated axioms, which are attractive to historians, and more on 
a collections of words that seem to operate jointly, and which suggest in their 
                                            
27 Ibid., 115-16. By “radial meaning,” Branigan means “a type of ambiguity that arises when 
the same word appears in different language-games.” Also, when Branigan speaks of “film 
theory”, he sometimes means “folk theory”, a sort of implied film theory each person 
hypothetically adopts when confronted with a film.  
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usage implied axiomatic ideas. Such an approach is of course different, and 
intriguing, as we find new ways of tracing film awareness indirectly.  
I have suggested here that Hulfish’s use of a dictionary definition is 
significant because it establishes an understanding of the way art was 
understood at the time (homonyms are one the most common pitfalls in 
historical analysis in that they provide the illusion of shared conceptual 
schemes between historian and historical figure, which, as the Hulfish 
example shows, is sometimes not the case, at least with key words). One 
might point out, however, that Hulfish is not necessary for establishing this 
fact, since one could merely consult the dictionary of the time and compare it 
with the dictionary definition of today. This would miss the crucial point, in 
my view, that dictionaries are not necessarily reliable in providing a 
representation of the way language is publicly used, and secondly, in the way 
language might simultaneously figure more or less differently depending on 
the domain (as the OED indicated above). It is the fact Hulfish accepts this 
definition of film as art that renders it a legitimate statement of fact about 
the way he (and possibly other) thought about film as art.  
A second interesting element of the article, tied to Branigan’s notion of a 
“grammar of film theory”, is that although Hulfish does not explicitly address 
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an expressionist theory of film, he strongly alludes to one in certain language, 
such as in this passage I quoted in the Introduction: 
Photography….in motography should be considered as merely the 
means for placing before the audience the thoughts of the author of 
the picture as embodied in changing scenes, the art of the picture 
being developed fully in the scenes themselves before the motion 
picture camera is placed before them.28   
Once again, we might be tempted here to focus on the word “author”, but it is 
not necessarily being used in the sense of “creator”, but rather as “camera 
operator”. Neither is “thought”, for that matter, being used in the sense of 
imagination. It seems to refer more to the image the photographer had in 
mind at the point of shooting. This statement seems to indicate that the 
audience sees what the camera operator had in mind at the point of shooting 
(his “thought”). Nevertheless, Hulfish insists on the idea that photography 
expresses “thoughts”, offering this important clarification: 
In pictorial art, every picture expresses at least one thought. 
Sometimes but a single thought is offered; sometimes a number of 
thoughts having some relation are offered, one being a principal 
thought, around which others are grouped.29 
This formulation comes closer to an expressive theory of film (not just because 
the word “expresses” is used). The possibility that pictures convey multiple 
thoughts, usually with some “principal thought around which others are 
                                            
28 Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” 139–40. 
29 Ibid. 
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grouped”, demands an interpretive spectatorship in which references to “first 
causes” would be essential. Following Branigan’s line of thinking, we can 
imagine Hulfish’s use of “author” and “thoughts” being quite different in a 
situation where art was understood in an expressive sense. Certainly, we are 
confronted with a blurry reality, where languages (“authors,” “artists,” 
“thoughts,” “motography”) from different domains are being used 
simultaneously. This is not uncommon in situations of discourse where 
someone is situated at the intersection of different modes of thinking about 
the same object (we are, at this point, not far off from the moment when the 
figure of the director emerges, although very far off from an auteur theory). It 
was during these years that discourses incorporating ideas like “intention”, 
“first causes”, “meaning”, “directors” started to became apparent. In the 
“Elusive Quality”, Louise Reeves Harrison makes allusion, for example, to the 
notion of intention, in reference to what he thought critics ought to be doing: 
If such men are not qualified by experience to judge, or lack 
imagination necessary to “see” what the author intends, every cog 
wheel in the business mechanism has been carefully set in its proper 
place and the main spring omitted altogether.30 
This idea of film cinematography expressing “thoughts” became manifest in 
other writing of the time as well (as will be seen below), and perhaps a code 
                                            
30 Louis Reeves Harrison, “The Elusive Quality,” Moving Picture World 7, no. 8 (August 20, 
1910): 398. 
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word, eventually, for “meaning”. Finally, I would like to draw attention to 
Hulfish’s camera metaphor: 
The motion camera is the audience, and the audience, therefore, 
may be taken by the artist into any viewpoint, at any distance from 
cities or civilization, to gain the setting of the suitable scenery….31 
Branigan defines eight different cameras in his study, which spectators 
hypothesize in the course of viewing a film as a way of navigating the story 
world.32 Interestingly, none of these seem to fit precisely with the idea of the 
“camera as audience.” Hulfish’s intended idea is, I believe, fairly clear: the 
audience views the profilmic world through a camera pointed at different 
things by an “artist” (he uses “camera operator” in the above passage 
although using “author” previously). Branigan’s overall argument is that the 
very language adopted by spectators to talk about films determines how they 
will conceptualize the relationship between audience, film, author, and 
reality. Hulfish’s notion of camera is perhaps worth exploring as a metaphor 
particular to the period, or at least, as one of those metaphors of camera that 
at one time existed before disappearing. Clearly though, what we are 
witnessing is a writer engaged in a struggle to define cinema, which includes 
establishing a vocabulary for talking about its various features, a language 
which in some ways comes to determine the attitude adopted to toward 
                                            
31 Hulfish, “Art in Moving Pictures,” 139–40. 
32 Branigan, Projecting a Camera, 65-96. 
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cinema at various levels. The language Hulfish is struggling with is actively 
revealing – indirectly – not just his sense of aesthetic awareness, but also a 
“folk theory” of the way the camera represents and engages with reality. 
  
2. Film Production Awareness 
The types of cause-effect relationships implied in the creation of film are, 
generally speaking, rather more complex than many other art forms. The 
causal relationship between painter and painting, between writer and text, 
between musician and a piece of music, appears easier to grasp than the 
relationship between filmmaker and film. In offering a criticism of a painting 
or of a piece of literature, the author – the painter or the writer – are 
relatively easy to identify. Moreover, filmmaking requires substantial 
technical knowledge, which is often delegated to experts (for example, “the 
special effects” department). All of these overlapping stages of pre-production, 
production and post-production eventually come together to construct the film 
and to deliver a unified experience to viewers. For the observer unfamiliar 
with production, many of these procedures remain opaque as an ensemble. 
And even when clearly understood, there is significant dispute about which 
elements of the process (the editing, the directing, the acting) have the 
greatest determining influence on the overall effect. This consideration does 
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not include what one understands or defines as “film language,” “film 
aesthetics,” or “filmographic operations,” the mechanism through which a film 
expresses meaning and produces effects. Confronted with such a complex 
world of interconnected elements and creative forces, which combine to form 
the film experience, it is understandable that not everyone would 
conceptualize film causes in the same way. Today, when intention is ascribed 
to an individual, as opposed to structural mechanisms, that “First Cause” – as 
Branigan defines it above – falls on the “director,” or even sometimes, as 
mentioned, the “camera.” However, in early film criticism such a figure had 
yet to be defined. Therefore, there was initially a struggle to identify these 
“causal figures.”  
In fact, it seems there are elements of the creation that remain invisible to 
spectators other than through witnessing the production or having access to 
personal accounts of the production. A director might play a substantial role 
in the editing or leave most of the decisions to the editor – a fact that remains 
unknowable other than through personal accounts, such as Ralph 
Rosenblum’s well-known When The Shooting Stops ... The Cutting Begins: A 
Film Editor’s Story. In discussing his role in the creation of The Night They 
Raided Minsky’s (William Friedkin, 1968), in which according to Rosenblum, 
he created the entire film almost on his own based on footage Friedkin left 
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him to sort through and edit entirely unsupervised over the course of a year.  
Rosenblum writes: 
When the film was finally released in December 1968 – to generally 
positive reviews – some of the critics noted that the combined use of 
color and black and white film was a particularly interesting 
innovation. In the year-end issue of New York magazine Judith 
Crist wrote, ‘Director William Friedkin proves his sense of cinema 
again by remarkable intersplicing of newsreels and striking use of 
black and white fade-ins to color.’ Crist, of course, had no way of 
knowing that Friedkin may not have even seen the film she 
reviewed.33  
While the “director” is now the main entity ascribed intention in the course of 
writing about film (in criticism that still holds to the idea of author intention), 
this was not the case in early film criticism, as presented in Chapter 1. 
Because of this, other entities were selected, which reflect not just a sense of 
“film production awareness,” but also a particular way of conceptualizing and 
ordering the causes and effect relations that result in a film effect. For 
example, identifying a “scenario writer” as opposed to a “photographer” as the 
“First Cause,” reveals a different concept of causation – one is distantly 
removed from the production and screening, the other is present during 
production and also during the screening, as in the examples presented in 
Chapter 1. The importance of giving “film production awareness” a name, in 
contrast to “aesthetic awareness,” is it that it defines a different region of film 
                                            
33 Ralph Rosenblum, When The Shooting Stops ... The Cutting Begins: A Film Editor’s Story 
(New York: Viking Press, 1979), 30. 
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consciousness, not only for the purposes of study, but also because it stands as 
a separate causal explanation for the types of writing found in film discourse 
and film criticism.  
“Film production awareness” is also a region of film consciousness in another 
sense, if the work of Daniel Frampton in Filmosophy is considered.34 While 
the director is critically regarded as the primary cause of the final film, and 
usually cited as such, Frampton believes that film screenings are a different 
order of experience in which rational constructions such as “director” are not 
necessarily present to consciousness as causal explanations. Rather, 
Frampton imagines an indistinct “film being” that serves as an all 
encompassing causal explanation for the “film world”: 
‘Film being’ is a general term for what we understand to be the 
origin(ator) of the images and sounds we experience. Who or what 
provides the images that we see? Why do we see this character, at 
this moment, from this angle?35 
Frampton argues, problematically, that theories about the way films become 
understandable to spectators – such as through narratological concepts like 
“enunciators” – are confusing, irrelevant, and incongruent with the actual 
                                            
34 Daniel Frampton, Filmosophy (London: Wallflower, 2006). 
35 “Film being is a general term for what we understand to be the origin(ator) of the images 
and sounds we experience. Who or what provides the images that we see? Why do we see this 
character, at this moment, from this angle.” Daniel Frampton, Filmosophy (London: 
Wallflower, 2006), 27. 
 195 
film experience.36 The experience of film is first order, in the sense that it 
consists of a direct experience between spectator and film. Theoretical 
explanations about the means through which film narratives become 
intelligible to viewers are second order, in that they are developed after the 
fact in a critical context that disregards the first order experience. 37 These 
second order explanations, Frampton seems to argue, are inserted as 
intermediaries between the spectator and the film without consideration of 
the subjective experience.38 Frampton addresses this gap by defining the film 
experience on phenomenological terms – which is to say, on terms that 
describe the experience of film from the perspective of film viewing. This 
approach is problematic to the degree it extrapolates a general rule from 
Frampton’s singular experience; whatever is happening in Frampton’s 
consciousness while undergoing a film experience is not necessarily the case 
for everyone.  
                                            
36 Daniel Frampton, Filmosophy (London: Wallflower, 2006), 34. 
37  Richard Shusterman distinguishes between first-order and second-order discourse, 
although not in the following manner; first-order discourse is the equivalent of criticism (such 
as film criticism) or some approach that allows for the playfulness of Sobchack’s approach; 
second-order discourse is an analysis of the first-order discourse, such as “meta-criticism.” 
Richard Shusterman, Surface and Depth: Dialectics of Criticism and Culture (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2002), 32, 202. 
38 See Chapter 6, section “Phenomenal or Subjective Experience,” for extended definition of 
“subjective film experience,” which refers to a viewer’s conscious experience during film 
screening.  
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Nevertheless, it is interesting that Frampton arrives at a similar conclusion 
than Branigan, but from a different theoretical approach: where Branigan 
identifies the ‘camera’ as the undefined, implied author, which is articulated 
after the fact, in conversation or writing, as a cause for film effects, Frampton 
sees the ‘film being’ on similar terms, as an all inclusive conceptualization of 
the various causal forces converging on that moment of experience. Rather 
than citing a metaphorical camera taking the viewer from scene to scene, or 
from place to place, Frampton’s ‘film being’ is – in a sense – its 
phenomenological counterpart, something that answers to a desire to causally 
explain the appearance of new film images as it unfolds.  
Returning to the earlier example that cited a “photographer” that “shows us” 
scenes, it serves a causal function in explaining the film experience, even if 
the photographer is not responsible for actually shifting the scene: it is a 
metaphorical photographer that acts as the film being in the case of this 
explanation, in the absence of some other causal explanation (a director, 
editor, writer, or abstract narrator). It enables us to understand something 
about the way this writer imagines how films are intelligible constructions – 
an implied photographer, like a lecturer, shows us scenes of interest which 
build the story. Frampton’s supposition of a “film being” is speculative, and at 
times contemptuous of other spectatorship explanations, but it has the 
 197 
advantage of focusing on the feeling of being a film viewer, and to this degree, 
it is an intervention on questions of film consciousness.  
Nevertheless, the notion of “film production awareness” is intended to 
categorize an area of spectator awareness that plays a role in the construction 
of cause and effect relations resulting in a particular effect. The way this is 
revealed to outsiders is often through the choice of a particular word that 
indicates this awareness – director, author, camera, photographer, scenario 
writer, and so forth.   
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CHAPTER 5: “FILM CULTURE AWARENESS” 
AND “A WAY OF EXISTING TOWARDS FILM.” 
 
1. Film Culture Awareness 
In Los Angeles before Hollywood: Journalism and American Film Culture, 
1905 to 1915, Jan Olsson links the rise of film journalism with the emergence 
of “film culture:” “In this work such discourses [those found mostly in daily 
press] coalesce around Los Angeles and its film culture as well as the more 
abstract place of films and movies within a larger cultural sphere.”1 While 
Olsson never formally defines “film culture” – in a straightforward, axiomatic 
statement – it seems to mostly derive from two understandings of ‘culture’. 
The first, as with “film consciousness,” is when combined with a “modifying 
noun”:  
With modifying noun: a way of life or social environment 
characterized by or associated with the specified quality or thing; a 
group of people subscribing or belonging to this.2 
Thus, “film culture” refers both to the “social environment” associated with 
film as well as the “group of people subscribing” to this environment. It is a 
                                            
1 Jan Olsson, Los Angeles before Hollywood: Journalism and American Film Culture, 1905 to 
1915 (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2008), 16. 
2  “culture, n.”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45746?rskey=imn2eN&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
September 01, 2015). 
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definition rooted in anthropologist Edward Tylor’s 1871 definition of culture, 
“that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society.”3 There is a sense in which “film culture” comprises these aspects of 
the meaning of culture, especially in terms of knowledge and habits. Where 
there is “film culture,” there are people united in developing a social 
environment that includes developing knowledge of film and activities 
centered on the preservation and appreciation of film. 
A second definition of ‘culture’ relevant to understanding Olsson’s usage of 
“film culture” is from Mathew Arnold’s 1869 Culture and Anarchy, writing 
that culture consists of the “pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting 
to know . . . the best which has been thought and said in the world.”4 This 
sense of “culture” refers to a set of behaviour, activities, objects, beliefs – 
within the above broader definition of culture – that attains a certain 
desirable standing or place and therefore becomes the object of “pursuit.” Film 
culture is therefore not necessarily a neutral characterization of a particular 
group or social environment in which film comprises the center of activity. It 
is also a social environment within which certain activities and discourse 
                                            
3  Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, 
Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom (London,: J. Murray, 1871), 1. 
4 Mathew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, quoted in Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 
1780-1950 (Columbia University Press, 1958), 115. 
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function towards providing film with this cultural standing – exercising, 
preserving and upholding “the best which has been thought and said in the 
world” of cinema.  
When seen from these dual perspectives, Olsson’s usage of ‘film culture’ is 
illustrative of a way of thinking about the place of film journalism in the 
context of early cinema, in which it nurtures and sustains discourse and 
activity centering on film, but with an orientation towards exalting its 
virtues. This can be seen narrowly, and literally, in self-congratulatory 
editorial comments, such as when Moving Picture World writes: “Truly for its 
progress, its splendid development, its marvellous rise and a moral influence 
in our civilization the moving picture owes no thanks to the daily press.”5 Less 
evident is the aggregate of activities that these journals enabled, each of 
which function to sustain this vision of film culture, such as the study of 
audiences (as described in Chapter 1), the development of film 
historiography,6 and the writing of film criticism, 7 in addition to creating a 
forum of discussion between readers, writers and the film industry.8  
                                            
5 “The Moving Picture and the Public Press,” Moving Picture World (6 May 1911): 1006. 
6 Film historiography emerged in different forms over the course of the first 20 years of 
cinema. At first towards the technological apparatus, as explained in Simon Popple’s 
“‘Cinema Wasn’t Invented, It Growed’: Technological Film Historiography before 1913,” in 
Celebrating 1895: The Centenary of Cinema edited by John Fullerton (London, John Libbey, 
1998), 19-26; Frank Kessler and Sabine Lenk, “L’écriture de l’histoire au present: Débuts de 
l’historiographie du cinema,” Cinémas 21, n° 2-3 (2011): 27-47; and Santiago Hidalgo and 
Philippe Gauthier, “An Historical Sketch of Animated Pictures: New Perspectives on 
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The concept of “film culture” is presented in this chapter as a means – or 
gateway – into thinking about a different meaning of “film consciousness,” 
which encompasses a spectrum between the previous chapter’s definition – 
that of “film awareness” – and the last chapter’s definition – that of an “entity 
in consciousness.” This chapter is therefore a transition between two points – 
in thinking about film consciousness as signifying an awareness of some 
aspect of film (aesthetics, filmmaking, films) and signifying an imagined thing 
in consciousness (faculty, place, identity, or conscious experience) as a 
singular entity named ‘film consciousness’. Transitional areas – spectrums – 
are therefore difficult to pinpoint or define as categories, since they draw from 
multiple domains. However, I believe it will make sense to define this broad 
area of film consciousness as “film culture awareness.”  
                                                                                                                                   
Historical Discourses in Early Cinema” presented at the FSAC (Film Studies Association of 
Canada) in Montreal in 2010. Film historiography gradually incorporates a history of authors 
and directors as discussed in Santiago Hidalgo and Philippe Gauthier, “En marge de 
l’historiographie du cinématographe? Georges Méliès et le discours historiques sur les vues 
cinématographes,” Méliès, Carrefour Des Attractions (Centre Culturel International de 
Cerisy, France, July 2011): 33-44 which highlights several early works tracing the history of 
George Méliès: Victorin Jasset, “Étude sur la mise en scène en cinématographie,” Ciné-
Journal, no 166 (28 October, 1911): 33 and 35-37; Maurice Clément, “Le cinéma sur les 
boulevards,” Ciné-Journal, no 297 (May 2, 1912): 22; and John B. Rathbun, Motion Picture 
Making and Exhibiting (Chicago, Charles C. Thompson Company, 1914): 77. 
7  Covered extensively in Santiago Hidalgo, “Film Theory as Practice: Criticism and 
Interpretation in the Early American,” in Proceedings of the XVI International Film Studies 
Conference-Permanent Seminar on History of Film Theories: In the Very Beginning, at the 
Very End, 2009, edited by Francesco Casetti and Jane Gaines (Udine: Forum, 2010): 83-93 
8 See Charlie Keil, “The Trade Press: A Forum for Feedback,” in his Early American Cinema 
in Transition: Story, Style, and Filmmaking, 1907–1913 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2001), 27-29. 
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Consider, for example, David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson’s usage of ‘film 
consciousness’ in Film History: An Introduction. The first of these examples is 
unique in that it straightforwardly presents a definition (in this case of ‘movie 
consciousness’ which for now will be taken as an equivalent idea as that of 
‘film consciousness’): 
During the recession [in the 1970s], however, studios also granted 
filmmakers the opportunity to create something like European art 
films. Sometimes a single filmmaker like Coppola might participate 
in both trends. Both were characterized by “movie consciousness,” 
an intense awareness of film history and its continuing influence on 
contemporary culture.9 
Bordwell and Thompson’s definition conforms almost perfectly with “film 
culture awareness,” which includes both awareness of film history, but also of 
film’s cultural value. The two other examples derive part of their sense from a 
sub-definition of ‘consciousness’ mentioned in chapter 3, when awareness is 
seen as the source of conviction (which is why social movements seek to “raise 
awareness” – the conviction is left implied):10  
The growth in international film consciousness spurred 
governments to fund archives that would take up the burden of 
systematically documenting and preserving the world’s film 
culture.11 
                                            
9 David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film History: An Introduction (Boston: McGraw-
Hill, 2003), 517. 
10  “consciousness, n., entry 1”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
11 Bordwell and Thompson, Film History, 356. 
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The meaning of ‘film consciousness’ in this passage refers to consciousness of 
the cultural and social value of film, from which conviction to preserve film 
arises. This meaning is further confirmed in another section of Bordwell and 
Thompson’s book, in a section titled “Film Consciousness and Film 
Preservation” (Figure 2). Although the formulation ‘film consciousness’ is not 
used in the section directly under the heading, the authors allude to it, 
writing “American filmmakers’ new awareness of film history coincided with a 
growing need to safeguard the country’s motion-picture heritage.”12  
 
Figure 2: “Film Consciousness and Film Preservation,” David Bordwell and 
Kristin Thompson, Film History: An Introduction (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 
2003), 532. 
                                            
12 Ibid., 532. 
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It is interesting – in showing the polysemic nature of the formulation as well 
as its possibilities of meaning – that Bordwell and Thompson use ‘film 
consciousness’ quite differently within the same volume (and Bordwell 
himself, as the final chapter shows, also manages to use ‘film consciousness’ 
in yet another sense in another text). Notice that in the following passage the 
formulation has acquired not just a different connotation, along the 
continuum of “film culture awareness,” but also a different ontological status:  
Scorsese’s film consciousness also emerges in his virtuosic displays 
of technique. His films alternate intense, aggressive dialogue scenes 
designed to highlight the skills of performers such as Robert De Niro 
with scenes of physical action served up with dazzling camera 
flourishes.13 
There are several points to be made about this usage. Elsewhere in the 
volume, as noted, Bordwell and Thompson define “movie consciousness” as 
“an intense awareness of film history and its continuing influence on 
contemporary culture.”14 The same authors also use ‘film consciousness’ on 
two occasions to mean this awareness, but also a conviction towards 
preserving and archiving film. But the above usage seems more oriented 
toward conceiving of “film consciousness” as a faculty that is implemented in 
the act of filmmaking. It includes, one assumes, a sense of film history and 
film culture, but it is also seems, given this context, a filmmaking knowledge 
                                            
13 Ibid., 529. 
14 Ibid., 517. 
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and artistic sensibility. We can deduce from this passage that great 
filmmakers have “film consciousness” – from which emerge “virtuosic displays 
of technique.” It draws from awareness of film history and culture, but it has 
become something else in the process, an “entity in consciousness” (which is 
discussed in more detail in the last chapter).   
If film consciousness is imagined as “film culture awareness,” it can be 
manipulated to serve a rhetorical or reception purpose – at least if we 
consider the way the following reviewer applies the formulation. In a review 
in the New York Press of Marco Bellocchio’s The Wedding Director (2006), 
Armond White writes, “Bellocchio uses film consciousness to address social 
consciousness.”15 The story is about a film director who falls in love with the 
daughter of a prince. White sees the director in the film as a proxy for the 
director outside of the film. In this sense, the film is intended to “to poke fun 
at the pretenses directors and audiences bring to the movies.”16 As such, the 
film makes reference to Italian filmmaking history: ““Bellocchio is inspired by 
film culture’s influence on Italy’s daily life,” especially in “the legacy of the 
Italian artist-nobleman like Visconti and Fellini.”17 But these references are 
not “about cultural hipness,” according to White, but rather, as suggested, 
                                            
15 Armond White, “Quicksilver Fox,” NY Press (June 11, 2008), Accessed June 23, 2013. 
http://www.nypress.com/article-18380-quicksilver-fox.html. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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they are a means of addressing “social consciousness.” Therefore, the 
audience’s awareness of these references – and of the particular place Italian 
filmmaking and film culture maintains within Italian culture – constitutes 
the audience’s “film consciousness.”. 
Unlike the preceding examples of film awareness, the category of “film self-
consciousness” does not clearly follow from substituting a notion of ‘film’ into 
the formulation ‘film consciousness.’ Each of the previously mentioned 
examples of film awareness incorporates a reasonable interpretation of “film” 
when considered broadly – as a historical and cultural phenomenon, as an 
aesthetic object, and as a process that results in the making of a film. In this 
category, awareness is not directed outwardly, but rather inwardly; or more 
accurately, it is directed in both directions, in the sense that it implies 
recognition of the self in relation to the construction of the object of film. This 
film awareness is essential to the formation of a community disposed to film 
studies. Therefore, the presence of this awareness is noteworthy in the study 
of writing about film. It is continuous with film study, without necessarily 
being an institutional representation of such an activity (a classroom, a 
library, a university or institute). As defined in detail in Chapter 1, such 
awareness is indeed present during the period of early cinema in film 
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publications, which substantially precedes current understandings of when 
the activity of film study begins.18 
We have seen thus far that when film consciousness is imagined as film 
culture awareness, it can serve to highlight different elements of 
consciousness – the consciousness of the filmmaker, of the audience, and of 
those engaged in activities oriented toward preserving, archiving, or even 
studying film. Secondly, it is sometimes imagined as something that refers 
strictly to a sense of awareness about certain facts related to film, but also to 
a faculty, which is to say, something which has become part of consciousness 
in some enduring or integrative sense. But as mentioned, this area of the 
spectrum of film consciousness presents certain difficulties in pinning down 
all of the different ways in which it can be used to mean. The following series 
of excerpts, for example, display a new orientation, which is as “turning 
points” or “changes” in a collective way of behaving, thinking or existing 
towards film; perhaps, even, it is that which underlies film movements, 
although not necessarily representing a film movement.  
 
                                            
18 Dana Polan, in Scenes of Instruction: The Beginnings of the U.S. Study of Film (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007) and Peter Decherney, in “Inventing Film Study and Its 
Object at Columbia University, 1915-1938,” Film History 12, no.4, Color Film (2000), 443-460, 
are not wrong in suggesting that film study begins institutionally in the late 1910s in 
university programs. The purpose of focusing on awareness, and “Ways of Existing Toward 
Film,” is to deinstitutionalize the awareness and attitude present in the study of film, such 
that it applies to non-traditional contexts.  
 208 
2. Ways of Existing Towards Film  
In his The Major Film Theories: An Introduction, Dudley Andrew describes 
the influence of Sergei Eisenstein’s ideas on French filmmaking in the 1970s 
as fostering “a new radical film consciousness:” 
With the massive translation projects of the late sixties, Bazin’s grip 
on the film theory of France was loosened. Eisenstein’s ideas today 
are heard everywhere in Paris. They dominate the major journals, 
Cahiers du Cinéma and Cinéthique. They are evident in the 
dynamic cutting style of recent French movies. In short they have 
been integrated into, and have helped foster, a new radical film 
consciousness.19 
Several decades later, film critic Marc Gervais, defines a generation of 
filmmakers and film savants after the Second World War as acquiring a 
“‘mature film consciousness:” 
Film reflected this process, though in abbreviated fashion. So the 
cinema, too, enjoyed its classical period, however briefly (some fifty 
years), a period that produced monuments to artistic creativity and, 
indeed, to the human spirit. Then came, after the Second World 
War, the great modernist period in which my generation acquired its 
“mature” film consciousness. Now, we felt, film was really daring to 
explore humanity’s encounter with reality.20 
In The Columbia Companion to American History on Film: How the 
Movies Have Portrayed the American Past, contributor William J. Palmer 
offers the following characterization of 1980s filmmaking:   
                                            
19 Dudley Andrew, The Major Film Theories: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 1976), 
75. 
20 Marc Gervais, “Movies Are Beginning to Breathe Again,” Compass 14, no. 5 (1996): 14. 
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A literariness marked by films such as The French Lieutenant’s 
Woman (1981) and Ragtime (1981) proved a false start to the 
decade’s film consciousness, but by 1982 the first real gatherings of 
sociohistorical film texts around contemporary life texts began. 
Films such as Testament (1983) and Silkwood (1983), perhaps 
inspired by Israel’s preemptive strike against an Iraqi nuclear 
reactor in 1981, actually predicted (as The China Syndrome had in 
1979) real-life toxic disasters such as the gas leaks in Bhopal, India, 
that killed 3,400 people in 1984 and the Chernobyl nuclear plant 
explosion in 1986.21  
Finally, in a recent piece covering Philippine films at the 58th Berlin Film 
Festival, the impact of new editing technology on Philippine filmmaking is 
described in terms of giving rise to a “new film consciousness:” 
This “new era” of filmmaking in the Philippines brings out a new 
breed of young and dynamic filmmakers. This is the advent of the 
independent digital filmmaking. The emergence of affordable and 
user-friendly digital cameras and editing softwares make this rapid 
evolution possible resulting to a new film consciousness in the 
Philippines with a profound interest in festivals abroad. It is quite 
similar to the so-called “golden age” of Philippine Cinema in the 70’s 
and 80’s . . . 22 
Here we have then four examples of ‘film consciousness’ – from different 
periods and different contexts – that differ in meaning from the ‘film 
consciousness’ discussed above, but which shares a strong continuity of 
meaning. We might recall that an important premise guiding this thesis, with 
                                            
21 William J. Parker, “The 1980s,” in The Columbia Companion to American History on Film: 
How the Movies Have Portrayed the American Past, edited by Peter C. Rollins (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 42-43. 
22 Signis no. 2082 (February 22, 2008), accessed August 31, 2015,  
 http://www.signis.net/imprimer.php3?id_article=2082 
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respect to the analysis of ‘film consciousness’, comes from Christian Metz, 
when he writes, “a film is difficult to explain because it is easy to 
understand.”23 The same is true of language – the above examples of ‘film 
consciousness’ are not difficult to understand, but they are difficult to classify 
and explain, not just because of the reality indicated, but also because of the 
way the formulation overlaps with other semantic areas. As an informal 
attempt, these usages of ‘film consciousness’ roughly mean a “way of existing 
towards film” based on a set of shared and defining beliefs. From a 
historiographic perspective, this “film consciousness” is observable in 
collective activity, more so than in “subjective first person reports”24 that 
provide access to the conscious experience of a group or individual, as the case 
with the film consciousness discussed in the final chapter.  
I believe that part of the meaning of the above usage of “film consciousness” 
derives from the third definition of ‘consciousness’ provided in Chapter 3, 
“shared defining ideas and beliefs”: 
                                            
23 Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), 69. 
24  These are reports that describe subjective experience directly from a first person 
perspective. The term is used in this form in the following source: Beja Margithazi, “‘Last 
night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows…’ The Role of Body and Senses in Various ‘First 
Contact’ Narratives,” Ősz (December 10, 2012). http://uj.apertura.hu/2012/osz/margithazi-the-
role-of-body-and-senses/ 
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OED: “Attributed as a collective faculty to an aggregate of people, a 
period of time, etc.; a set of shared defining ideas and beliefs.” 25 
Each of the above examples refers to an “aggregate of people” (filmmakers, 
savants) and a period of time (the 70s, the 80’s, after the Second World War, 
and the 2000s). It is more difficult, perhaps, to see that the ‘consciousness’ – 
in these contexts – consists of a set of shared and defining beliefs, since in 
each case ‘film consciousness’ is used in reference to an action or behaviour 
that presumes it. Moreover, when Dudley Andrew writes about Eisenstein’s 
writings ushering in “a new radical film consciousness” – the film 
consciousness is not something which a person or group has to different 
degrees. It is finite and indivisible. In contrast, film consciousness in terms of 
“film awareness” is spoken about in quantifiable and spatial terms – it has a 
range, a level; it increases or decreases.   
In other words, as opposed to being quantifiable, this usage of film 
consciousness is qualified. The accompanying modifier serves to define its 
nature: “new,” “mature,” and “new radical.” As characterizations, these are 
also not neutral. The word choice is indicative of the particular rhetorical 
function the formulation serves. In each case, the modifying term announces a 
turning point in a particular direction: from old to “new,” from 
                                            
25  “consciousness, n., entry 4b”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
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unsophisticated to “mature,” from conventional to “radical.” Film 
consciousness is presented as a desirable end point within a contained 
historical process.  
Finally, there is an interesting categorical implication in the above passages. 
In order for there to be a “new film consciousness” there logically must have 
been an “old film consciousness” – even if that seems antithetical to the idea 
of film consciousness as a point of culmination. It is the nature of this 
accompanying language that its opposite is implicitly invoked, to some 
degree. 26  A “radical film consciousness” implies a “conventional” one; a 
“mature film consciousness” implies an “immature” or “primitive” film 
consciousness. In each case, the chosen vocabulary brings into existence a 
category through which behaviour is analyzable and to which is attributable a 
relative degree of progression along some imagined spectrum (the fact Palmer 
refers to a “false start” is a sign of this imagined progression, which, from his 
perspective, is momentarily halted during a turn toward “literariness” in the 
early 1980s, but which resumed with an increase in “sociohistorical film 
texts”).  
Whatever the ultimate meaning of “film consciousness” for these writers, it 
minimally, and unequivocally, represents – within the historical context 
                                            
26 The idea of a word implying its opposite is derived from Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” in 
Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 3-27. 
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referred to – an important shift from one “way of existing” towards film, to 
another “way of existing” towards film. 27 This shift might include a new 
sensitivity to the theoretical side of film (in the case of integrating 
Eisenstein’s ideas); a willingness to “explore humanity’s encounter with 
reality”; a turn towards “contemporary life texts;” or a “new era” of affordable 
filmmaking and its global impact. Therefore, while representing an end point 
of a historical process, it is not specific or enduring, in the sense of being the 
same across different contexts, as is the case with “aesthetic film awareness,” 
which refers to a specific awareness of film that is either present or not 
present to different degrees. In the hands of a given writer, ‘film 
consciousness’ will signify that an important change has take place at a level 
that is difficult to define institutionally, but which pervades a defined group 
and period.   
                                            
27 The expression “way of existing” is taken from the OED’s definition of “state,” which is used 
in conjunction with ‘consciousness’: “A combination of circumstances or attributes belonging 
at a particular time to a person or thing; a particular manner or way of existing as defined by 
the presence of certain circumstances or attributes.” I believe this expression – “way of 
existing” – captures the external, behavioural side of consciousness. It does not refer to a 
subjective phenomenon, but rather to an empirically describable collective behaviour, in 
specific contexts, that is nevertheless binding at the level of beliefs, actions and ideas. 
Therefore, “film consciousness” as a “way of existing towards film” identifies a presumed 
consciousness underlying collective behaviour occurring at a fixed place and moment in 
relation to film as a response to film experience and major public events.  “state, n.”. OED 
Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/189241?rskey=2QTxnG&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed September 02, 2015).  
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One concept that seems to overlap with this sense of film consciousness, as a 
way of existing towards film, deriving from an awakening or awareness of 
film culture, is that of “film movement.” However, contrasting this term with 
that of film consciousness, as used in the above excerpts, will show that there 
is enough differences between them to consider the value of thinking about 
certain collective behaviour in cinema in terms of film consciousness. In Film 
Art, Bordwell and Thompson provide, if not a widely accepted, then at least a 
direct, authoritative definition of “film movement.” According to Bordwell and 
Thompson, “a film movement consists of two elements:” 
1. Films that are produced within a particular period and/or nation 
and that share significant traits of style and form 
2. Filmmakers who operate within a common production structure 
and who share certain assumptions about filmmaking28 
Both of these elements are present in the particular historical reality Dudley 
Andrews describes. Andrews identifies a set of filmmakers (French 
filmmakers in the 1970s) operating within a common production structure 
who produce films sharing significant traits in style (“dynamic cutting style of 
recent French movies”). The causal explanation is that this style is drawn 
from Eisenstein’s’ recently published writings. All of the typical elements 
associated with a film movement are present, including the importance of a 
                                            
28 Bordwell and Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction, 8th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2008), 
440. 
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common source of shared, published ideas. Yet – at first glance – these 
elements do not constitute a film movement. Andrews was aware of this in 
refraining to define it as such – instead it made sense to define this collective 
behaviour as “film consciousness,” the consciousness that might normally 
underlie a film movement, but which does not have the same visible and 
perhaps consistent structure. 
In fact, there seem to be at least four significant differences between “film 
movement” and “film consciousness.” The first is that “film consciousness” – 
as opposed to “film movement” – belongs to more than just filmmakers; it also 
belongs, potentially, to other groups working in film-related environments 
(academics, archivists, historians, spectators), as Gervais’s example shows.  
Secondly, film consciousness does not necessarily exist within a defined 
“production structure.” As the Gervais’s and Parker’s example also shows, 
film consciousness – rather like ideology – traverses usual structuring 
categories, such as “nations” or “institutions.” It is a more porous idea. 
Thirdly, and following from this, film consciousness is a description of a 
reality underlying a more structured behaviour, but which nevertheless has 
an identity and coherency. Where “film movement” identifies an objectively 
verifiable social reality that exists at the “surface” of our historical attention – 
but which nevertheless requires analytical concepts to occasionally identify – 
“film consciousness” describes an area of reality that is less visible, less likely 
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to draw attention, but which might serve as the basis of a film movement. 
Finally, a “film movement” suggests a direction and purpose, often publicly 
indicated, such as in manifestos or writings. This is to say, filmmakers 
involved in film movements are more or less aware of the fact of being in a 
movement (a good example is the French New Wave). But “film 
consciousness” is not necessarily purpose-oriented; it is a terminal point, from 
which other ideas and behaviour might emerge. 
In suggesting that “film consciousness” underlies “film movements,” but is not 
a movement itself, it is perhaps advisable to turn to a concept that purports to 
describe underlying behaviour related to film – that of “cinematic episteme.” 
Is it the case that this term duplicates “film consciousness”? I believe it does 
not; and moreover, I believe it brings into further focus further concept 
specificity.  
Although developed over a series of texts, François Albera appears to have 
formally presented the notion of “cinematic episteme” for the first time in his 
chapter “First Discourses on Film and the Construction of a ‘Cinematic 
Episteme’ (2010) in the Blackwell Companion to Early Cinema: 
We might therefore speak of a cinematic episteme, in the sense in 
which Michel Foucault uses the word, and here I will advance the 
hypothesis, in an analysis of a broad range of “early discourses” on 
film, that this episteme was built on a relationship between the 
mechanical (the device and its mechanical, optical and chemical 
workings) and the psychic (the “modern mind” subjected to the 
 217 
upheavals of urban and industrial life; the various scientific 
reformulations around perception, intellection and affects).29 
The remainder of Albera’s chapter leaves the precise nature of the term 
unexplained, even if the study itself serves as an illustration of it. However, 
Albera suggests two references for interpreting the meaning of “cinematic 
episteme”: the first is Michel Foucault’s use of “episteme,” and the second, 
indicated in a footnote, is of an earlier article in which he “introduced this 
hypothesis with Maria Tortajada in ‘The 1900 Episteme.’”30 This earlier text 
is then a logical starting point for understanding the meaning of “cinematic 
episteme”, since it explains the methodology and concepts Albera applies in 
the text mentioned above. This first text also provides a relatively clear 
definition of “episteme” in contrast to other terms; in this sense it provides a 
more global picture of Albera’s conceptual framework. In this context, 
“conceptual framework” simply means the particular way an author uses a set 
of terms even if these terms already have established institutional meanings 
elsewhere. Each author has a hierarchy in which a particular term is situated 
in relation to one another. This passage is revealing of this framework and 
hierarchy, since all of these terms are polysemic and interpreted differently 
according to individual.  
                                            
29 François Albera, “First Discourses on Film and the Construction of a ‘Cinematic Episteme’,” 
in The Blackwell Companion to Early Cinema edited by André Gaudreault, Nicolas Dulac and 
Santiago Hidalgo (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 121. 
30 Ibid., fn1, 136. 
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The term [episteme], coined by Michel Foucault, is problematic, 
partly because of the way it ‘competes’ in this chapter with notions 
of ‘model’ and ‘paradigm’ with which it is confused. Foucault’s 
episteme has a characteristic which distinguishes it from paradigm 
(described by Thomas S. Kuhn) and a fortiori from the model, in that 
it does not define a state of knowledge – whether scientific of 
philosophical – at a particular moment, but that which makes a 
theory, practice or opinion possible.31 
The important question left open regards the meaning of “that” in the final 
phrase (“that which makes a theory, practice or opinion possible”). In the 
earlier chapter on film awareness, one of the arguments presented was that 
film awareness represented a condition for certain film discourse. “Aesthetic 
film awareness” and “film production awareness” are conditions for 
elaborating a theoretical understanding of the causal chain through which 
films produce effects, including meaning. In this regard, film awareness offers 
some detail about the meaning of “that.” It is a piece of the “cinematic 
episteme” puzzle. If episteme, as Albera and Tortajada assert via Foucault, is 
the condition – and not a state of knowledge – that makes a theory, practice, 
or opinion possible, then film consciousness, as film awareness, is precisely 
one of those explanations, especially with respect to early film discourse. 
However, it seems that Albera does not necessarily have this idea of 
“cinematic episteme” in mind – the idea that cinematic episteme is a means 
                                            
31 François Albera and Maria Tortajada, “The 1900 Episteme,” in Cinema Beyond Film: 
Media Epistemology in the Modern Era edited by François Albera and Maria Tortajada 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 25. 
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through which film is understood – even if the concept is definable as such. 
Rather, it seems that Albera is interested in defining an episteme that cinema 
– and its technological and artistic web of connections – contribute to 
producing and from which assertions about the world at large are constructed. 
Where the category of film consciousness is an attempt to investigate the 
consciousness of a spectator, critic, or writer whose attention is directed at 
film, expressed in acts of discourse and behaviour, Albera’s causal arrows 
point in the other direction: he is interested in studying the episteme of 
cinema that a spectator learns and reapplies in other contexts. In this sense, 
Albera’s “cinematic episteme” is closer in nature to Francesco Casetti’s “film 
gaze” (discussed in Chapter 7, in the section “Faculty”). They are both 
concepts that capture the epistemological effects (know how, ways of seeing, 
beliefs) of cinema on spectators, rather than serving to study the means – the 
episteme or awareness – through which film becomes intelligible to audiences, 
including critics and theorists.  
Another key difference between “film consciousness” and “cinematic episteme” 
exists at the level of attribution – which is to say, at the level of who possesses 
these qualities. Stated otherwise, is it possible for someone to hold “cinematic 
episteme” such that it would make grammatical sense to attribute it to a 
group? The answer to that seems “no.” Cinematic episteme does not, in 
principle, belong to anyone. It is a construction of what someone imagines as 
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being “out there” in the world (ideas, beliefs, concepts, information from which 
prospective individuals or groups draw from in order to form opinions or 
theories). In metaphorical terms, cinematic episteme is rather like a fountain 
or a pool. Film consciousness, on the other hand, is something that belongs to 
a group or individual. It is an already acquired and defined “way of existing” 
that includes shared and defining beliefs, and various sets of film awareness. 
This “embodiment” of film consciousness is a crucial difference from the more 
detached notion of episteme and speaks to a rhetorical difference in the way 
such terms are applied, in other words, what these terms target as objects of 
description, even if the evidence that is used to support these descriptions is 
very similar. The vast majority of Albera’s writings on cinematic episteme are 
based on information – transformed in the act of analysis into beliefs, 
schemes, or concepts – contained within early publications. 
In the end, we can say that the categories of film consciousness presented in 
this and the last chapter are fluid ideas, which are nevertheless distinct. They 
are not neatly segregated aspects of consciousness. It is merely helpful, I 
believe, to see the differences in the way the formulation is used publically 
and institutionally, as well as to cast attention on particular features of 
ordinary evidence. In addition to this, there are usages of ‘film consciousness’ 
that seem to assume many of these meanings simultaneously. Consider this 
example from 1974: 
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Since the cinema and print literature share so many conventions 
and techniques, despite media differences, it would seem logical that 
similar critical methods could be applied, and that the student and 
critic of each could benefit from familiarity with not one but both art 
forms. A reader with film consciousness becomes aware of the visual 
and aural appeals of much fine writing, and training in literature 
gives perspective to ones appreciation of film.32  
The meaning of this usage of ‘film consciousness’ is elusive yet intuitive – it is, 
at the same time, an awareness of film aesthetics, of film history, of film 
production, and also a way of seeing and understanding, a change to the way 
the world is perceived, including writing. Indeed, it makes perfect sense that 
“A reader with film consciousness becomes aware of the visual and aural 
appeals of much fine writing,” since a person who has experienced film and 
who has become immersed in it potentially perceives details in the visual field 
differently than someone who has gone through the same experience.  
 
                                            
32 Christine Mary Gibson, Cinematic Techniques in the Prose Fiction of Beatriz (PhD diss., 
Michigan State University, 1974), 17. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE MEANING OF ‘FILM 
EXPERIENCE’  
The last chapters turn attention towards a more subjective understanding of 
“film consciousness” – as something that exists in the world as a result of film 
experiences. Because one of the operating premises of this this thesis is that 
film consciousness belongs to a world in which film experiences occur, the 
objective of this chapter is to define the meaning of ‘film experience’.  The 
following chapter examines more specifically the significance of treating “film 
consciousness” as a unified thing or entity, as opposed to representing a 
relationship between film and consciousness. In examining the different ideas 
associated with “film experience,” it also provides an opportunity to review 
some of the literature that seems to overlap with the more subjective and 
unified understanding of film consciousness.  
In fact, it is impossible to imagine “consciousness” without reference to 
“experience.” The relationship between “experience” and “consciousness” can 
be divided according to different intervals: experience causes conscious 
phenomena to become manifest, such as feelings, emotions and thoughts; 
consciousness, itself, is an experience, exemplified in the expression 
“conscious experience;” and experience is something that remains in 
consciousness  (in the form of know-how, but also in the form of feelings, 
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emotions and thoughts). These different ways of using ‘experience’ in relation 
to “consciousness,” or aspects of consciousness, provides distinct possibilities 
of description, including at various intervals, but also a means of talking 
about consciousness more generally.  
Consider, for example, the simple act of biking. The experience of biking (the 
trial or act of biking) causes certain conscious phenomena to appear (feelings, 
sensations, thoughts, memories). These conscious phenomena are definable, 
as an aggregate or totality, as an experience (or as “subjective experience”). 
Subjective experience is that which one experiences while engaged in a 
particular activity. Over the course of biking, a person gains experience or 
more specifically “biking experience.” There is now an experience that stays 
with this person in the form of know-how or skill.  But this “biking 
experience” might also refer to the subjective experience that took place while 
biking, which is to say, the sensations and emotions during that interval of 
time – during that experience of biking. Therefore, ‘experience’ can refer to 
the entirety of an activity, to the act itself, to the interior world produced by 
the act, and to the phenomena and knowledge that remains with the 
individual after the activity is completed.  
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1. The Semantic Field of ‘Experience’ 
Most dictionary sources recognize multiple definitions of the word 
‘experience.’ The Oxford Dictionary of English, for example, offers a combined 
eleven entries when ‘experience’ is used as a noun and a verb.1 Rather than 
present all eleven entries, this chapter attempts to organize them into smaller 
groups: (1) the fact of “undergoing” an event (“to experience” bike riding for 
the first time, to observe an event or situation, to experiment with 
something); (2) the “subjective experience” in these acts of undergoing (the 
feelings, sensations, thoughts occurring while undergoing the event; (3) the 
“remainders” in consciousness, either in terms of know-how or conscious 
phenomena; and (4), an institutional or social category of experience that 
designates an ideal or typical experience in relation to an object.  
A. “Undergoing”  
A common usage of the term ‘experience’ is for describing the act of 
“undergoing” (“to experience” an event, activity, emotion, etc.). Many 
expressions convey this sense of the term: “observing,” “making trial of,” 
“being exposed to,” “living through.” There seem at least three basic 
conditions for this usage: that there is an event, including mental or 
psychological events (biking, crying, thinking); that there is a passage of time 
                                            
1  “Experience.” OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed June 23, 2013. 
http://www.oed.com. 
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that would justify seeing it as “undergoing” that particular event; and finally, 
that attention was directed at the event. It is the person describing this 
“experience” who obviously determines whether being at an event counts as 
“observing,” “as living through,” as “being exposed to,” and so forth. 
Otherwise, it is possible to imagine a situation in which a person is present at 
an event, but who, at the same time, is not experiencing the event (because 
attention is directed elsewhere). The conscious link between the person and 
the event is necessary for it to be defined as “experiencing” or “undergoing.” 
B. “Subjective Experience” 
When undergoing an event, such as biking (or film viewing), a set of conscious 
phenomena is produced. This set of conscious phenomena is definable as 
“subjective experience” and is particular to that person. This is why two 
people will “experience” the same event differently; the conscious phenomena 
appearing in each person is different. This conscious phenomena – which is 
consciousness for many philosophers – is dividable into three areas, following 
the work of Daniel Dennett: 
 (1) Experiences of the “external” world, such as sights, sounds, 
smells, slippery and scratchy feelings, feelings of heat and cold, and 
of the positions of our limbs; (2) experiences of the purely “internal” 
world, such as fantasy images, the inner sights and sounds of 
daydreaming and talking to yourself, recollections, bright ideas, and 
sudden hunches; (3) experiences of emotion or “affect” (to use the 
awkward term favored by psychologists), ranging from bodily pains, 
tickles, and “sensations” of hunger and thirst, through intermediate 
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emotional storms of anger, joy, hatred, embarrassment, lust, 
astonishment, to the least corporeal visitations of pride, anxiety, 
regret, ironic detachment, rue, awe, icy calm.2 
Therefore, descriptions of subjective experiences entail describing features 
from one of these three areas: experiences of the “external” world, of the 
“internal” world, and of emotions. If we take the aforementioned example of 
biking, the subjective experience could include: the feeling of the wind blowing 
through a person’s hair (experience of the “external” world), the memories of 
past biking experiences (experience of the “internal” world), and the 
sensations of excitement and enjoyment (experience of emotions or affect). 
When regarded as a set, these experiences are construable as the “subjective 
experience” of biking.  
C. “Remainders” 
After an “experience” is completed, such as an act of biking or skydiving or 
film viewing, “something” remains in consciousness that is definable as 
“experience.” This “something” is broadly dividable into two areas: the 
subjective experience that remains with the person, such as images, 
sensations, feelings, which are recallable as memories, or even as “re-
experiences” (more on this later this chapter); and a knowledge or “know-how” 
or skill that is connected to the original experience, or series of experiences of 
                                            
2 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained  (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 45. 
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the same category. The term ‘experience’ refers to the know-how gained in the 
course of performing a particular activity.  
The fact “subjective experience” remains in consciousness – as a memory or as 
some other form of presence – means it is possible to recall the subjective 
experience of an event without necessarily remembering the precise objective 
details (such as vividly recalling the experience of a movie but not the movie 
itself, as discussed below in relation to the work of Annette Kuhn). Secondly, 
this subjective experience is also sometimes imagined as an accrued or 
aggregate phenomena, not just a specific instance – for example, the 
accumulated film experiences imagined as a singular set, simply named ‘film 
experience’. 
D. “Institutional Fact” 
An experience can become an institutional or social fact when combined with 
an object and presented in a particular context or manner, usually preceded 
with the word “the”: “the teaching experience,” “the sailing experience,” “the 
immigrant experience,” “the Antonioni experience.” When presented in this 
form, the formulation implies that there is something typical, essential, or 
noteworthy in these experiences that is open to definition and discussion.   
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There are basically two forms to this category of experience. One is an “ad-hoc 
construction,” in which someone presents an experience with the intention of 
recognizing or acknowledging some essential or typical fact related to this 
experience, sometimes to another person familiar with the same experience. 
For example, two friends discuss the experience of having Philippe as a 
roommate. Perhaps Philippe is eccentric, messy, late paying his bills, etc. This 
results in the feeling of frustration. There is then something that it is like to 
live with Philippe as a roommate. The two friends might then refer to this 
experience of living with Philippe as “the Philippe experience,” because it 
refers to these objective and subjective elements that each recognize. In that 
moment, as a result of this performative act, “the Philippe experience” 
becomes a category of experience.   
The second form has an institutional dimension. It is like the above “Philippe 
experience,” in the sense of defining an experience as having typical or 
essential traits, but with time it becomes much more entrenched as a category 
such that it attains an institutional or public status. Consider, the 
formulation “the immigrant experience.” The objective conditions might 
include leaving family behind, finding a place to live, finding work, finding 
friends who speak a similar language, learning a new language. But there is 
also a subjective experience, such as feelings of alienation, a sense of 
displacement, loneliness, or feelings of insecurity. Although those who 
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consider themselves immigrants may disagree on what counts as “typical,” 
whether in reference to the subjective experience or to the objective events, 
the category of experience itself – “the immigrant experience” – is 
acknowledged (usually implicitly) as being a legitimate category. This is 
precisely the usage of ‘experience’ found in a lesson plan for teachers at the 
Library of Congress entitled “The Immigrant Experience: Down the Rabbit 
Hole,” described as follows: 
Relocating to a new country can be a disorienting experience. 
Immigrants often find themselves in a strange new world where the 
rules have changed, the surroundings are unfamiliar, and the 
inhabitants speak in strange tongues. In some ways, the immigrant 
experience is like the dizzying journey taken by the lead character 
in Lewis Carroll’s 19th-century novel Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland.3 
This account of “the immigrant experience” includes both objective and 
subjective elements that constitute the category: the surroundings and 
language are objectively unfamiliar, resulting in the subjective experience of 
“disorientation” and “strangeness.” Not every immigrant experience will 
follow this “dizzying journey,” of course, but the fact that it is presented on 
these terms is an illustration of this institutional category of ‘experience’. As 
will be explained below, this is the case with ‘film experience’, when presented 
as “the film experience.”   
                                            
3  Mary Johnson and Linda Thompson, “The Immigrant Experience: Down the Rabbit Hole,” 
Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/lessons/rabbit/ (accessed 
May 8, 2015). The Library of Congress offers many lessons plans for various grade levels. 
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2. Definitions of ‘film experience’ 
The formulation ‘film experience’ is ubiquitous in film studies, but as with the 
term ‘experience’, it is polysemic. The objective in this section is to establish 
the broadest possible “semantic field of ‘film experience’.” This process is 
partly based on the above categorizations of the term ‘experience’, but also on 
the way the term is used in film discourse. While there are many ways of 
defining ‘film experience’, most will fit into one of the following six categories: 
“film viewing,” “psychological film experience,” “subjective film experience,” 
“film remainders,” “the institutional category of film experience,” and “point of 
contact.” The same “temporal continuum” that applies to ‘experience’ also 
applies to several of these definitions of ‘film experience’ in that the term 
refers to different intervals along a continuum, each of which are justifiably 
defined as “film experience.”  
A. Film-Viewing Event 
A common usage of ‘film experience’ is when it refers to the “film-viewing 
event” (watching a movie). It therefore corresponds, precisely, with the first 
meaning of ‘experience’ mentioned above, that of “undergoing,” “living 
through,” or “making trial of.” In his work on “filmic experience,” Francesco 
Casetti refers to mostly the same definition when he defines ‘experience’ as 
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the “act of exposing ourselves to something...”4 Thus, this ‘film experience’ 
refers mainly to “film viewing.” It does not refer to the “internal experience” of 
film viewing, merely to the objective fact of an individual engaged in an 
activity with certain parameters: a film was presented in some format, a 
person attended to the film in some manner, such that it constitutes, from 
some perspective, an experience of the film (and not, for example, standing 
before a film while engaged in an entirely different activity). The requisite 
condition is “watching,” “viewing,” “being engaged,” although not necessarily 
fully attentive, nor fully immersed. There is no way of essentialising the 
boundary between experiencing a film and merely being present while a film 
is screened. In any case, ‘film experience’ sometimes refers to just this event – 
the act of film viewing, which includes the content that begins around the 
time of the opening credits until the final credits. It is of course possible to 
argue in favour of expanding the definition to include other elements, but it is 
not necessary for recognizing this category of usage. This is more or less the 
meaning Timothy Corrigan and Patricia White have in mind in the title of 
their volume, The Film Experience: An Introduction.” 5  
 
                                            
4 Francesco Casetti, “Filmic Experience,” Screen 50, no. 1 (March 20, 2009): 56. 
5 Timothy Corrigan and Patricia Barry, The Film Experience: An Introduction (Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2009). 
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B. Psychological Film Experience 
While ‘film experience’ in the sense of “film-viewing event” is an external, 
objective fact – referring to someone engaged in the act of viewing a film – 
there is also the corresponding “internal” experience of film viewing, 
everything taking place “within” the viewer as the film is screened. This 
follows from the second definition of ‘experience’ presented earlier (subjective 
experience), with one important caveat: it also includes mental processes that 
are not necessarily apparent to the viewer. Thus, this internal experience is 
dividable into two areas, each of which is different in nature and therefore 
irreconcilable at different levels. Yet, as will be shown, both are justifiably 
named ‘film experience’. 
David Chalmers’ distinction between “two concepts of mind” is useful for 
elaborating a distinction between these “internal” film experiences. In The 
Conscious Mind, Chalmers discusses a “psychological concept of mind” and a 
“phenomenal concept of mind.” For Chalmers, “the psychological concept” 
refers to the cognitive faculty, reflected in such terms as “memory,” “mental 
processes” and “schemata.” These mental processes occur without one 
necessarily being aware of them, and therefore, according to Chalmers, should 
be treated as a distinct concept of mind:  
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According to the psychological concept, it matters little whether a 
mental state has a conscious quality or not. What matters is the role 
it plays in a cognitive economy.6 
On the other hand, some aspects of the mind do have a “conscious quality.” It 
is conceivable that someone is aware of these phenomena (and why it makes 
sense to define this phenomena as “conscious phenomena”). Such conscious 
phenomena are often accompanied by a “feeling,” or “what it is like.” 7 
Chalmers refers to this aspect of the mind as the “phenomenal mind.” If it can 
be described from a first-person perspective, then it is the phenomenal mind 
that is under description. For someone like Chalmers, situated within 
consciousness studies, this aspect of the mind represents the very essence of 
consciousness. Thus,  
On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it 
feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it 
does.8 
The two internal film experiences can be similarly characterized: there is a 
‘film experience’ that has a particular feeling (the subjective or phenomenal 
film experience) and a ‘film experience’ that is beyond conscious attention (the 
psychological film experience).  
                                            
6 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 11. 
7 Thomas Nagel discusses this character in the seminal essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
discussed as well in Chapter 7 (The Philosophical Review 4, no. 83 (1973): 435-450. 
8 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 11. 
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The “psychological film experience” is precisely that which “cognitive film 
theory” endeavours to study. The link between the formulation itself – ‘film 
experience’ – and the “psychological mind” is clearly established in a 2011 
article entitled, “Watching you watch There Will Be Blood,” published on 
David Bordwell’s personal website. 9 Written by Tim Smith, this article is a 
rejoinder to a previous Bordwell blog entry.10 The link between the term ‘film 
experience’ and this psychological process is established both literally, in the 
sense that Smith uses the term ‘film experience’ in reference to the 
psychological mind, but also substantively in the implications of the 
argument, which connects an external physiological action, “eye movement,” 
with an internal experience that is definable as psychological “attention.” In 
examining this argument, the distinction between the two different notions of 
‘film experience’ in reference to the mind during film viewing should become 
clear.   
As mentioned, Smith’s article is a rejoinder to a prior Bordwell blog entry on 
the same website, “Hands (and faces) across the table,”11 an analysis of a 
scene from Paul Thomas Anderson’s There Will Be Blood (2007). Bordwell’s 
                                            
9 Tim Smith, “Watching you watch THERE WILL BE BLOOD,” David Bordwell’s Website on 
Cinema (February 14, 2011). http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2011/02/14/watching-you-
watch-there-will-be-blood/ 
10 David Bordwell, “Hands (and faces) across the table,” David Bordwell’s Website on Cinema 
(February 13, 2008). February 14, 2011). 
http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2008/02/13/hands-and-faces-across-the-table. 
11 Bordwell, “Hands (and faces) across the table.” 
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analysis, according to Smith, attempts to demonstrate the more or less 
commonplace view within film studies that “staging can be used to direct 
viewer attention without the need for editing.”12 The way a scene is arranged, 
the movements of the actors, camera mobility, lens focus, color, lighting, and a 
number of other non-editing film aesthetic components contribute to guiding 
viewer attention, a theme that is elaborated over the course of Bordwell’s 
entire body of work, but especially in Film Art: An Introduction, written with 
Kristen Thompson.13  
However, the fact film aesthetics, including staging, guide viewer attention 
has not, up to now, been established through an analysis of the mind as it 
engages with the film. It is presumed on the basis of narrative 
comprehension, itself encompassing a series of discrete mental processes. No 
device exists that can study “attention” (nor, for that matter, the “experience 
of attention”). Notice that “attention” belongs to both the “psychological mind” 
and the “phenomenal mind.” It is a cognitive process that takes place without 
being aware of it, and also a behaviour that has a conscious quality (which is 
to say, it is possible to describe the experience of “being attentive” or 
“attending to something”).  
                                            
12 Smith, “Watching you watch THERE WILL BE BLOOD.” 
13  David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction, 7th ed. (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, the act of attending in a psychological sense – that which is 
encompassed in the expression “viewer attention” – corresponds with certain 
observable behaviour that indicates psychological attention. It is possible to 
deduce attention, for example, from the way a person answers subsequent 
questions about an event (which most parents and teachers intuitively know). 
Or, as Tim Smith’s work shows, there is visual behaviour that strongly 
correlates with attention, such as where we look, how we look, and how long 
we look. While it is not necessary to look at something in order to be engaged 
in the act of attending, it is obviously presumed in the act of film viewing. 
Therefore, where eyesight is directed at the screen is a reasonable indication 
of where attention is directed, especially according to certain eye movements 
that are extremely quick and difficult to perceive without the assistance of a 
specialized instrument. As part of a larger project named Dynamic Images 
and Eye Movements, Tim Smith’s research therefore entails tracking eye 
movements during the act of film viewing:  
In a small pilot study, I recorded the eye movements of 11 adults 
using an Eyelink 1000 (SR Research) eyetracker. This eyetracker 
uses an infrared camera to accurately track the viewer’s pupil every 
millisecond. The movements of the pupil are then analysed to 
identify fixations, when the eyes are relatively still and visual 
processing happens; saccadic eye movements (saccades), when the 
eyes quickly move between locations and visual processing shuts 
down; smooth pursuit movements, when we process a moving object; 
and blinks.14 
                                            
14 Smith, “Watching you watch THERE WILL BE BLOOD.” 
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These eye movements can then be compared to Bordwell’s analysis in order to 
confirm whether staging, as Bordwell sees it, guides “viewer attention.” While 
the fact there seems a correlation between eye movement and viewer 
attention is the main premise guiding Smith’s study, it is not one Smith 
necessarily questions or problematizes. This is because just as we can attend 
to something while not looking at it, we can also look at something while not 
attending to it.15 It is at a more granular level that the relationship between 
eye movement and cognitive processes that qualify as “attending” become 
evident (by which I mean very quick, nearly imperceptible eye movements), 
but clearly an aspect of “attention” is that it can be directed “internally,” 
towards conscious phenomena, even while appearing to look at some external 
object. This sort of internally directed attention carries many names, but 
perhaps the most common is “day dreaming:” 
Over the past 60 years, researchers have assigned various names to 
the thoughts and images that arise when attention drifts away from 
external tasks and perceptual input toward a more private, internal 
stream of consciousness. The list includes daydreaming, thought 
intrusions, task irrelevant thoughts, spontaneous thought or 
cognition, stimulus independent thought, respondent thought, 
fantasy, task unrelated thought, task unrelated images and thought, 
internally generated thoughts, self-generated thought, absent-
                                            
15  It is possible to visually fixate a point in space and also attend to something else 
(something internal). Bianca De Haan, Paul S. Morgan, and Chris Rorden, “Covert Orienting 
of Attention and Overt Eye Movements Activate Identical Brain Regions.” Brain 
research 1204 (2008): 102–111. 
 238 
mindedness, zoning out, offline thought, undirected thought, 
unconscious thought, and mind wandering.16  
Smith’s study is strongest when the results show patterns across a range of 
viewers, indicating that psychological attention is manifest in a defined 
manner in relation to particular sorts of stimulation, including film. This 
generalization is possible, and likely, even if a percentage of the spectatorship 
is also engaged in daydreaming while viewing. The issue here is that there is 
a relatively clear boundary, within the parameters of a single mental 
operation, such as attention, between those aspects that are outside of 
awareness and those that are inside of awareness, which is precisely the point 
at which psychological and subjective film experience are differentiated. In 
other words, “attention” falls into two separate types of film experiences 
depending on the particular dimension of it that is analyzed (the conscious 
quality or the process).  
It will be useful further on to return to this example, but for now it is 
important to merely recognize that the “film experience” Smith analyzes is 
rooted strictly within the “psychological mind,” the part that most closely 
correlates with viewing behaviour. It is possible to extrapolate from viewing 
behaviour where attention is directed in the visual field; but it is not possible 
to extrapolate what the attention is producing as conscious phenomena, and 
                                            
16  Rebecca McMillan, Scott Barry Kaufman, and Jerome L. Singer, “Ode to Positive 
Constructive Daydreaming,” Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013): 1. 
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whether attention is being placed on these phenomena, and to what degree in 
contrast to the following of the film or scenes. However, Smith seems mostly 
aware of this limitation (the key term, ‘film experience’, appears near the end 
of the second paragraph, indicating that Smith is operating strictly with this 
understanding of the term in mind):  
But I expect an objection. Isn’t this sort of empirical inquiry 
too reductive to capture the complexities of film viewing? In some 
respects, yes. This is what we do. Reducing complex processes down 
to simple, manageable, and controllable chunks is the main 
principle of empirical psychology. Understanding a psychological 
process begins with formalizing what it and its constituent parts 
are, and then systematically manipulating and testing their effect. If 
we are to understand something as complex as how we experience 
film we must apply the same techniques. 
As in all empirical psychology the danger is always that we lose 
sight of the forest whilst measuring the trees. This is why the 
partnership between film theorists and empiricists like myself is 
critical. The decades of film theory, analysis, practice and intuition 
provide the framework and “Big Picture” to which we empiricists 
contribute. By sharing forces and combining perspectives, we can 
aid each other’s understanding of the film experience without losing 
sight of the majesty that drew us to cinema in the first place. 17 
Smith’s study thus illustrates the fact ‘film experience’ is sometimes used 
within film studies to mean the “psychological film experience” alone. It also 
presents a useful pivot point between the two concepts of mind that Chalmers 
defines, given that “attention” is both an element of the “psychological mind” 
                                            
17 Smith, “Watching you watch THERE WILL BE BLOOD.”  
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and “phenomenal mind.” This is to say, “attention” is also an experience with 
characteristic conscious qualities, in addition to being a cognitive process.  
For the psychological explanation of film experience to be effective, a tacit 
assumption is necessary that spectator attention is focused strictly on the 
film, such that the relationship between film events and mental events are 
more or less analyzable along a temporal continuum of the same duration as 
the film. Cognitive film theory, combined with narratology, appears best 
suited to provide this kind of account because film events are then 
construable as “cues” that guide the attention of the viewer, triggering mental 
responses, such as schemata.18 In effect, the film experience is narrativized in 
terms of a back and forth process between film events and corresponding 
mental events that are mutually determinative in the sense that the mental 
event renders certain film events more interesting to attention. Therefore, 
when the film-viewing experience is idealized in terms of constant attention 
directed at the film – in which cognitive film theory and narratology play a 
significant explanatory role – the “psychological mind” is under description. 
 
 
                                            
18 As explained in David Bordwell’s seminal study, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric 
in the Interpretation of Cinema (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), but which also 
a common feature of cognitive film theory generally.  
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C. Phenomenal or Subjective Film Experience 
If the “psychological film experience” refers to the mental processes outside of 
conscious attention while viewing film, then the “phenomenal film experience” 
is everything that is potentially describable from a first-person perspective. 
“Describable” is merely another way of saying that attention can be focused 
on the conscious phenomena, even if it is not easily described, or even 
describable in some practical, linguistic sense. It is something present to 
awareness and therefore describable in theory.  
The “conscious phenomena” produced by film experience are of the same order 
as those that Daniel Dennett presents in the above section on “subjective 
experience,” but with the additional condition, in this case, that ‘film 
experience’ refers to the subjective experience occurring while film viewing, 
including “feelings,” “fantasies,” “images,” “daydreaming,” “thoughts,” 
“sensations” and “emotions.” These conscious phenomena are construable as 
“raw experience.” It has not yet been transformed, consciously, into anything, 
such as an idea, reflection, or knowledge, or interpretation. It is just what 
happens to appear in consciousness while watching a film, based on any 
number of causes: the film itself, the theatre, the audience, and of course the 
consciousness brought into the theatre, which includes, as Martin Lefebvre 
defines it, an “imaginary museum” containing “the various films and film 
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fragments that have touched us deeply or made a profound impression on 
us.” 19  Through whatever form this conscious phenomena appears, it is 
definable as subjective film experience because it is produced during this 
interval of time – during film viewing – with the expectation that attention is 
reasonably placed on the film.  
An example in the field of film history, and probably the first written account 
of subjective film experience, is Maxim Gorky’s July 4, 1896 piece, “On a Visit 
to the Kingdom of Shadows.” In describing his first film experience, Gorky 
writes: 
This mute, grey life finally begins to disturb and depress you. It 
seems as though it carries a warning, fraught with a vague but 
sinister meaning that makes your heart grow faint. You are 
forgetting where you are. Strange imaginings invade your mind and 
your consciousness begins to wane and grow dim …20 
This account contains several passages referring to the conscious phenomena 
fitting with subjective film experience: the attribution of “life” to the film 
(thoughts); the fact it “disturbs” and “depresses” (emotions); the fact it is seen 
as “fraught with a vague but sinister meaning” (thoughts); that it makes the 
heart grow faint (sensation); “forgetting where you are” (sensation); mind and 
                                            
19 Martin Lefebvre, “On Memory and Imagination in the Cinema,” New Literary History: 
Cultural Inquiries 2, no. 2 (1999): 480. 
20 Maxim Gorky, “The Lumière Cinematograph,” in The Film Factory: Russian and Soviet 
Cinema in Documents 1896-1939, edited by Ian Christie and Richard Taylor (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), 25-26. 
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consciousness growing “dim” (sensation). While describable as individual 
components, all of these consciousness phenomena, when seen as a totality, 
constitute Gorky’s subjective film experience. Nevertheless, as explained in 
the next section, this is an after the fact description of a subjective film 
experience; it is a description of the subjective film experience that has 
remained in consciousness. In fact, it would be very difficult – and probably 
undesirable – to describe an actual subjective film experience as it transpires 
while viewing, which would entail describing the film experience as the film is 
viewed, creating a condition that is vastly different from normal viewing 
conditions.  
One approach within film studies towards the study of subjective film 
experience is “phenomenology.” I would like to briefly explain some aspects of 
this approach and why it does not occupy an important place in this thesis, 
given its link with consciousness. Those who define their approach as 
“phenomenological” typically write in a manner that appears to deliberately 
undermine the possibility of understanding – at least in a way that enables 
finding common ground. It is a very personal form of discourse that relies on 
abstract concepts, and turns of phrase, intended to problematize language. 
Perhaps there is a sense that the writing should reproduce or mirror – in its 
performance – the complexities of the very object of study it intends to 
elucidate, in this case “subjective experience.” It is rather the equivalent of 
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writing poetry in order to analyze poetry – interesting, certainly, but not 
conducive to a “second-order” discourse that engages with other “second-
order” discourse at the same level.21 
In this regard, Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of 
Film Experience is a model example. As the title indicates, Sobchack studies 
“film experience,” but not the same film experience mentioned in the previous 
section, which is to say, psychological film experience. It is also not quite like 
the subjective film experience mentioned above, since the mind Sobchack 
places under observation does not always have a conscious quality, but it is 
closer to the subjective film experience than the psychological one. In any 
case, her study is indicative of the “phenomenological approach.” In her book’s 
Preface, Sobchack argues that “the appeal of phenomenology lies in its 
potential for opening up and destabilizing language in the very process of its 
description of the phenomena of experience.”22 In other words, Sobchack is 
announcing to the reader that the forthcoming study – which uses a 
phenomenological approach – will switch to a different style of writing, which 
                                            
21 Shusterman distinguishes between first-order and second-order discourse, although not in 
the following manner; first-order discourse is the equivalent of criticism (such as film 
criticism) or some approach that allows for the playfulness of Sobchack’s approach; second-
order discourse is an analysis of the first-order discourse (“meta-criticism”), an explanatory 
discourse that is common within pragmatism and which is, by nature, an attempt to stay 
within a more accessible discourse. Richard Shusterman, Surface and Depth: Dialectics of 
Criticism and Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), 32, 202. 
22 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience  (Princeton 
University Press, 1992), xviii. 
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the reader may find “irritating,” although the larger problem is one of 
understanding: 
The following work, therefore, is marked by a prose style that insists 
on interrogating “ordinary” language as it interrogates “ordinary” 
experience. This involves frequent hyphenation in order to force a 
certain form of attentiveness to what we say but hardly hear . . . My 
prose is also engaged in serious punning and in a kind of dialectical 
play, inversions and parallelisms underscored in order to model and 
highlight in language the transitivity and reversibility experienced 
in subject-object relations in general, and vision in particular. It is 
my hope these peculiarities will be more illuminating than 
irritating.23 
The difference between the Preface and the remainder of the book fits, 
roughly, with Shusterman’s distinction between first and second order 
discourse. The Preface of Sobchack’s work, which is oriented toward a more 
standard communication, is able to offer a detached, objective assessment of 
the more performative writing that follows. Thus, the phenomenological 
approach produces the following sorts of passages, which leave out the second-
order discourse necessary for making sense of its meaning: 
Thus, the film experience is a system of communication based on 
bodily perception as a vehicle of conscious expression. It entails the 
visible, audible, kinetic aspects of sensible experience to make sense 
visibly, audibly, and haptically. The film experience not only 
represents and reflects upon the prior direct perceptual experience 
of the filmmaker by means of the modes and structures of direct and 
reflective perceptual experience, but also presents the direct and 
                                            
23 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye, xviii. 
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reflective experience of a perceptual and expressive existence as the 
film. 24 
These passages are examples of Sobchack destabilizing language. It is nearly 
impossible to make sense of the text because of the deliberate intention of 
making it difficult to understanding. Nevertheless, the traits that are typical 
of the phenomenological approach are visible, including “mirroring,” as in the 
passage “it [film experience] entails the visible, audible, kinetic aspects of 
sensible experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and haptically.” Mirroring 
is presumably intended to create a poetic effect, but the purpose of this 
rhetorical flourish is unclear.   
Sobchack is not a unique or isolated case. Other works similarly and self-
consciously adopt this stylized “phenomenological approach.” Like Sobchack, 
scholar Spencer Shaw makes a similar announcement at the beginning of his 
book Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze (discussed in later 
chapters), declaring the remainder of the study “‘does phenomenology,’” 
described as a “descriptive pursuit in which, as much as possible, one 
immerses oneself in an experience to analyze and understand it.”25  The 
purpose of shifting styles is unclear, but the results are similar to Sobchack’s:  
Film enters into flux as a capture of movement, at the point of 
emergence from non-visibility to visibility, from the undeveloped to 
                                            
24 Ibid., 9. 
25 Spencer Shaw, Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 2008), 3. 
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the developed, from the intricate to the extricate, from impression 
to expression.26  
Once again, there is a “mirroring” effect that seems to serve no purpose other 
than to draw attention to the writing itself – as a rhetorical flourish without a 
clear referent. It is simply quite difficult, if not impossible, to connect these 
passages with other known bodies of knowledge, other than grouping these 
statements with others of a similar kind, such as Sobchack’s.   
Of course, Sobchack and other self-named phenomenologists have a point in 
attempting to “destabilize” or draw attention to language. Subjective 
experience is by nature “messy” and open to different sorts of description. 
Phenomenologists tend to see language as a restrictive intermediary between 
consciousness (in terms of a faculty) and conscious experience (in terms of the 
contents of consciousness), which therefore requires a sort of disruption of the 
medium that is used for description, if the medium is viewed with suspicion. 
In this regard, there is overlap between pragmatic philosophy and 
phenomenology. However, the difference lies at the level of how the language 
problem is addressed. It seems that it requires accepting the limitations and 
restrictions of language in order to address some problem within it, or risk 
becoming unintelligible. There are some exceptions to this rule, obviously, 
since great writers transcend the medium in important ways – one thinks of 
                                            
26 Ibid., 26. 
 248 
Walter Benjamin or Ludwig Wittgenstein, who both wrote cryptically at 
times, in ways that required interpretation.  
However, consider the way someone like Wittgenstein treated the issue of 
subjective experience in his writing, in this case the experience of reading. It 
is revealing of the underlying difference between these approaches. In 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein wonders if it is necessary to 
understand the subjective experience of reading in order to define the 
behaviour of “reading out loud” as “reading.” In other words, Wittgenstein 
wonders how we know a person is actually reading. Is it merely the fact 
someone is saying words that match written words? Wittgenstein seems to 
argue that there is a subjective experience that accompanies the activity of 
reading that defines “reading.” The important point, aside from being a great 
example of describing subjective experience, is that entirety of the account 
remains within the realm of ordinary language, such that a reader is able to 
verify the account against personal experience:  
Read a page of print and you can see that something special is going 
on, something highly characteristic.—Well, what does go on when I 
read the page? I see printed words and I say words out loud. But, of 
course, that is not all, for I might see printed words and say words 
out loud and still not be reading. Even if the words which I say are 
those which, going by an existing alphabet, are supposed to be read 
off from the printed ones.—And if you say that reading is a 
particular experience, then it becomes quite unimportant whether or 
not you read according to some generally recognized alphabetical 
rule.—And what does the characteristic thing about the experience 
of reading consist in?—Here I should like to say: “The words that I 
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utter come in a special way.” That is, they do not come as they 
would if I were for example making them up.—They come of 
themselves.—But even that is not enough; for the sounds of words 
may occur to me while I am looking at printed words, but that does 
not mean that I have read them.—In addition I might say here, 
neither do the spoken words occur to me as if, say, something 
reminded me of them. I should for example not wish to say: the 
printed word “nothing” always reminds me of the sound “nothing”—
but the spoken words as it were slip in as one reads. And if I so 
much as look at a German printed word, there occurs a peculiar 
process, that of hearing the sound inwardly.27 
In this passage, Wittgenstein shows a pragmatic, ordinary-language approach 
to defining the subjective experience associated with a particular activity, in 
this case reading; but, it is also possible to imagine a similar description of the 
experience of viewing film, or any subjective experience, including, as I will 
discuss in a later chapter, the experience of film consciousness.  
D. Film Remainders 
So far, we have seen that ‘film experience’ refers to the film viewing event (the 
act of viewing a film); the internal psychological experience (the cognitive 
processing occurring during film viewing); and the internal phenomenal 
experience (the conscious phenomena that appears during film viewing). 
However, once the lights dim and post-film viewing reality begins, 
“something” remains from these experiences in consciousness – memories, 
emotions, moods, images, feelings, knowledge, understanding, and so forth. 
                                            
27 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §165. 
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The term ‘film experience’ also encompasses these “remainders,” which are 
dividable into at least three groups: “subjective film experience remainders,” 
“know-how,” and “film consciousness” – keeping in mind that boundaries 
between such abstract concepts inevitably overlap.  
Since subjective film experience is the “raw experience” of a movie event – 
that which transpired subjectively during the original viewing – then the “raw 
experience” that remains in consciousness is definable as “subjective film 
experience remainders.” “Know-how” is the transformation of this raw 
subjective film experience into some form of knowledge that pertains to 
cinema-oriented activities, a theme which reappears in Francesco Casetti’s 
body of work, as discussed below. However, “subjective film experience 
remainders” can eventually form into something that is not specifically 
knowledge, or a collection of subjective experience phenomena. There is a 
sense in which the aggregate of these “subjective film experience remainders” 
form into a particular kind of conscious state, as an enduring element of 
consciousness. This state is manifest in moods, feelings, sensations, but also a 
sense of self, or streams of thought, that seem largely connected to past film 
experiences, but which have assumed a distinct status. This “film 
consciousness” becomes activated, or present, in different moments of 
ordinary life, including film viewing. Therefore I define this consciousness as 
“subjective film consciousness,” in contrast to other categories of film 
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consciousness. Since this category of film consciousness is discussed in 
Chapter 7, this section focuses on explaining the first two groups.  
In the preceding section, I presented Gorky’s account of a Lumière projection 
as an example of “subjective film experience.” However, I also mentioned that 
the writing itself was more specifically a “recollection” or “memory” of 
subjective film experience. Even if Gorky’s present tense description conveys 
the impression of being an ongoing account of subjective film experience, and 
even if this account provides insight into that experience, Gorky did not write 
the account while the subjective film experience was taking place. It is 
perhaps more accurate to say that Gorky describes the subjective film 
experience that “came to mind” while engaged in writing about it. Moreover, 
Gorky shaped this experience with a specific purpose and audience in mind, 
which therefore determines, potentially, the way the subjective film 
experience is presented (in Gorky’s case, it was obviously important for him 
that readers come to see the “experience” from his perspective, which explains 
the second person address – “You are forgetting where you are.”). The issue, 
then, is how to define the phenomena that “came to mind” when Gorky 
undertook its description. I believe it is worth considering this phenomenon as 
a distinct “order of experience,” different than the original subjective film 
experience, but also different than a memory of the subjective film experience.   
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Annette Kuhn’s work on “cinema memory” offers a valuable framework for 
considering this issue. For one, her work emphasizes the degree to which 
accounts of cinema experiences are transformed in the process of describing 
and relating them. The empirical evidence that Kuhn relies on consists of 
accounts of 1930s cinema experiences she obtained in the 1990s in a series of 
interviews. In Kuhn’s study there is a substantial gap between the actual 
cinema event and the account. This is very different than Gorky’s account of 
his film experiences, which were very recent, but Kuhn’s study nevertheless 
provides some understanding of the differences between the act of describing 
subjective film experience and the experience itself.   
In her work, Kuhn divides these accounts of past film experiences into three 
types of cinema memories: Type A memories are of films, scenes and images; 
Type B memories are “situated memories of films” (of the film and also of 
related life experiences taking place at around the time of the film); and Type 
C memories are of “cinemagoing” (the theatre, among other things).28 A 
pattern that Kuhn identifies in these accounts is that they sometimes take an 
“anecdotal” form that “typically involves a story narrated in the first person 
singular about a specific, one-off event or occasion.”29  This indicates, as 
                                            
28 Annette Kuhn, “What to do with Cinema Memory?”, in Explorations in New Cinema 
History: Approaches and Case Studies, edited by Richard Maltby, Daniël Biltereyst, and 
Philippe Meers. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 91. 
29 Ibid., 91. 
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mentioned, that film experiences are given a narrative form depending on the 
context and purpose of the account. Another pattern Kuhn identifies is the 
appearance of “implants” in some of the memories. These are memories that 
have “entered their stories after the event, as a particular image has acquired 
cultural iconicity in later years.” 30  In other words, the person does not 
actually remember the image or scene from the film, but rather discovers the 
importance of the scene at a later time and then inserts this scene into the 
memory. These implanted memories, Kuhn explains, “lack the ‘brilliance’ of 
scenes from the truly remembered film.”31  
While these points show that memories of film experiences assume a 
particular rhetorical form when recounted in certain contexts (such as when 
prompted or when presented in the context of a journal with a specific 
audience in mind), it is the following passage that seems most relevant to our 
interests in this section. In describing characteristics of type A cinema 
memories, Kuhn observes: 
And yet these images are obviously still resonant, in all their 
intensity, in informants’ consciousness decades after the event. It is 
clear that in the moment of telling in the present the remembered 
feelings or sensations associated with these memories are in some 
way being re-experienced. 32 
                                            
30 Ibid., 91-92. 
31 Ibid., 92. 
32 “And yet these images are obviously still resonant, in all their intensity, in informants’ 
consciousness decades after the event. It is clear that in the moment of telling in the present 
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I believe this statement is revealing for different reasons, but mainly it shows 
the difficulty in finding a conceptual or terminological perspective from which 
to define the subjective film experience that remains in consciousness in 
distinction from memories of film. Kuhn’s difficulty in distinguishing between 
memory and this other phenomena is reflected in defining the same thing as 
“remembered feelings or sensations” and “re-experienced” feelings and 
sensations. This might seem like a trivial semantic point, but the implications 
are interesting enough to consider. 
Clearly, it is possible to remember that a feeling or sensation was experienced 
at a particular moment without necessarily “re-experiencing” the feeling. For 
example, it is possible to remember that during the viewing of a particular 
film one felt sad. However, Kuhn means something different than memory 
when using the term “re-experiencing.” She means experiencing the same 
feelings or emotions as during the original event, not just remembering that 
these feelings took place. Does the act of “re-experiencing” then count as a 
“memory?”  
In the cognitive sciences at least, this sort of “re-experiencing” (of the original 
feeling or emotion) is discussed more in terms of its function in relation to 
                                                                                                                                   
the remembered feelings or sensations associated with these memories are in some way being 
re-experienced.” Ibid., 87. 
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memory, rather than as a distinct phenomenon, especially in terms of the 
quality and vividness of the memory:  
Memories of our experiences are likely characterized by 
representations in the form of neuronal activity. Activity among a 
network of neurons represents a code for the experience of, say, a 
birthday party. When this network is activated by some cue that 
triggers a reexperience of that event, we are said to have recollected 
the birthday party. Emotional events are often remembered with 
greater accuracy and vividness (though these two characteristics do 
not always go together) than events lacking an emotional 
component.33  
It is not a question here of disputing whether emotions and memories are 
linked, or if emotions and feelings are remembered, only to consider it 
interesting to draw a distinction between a conscious event that involves 
“remembering a feeling” and a conscious event that involves “re-experiencing 
a feeling.” These seem like different conscious events, which the term 
“memory” fails to distinguish, but I believe this distinction is necessary to 
understanding ‘film experience’ when the term is used in reference to the 
subjective film experience that remains in consciousness and which is 
potentially “re-experienced” at a later time. The point may seem insignificant, 
but there are referential implications in distinguishing between memories of 
emotional responses to film and the “re-experiencing” of emotions or 
sensations that took place during film viewing.  
                                            
33  Tony Buchanan, “Retrieval of Emotional Memories,” Psychological bulletin 133, no.5 
(2007): 761–779. 
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One difference, for example, is that a memory, or the act of remembering, 
often includes an intervening symbol, representation or mental image that 
refers to the original event, much like a photograph. Film flashbacks attempt 
to emulate this experience of remembering by using blurry, repetitive images, 
slow motion, and different sound perspectives. However, re-experiencing the 
same feeling as during the original event does not include any such referential 
content: it is the same feeling. Imagine if instead of “re-experiencing” a 
feeling, one “re-experienced” the visual perception of a scene. It would be the 
equivalent of saying that the exact scene, in its integrity, was somehow 
reproduced within consciousness such that there was no difference between 
the actual scene as originally perceived and the one that is “re-experienced.” If 
that were possible, it would likely not be considered a memory but rather 
some other sort of conscious phenomena. When a feeling is “re-experienced” it 
is – if we take the meaning of the term literally rather than figuratively 
(which is fine, in my view, as a thought experiment) – the same feeling, the 
same conscious phenomenon, as during the film event. This complicates an 
understanding of this phenomenon as a “memory.” Moreover, I believe this 
example regarding the re-experiencing of feelings and emotions extends to 
other conscious phenomena that fall under the category of “subjective film 
experience,” such as streams of thought and mental images. 
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Therefore, I would place any aspect of a “subjective film experience” that is 
later “re-experienced” into the category of “subjective film experience 
remainders.” The basic condition for fitting within this category is that the 
conscious phenomena that appear in consciousness after film viewing are the 
same as the conscious phenomena that appeared during film viewing, 
including images or sounds of the film that come to mind. Perhaps this is a 
distinction many will feel is purely semantic, but I believe it defines a sort of 
conscious phenomena that is not really a memory or recollection, but rather 
some other experience that includes sensations, feelings, flickering images, 
and so forth, that emulate the original film experience in some characteristic 
fashion the individual alone is in a position of knowing. When these 
“subjective film experience remainders” cease to be about a film experience in 
particular, but still present in some general sense, as an enduring element of 
consciousness, then it becomes “subjective film consciousness,” as discussed in 
Chapter 7, which is a conscious experience that includes moods, feelings, and 
streams of thought that the individual identifies as being connected to film 
experiences in some meaningful manner, and which becomes manifest or 
present in ordinary life situations, but without a specific film experience 
referent. Each person will characterize “subjective film consciousness” 
differently, but I believe that it is distinct from whatever one will classify as 
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“subjective film experience,” or “subjective film experience remainders,” when 
presented with definitions of these categories.  
The second way in which ‘film experience’ refers to “something that remains 
in consciousness” from film viewing, is that which Casetti defines, in different 
ways, as a form of knowledge.  Sometimes this form of knowledge is a “film 
gaze” that the viewer adopts and applies in other areas of life, and which, in 
Casetti’s case, has a therapeutic function, enabling the film spectator to 
“negotiate” conflicts that arise from the general experience of modernity.34 At 
other times, Casetti defines this same type of knowledge as ‘film experience’. 
Casetti’s approach is in fact quite similar to that applied in this chapter. He 
first considers several definitions of ‘experience’ and then, on this basis, 
constructs a more specific understanding of film experience – although it is 
important to note that Casetti uses ‘filmic experience’ and not ‘film 
experience’. While the difference between ‘film’ and ‘filmic’ is significant, since 
it clearly establishes a non-essential concept of film as the object of 
experience, it is not essential to the explanation that follows, especially since 
‘film experience’ can mean, precisely, ‘filmic experience’ in certain contexts, 
such as in a context where the meaning of ‘film’ is explained in advance as 
including that which Casetti defines as ‘filmic’ (for example, I might define 
                                            
34 This argument is most forcefully presented in Francesco Casetti, Eye of the Century: Film, 
Experience, Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).  
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reading a comic as a film experience, by virtue of the comic producing similar 
aesthetic content to film, such as shot scales or angles).35  
Thus, in his article entitled ‘Filmic experience’, Casetti offers two definitions 
of ‘experience’. One of these was cited earlier, under the heading of “Film-
Viewing Event,” as “the act of exposing ourselves to something that surprises 
and captures us.” The second definition is as follows:  
On the other hand, [experience] relates to the act of reelaborating 
this exposition into a knowledge and a competence, so that we are 
then richer in the face of things, since we are able to master them 
(‘to have experience’). 36 
One tendency that is characteristic of Casetti in general is that he tends to 
add orientations to definitions as if these were essential to the definition. For 
example, there is a definition of the word ‘experience’ that is simply “exposing 
ourselves to something.” And another definition that is “a knowledge and a 
competence.” But Casetti adds qualifications to these neutral descriptions 
that either determine, or reflect, the nature of his work. Generally speaking, 
Casetti attempts to promote film experience as having a certain social value, 
and this added function enters his definitions. Thus, for Casetti, experience is 
                                            
35 This is a point discussed in a presentation I delivered with Pierre Chemartin at DOMITOR 
on the connection between film and comics in early cinema, in which “montage” is regarded as 
preceding cinema in order to draw an analogy of experience between comics and film. 
Santiago Hidalgo and Pierre Chemartin, “Learning Film Performance through Comics,” 
DOMITOR, Brighton, 2012. 
36 Francesco Casetti, “Filmic Experience.” Screen 50, no. 1 (March 20, 2009): 56 
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“exposing ourselves to something that surprises and captures us,” and the 
know-how that film experience produces makes us “richer in the face of 
things” (though not always, which is the point).   
Nevertheless, we will focus on this first part of the definition in reference to 
seeing experience as knowledge. The utility of saying ‘experience’ rather than 
‘knowledge’ is that the term ‘experience’ specifies the nature of the knowledge 
and where it came from.  A clear example is the difference between “the 
experience of teaching” and “teaching experience.” The parallel implied in 
Casetti’s distinction would then be between “teaching experience” and “film 
experience” – a knowledge or know-how that derives from the experience of 
film. The issue is then the domain of application. This may sound confusing, 
but the point is quite straightforward. When one claims to have “teaching 
experience” it pertains to a capacity in or knowledge of teaching. However, 
“film experience,” as “know-how,” seems to have a different domain of 
application than film viewing (from where the experience emerged). This is 
evident by the fact nobody refers to the capacity to understand film, or to 
engage in film viewing, by virtue of having “film experience.” One wonders, in 
fact, in what context the statement “I have film experience” would make 
sense. It would require defining the areas of film viewing in which “film 
experience” – in the sense being considered – would have a bearing, in the 
same way that “teaching experience” has a bearing in the activity of teaching 
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(preparing a class, moderating discussion, etc.). I suppose one of the reasons 
“film experience” as “teaching experience” does not make sense in relation to 
film viewing is that film viewing is seen as a passive activity that is now 
mostly general to the population, in the same way that “I have book 
experience” or “I have reading experience” would not be a normal statement 
in most contexts.  
Of course, this sort of literalness is perhaps only interesting as a thought 
experiment, but I think it highlights the fact the domain of reference to which 
this sense of “film experience” applies is not the same domain as the one 
which produced the “film experience,” as with the inextricable link between 
“the experience of teaching” and “teaching experience.” It seems fairly clear, 
in reading Casetti, but also in considering the meaning of ‘film experience’ 
more generally in film discourse, that this sense of “film experience” is a 
statement about a knowledge, or know-how, that is gained from the 
experience of film, but which applies to non-film viewing domains, in other 
areas of life, that have a “film-like” quality (something which Casetti 
elaborates on his work, such as comparing the “dizzying” experience of cross-
cutting with the experience of modern transportation).37 
                                            
37 Francesco Casetti, Eye of the Century: Film, Experience, Modernity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008). 
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I should note that this is an interpretation of Casetti that derives from 
regarding his body of work as a whole, rather than a specific statement that 
indicates the above, but it is a usage of ‘film experience’ that I think is 
prevalent in film studies generally. Casetti’s specific statements in fact 
provide other ways of interpreting the meaning of ‘filmic experience’ as a 
“form of knowledge,” but it nevertheless follows the above distinction between 
domains of reference (film-viewing versus non-film viewing). For example, in 
discussing film experience, Casetti writes that it changes the way reality is 
experienced:  
[E]veryday vision often finds itself following the example of filmic 
vision, to the point of becoming a “cinematographic” vision, and of 
demanding of the real to become a bit “cinematographic” in order to 
be truly apprehended.38  
Casetti pursues this line of argument to the point of suggesting that film 
experience, as outlined, has “reshaped the meaning of experience.”39 These 
are all points worth considering in relation to the subject of this thesis, but 
this advances the argument to a point that extends beyond the parameters of 
this section, which is to establish what is meant by ‘film experience’ – and it 
seem clear that one of the meanings of the term is a form of knowledge that 
                                            
38 Francesco Casetti, “The Filmic Experience: An Introduction,” 1-2. Based on a seminar given 
at Yale in the Spring Semester of 2007 and published on Casetti’s personal website, 
https://francescocasetti.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/filmicexperience1.pdf 
39 Ibid., 2 
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has a “cinematographic” dimension that applies broadly, not specifically to 
film viewing. 
E. The Category of Film Experience 
There is a usage of ‘film experience’ that means a category of experience, such 
as in “the film experience.” The meaning of ‘film experience’ in this expression 
differs from all of the above definitions. It has the meaning of an institutional 
fact or category, which includes both objective and subjective characteristics 
regarded as essential to the category. These characteristics vary according to 
person, history and changes in technology. The particular characteristics are 
not relevant to this section, although some are presented as examples. It is 
mostly a question of recognizing the existence of the category and the sorts of 
issues that arise in relation to this category. The example below, from a 1966 
article by Michael Kirby entitled “The Uses of Film in the New Theatre,” 
illustrates this usage of ‘film experience’.   
The film experience is not necessarily a single rectangle of light and 
shadow that flickers at one end of a darkened room. Call this 
“movies” or “cinema” – that archetypal dream world in which the 
spectator, seated in a near-foetal position, attempts to ignore the 
physical space, the other spectators, the projector’s shifting beam, to 
concentrate on the images and the sounds that accompany them. Of 
course, the movies are a film experience – and a theatre experience 
– but the use of motion pictures is not so limited, and theatre is just 
beginning to realize the possibilities inherent in film.40 
                                            
40 Michael Kirby, “The Uses of Film in the New Theatre,” The Tulane Drama Review 11, no. 1 
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The difference between “a film experience” and “the film experience” in this 
passage illustrates the category in question. When Kirby refers to “a film 
experience,” he means a film viewing event, such as defined earlier in this 
chapter. The main condition for “a film experience” is that a film is present. 
However, “the film experience” is a general, idealized version of this singular 
event, in which certain objective and subjective traits are assumed. Thus, 
Kirby defines “the film experience” as  “that archetypal dream world in which 
the spectator . . . attempts to ignore the physical space, the other spectators, 
the projector’s shifting beam, to concentrate on the images and the sounds 
that accompany them.” In other words, “the film experience” entails being 
absorbed by the film and losing a sense of awareness of the surrounding 
world.  
As with many characteristics assigned to the institutional category of film 
experience, these “essential” traits become acutely visible in moments of crisis 
caused by technological changes. For example, the advent of home video 
revealed at least two traits that were seen as essential to the film experience. 
The first trait is best defined as the “indexicality” of celluloid which video 
obviously threatened. This point is raised, and explained in some detail, in 
Marc Furstenau and Martin Lefebvre’s article “Digital Editing and Montage: 
                                                                                                                                   
(1966): 49-61. 
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The Vanishing Celluloid and Beyond.”41 In the Abstract, the authors explain 
that their objective is to “examine the impact these new interfaces [digital 
film editing technology and DVD technology] have on the film experience.”42 
Although Furstenau and Lefebvre do not agree that celluloid is any more 
“indexical” than video – “indexicality is not specific to photographic-based 
media—or to any medium for that matter . . . . [it] is simply how signs 
indicate what it is that they are about”43 – the article nevertheless establishes 
this current of thought as prevalent within film studies. In charting the 
history of the misuse of the term “indexicality,” they confirm that indexicality, 
rightly or wrongly understood, is one of the characteristics typically regarded 
as essential to this category of experience.  
The second trait is the sense that film should be seen in theatre. It is in this 
context that film is assumed to have its greatest impact in rendering 
spectators unaware of their surroundings, because of the scale and quality of 
the image and sound, and perhaps because of ritual-like, public experience of 
the movie theatre. Just as home video brought this belief about “the film 
experience” to the foreground, it is evident as well in the way regular cinemas 
are compared with “state of the art” theatres like IMAX. In fact, the IMAX 
                                            
41  Marc Furstenau and Martin Lefebvre, “Digital Editing and Montage: The Vanishing 
Celluloid and Beyond,” Cinémas 13, no.1-2 (Fall 2002), 69-107.  
42 Ibid., 69. Their Emphasis.  
43 Ibid., 97. 
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example is ideal for our definitional interests in a second sense: it validates 
the very existence of the formulation under discussion by adopting its 
structure in order to promote the technology. The entire description is drawn 
from the very category of “film experience” Kirby applied in 1966. In a section 
named “the IMAX experience,” the IMAX website explains that the public 
does not attend an IMAX screening solely to see the movie in a larger than 
usual format, but also because of the unique experience it produces:  
It is going to the theatre to forget you’re at the movies. Sitting there, 
without the slightest doubt, convinced you’re someplace else. Going, 
in the space of minutes, to a place that’s frightening, intense, heart-
rending, altogether magical – a place you’ve never been before. 
IMAX grabs your senses. Visually, there is no frame. The picture’s 
bigger, higher, wider than your field of view. You’re no longer at the 
window peeking out; you’re outside among the stars. And that 
sensation is intensified by the sound. It’s all around you and it’s real 
– so much so that the whole experience is visceral. You don’t just 
hear and see an IMAX movie. You feel it in your bones.44 
IMAX enters the conversation in a way that ties together Gorky’s seminal 
piece, Kirby’s characterization of the film experience, and the crisis that new 
technology produces, and resolves, in maintaining the belief that the film 
experience is primarily about emotions and losing awareness of reality. The 
connection with Gorky is obvious: like Gorky, IMAX emphasizes the 
experience through the same rhetorical trope of presenting the description in 
the second person. IMAX writes, “It is going to the theatre to forget you’re at 
                                            
44 “The IMAX experience,” https://www.imax.com/about/experience/ (accessed May 8, 2015). 
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the movies. Sitting there, without the slightest doubt, convinced you’re 
someplace else.” Over a century ago, Gorky wrote “You are forgetting where 
you are. Strange imaginings invade your mind and your consciousness begins 
to wane and grow dim.” IMAX is the cinema ersatz – it attempts to continue a 
fading tradition due to an increase in sophisticated home entertainment 
systems, high definition screens and high definition video, that has rendered 
the ordinary cinema experience comparatively less thrilling.  
Just as significant is the fact “the IMAX experience” – which is “the film 
experience” in new garbs – is comprised of both objective elements (which is to 
say, in this case, physical or external) and subjective elements (subjective film 
experience). The chart below divides the description into just these parts: 
Objective facts related to 
the IMAX experience 
“visually, there is no frame,” “the 
picture’s bigger, higher, wider than 
your field of view,” the loudness and 
quality of the sound.” 
Subjective facts related 
to the IMAX experience 
“convinced you’re someplace else,” 
“frightening,” “intense,” “heart-
rending,” “altogether magical,” “it’s 
all around you and it’s real.” 
 
In the same way that the IMAX experience is presented as an institutional 
fact, “the film experience” should be regarded as a distinct usage of the term 
‘film experience’. The addition of the word “the” to the formulation signals to 
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the reader that it is this understanding of the expression that is under 
discussion, even if it goes unacknowledged, which encompassed both objective 
facts related to the screening and subjective facts related to the way the film 
feels.   
F. Film Experience as a “Point of Contact” 
One of the operating premises of this thesis is that “film consciousness 
belongs to a world in which film experiences occur.” The question in this 
section regards the meaning of ‘film experience’ in this passage, in contrast to 
those already considered: it does not refer specifically to film viewing, 
although it is certainly included as a possibility; it does not refer to the 
psychological film experience, or to the subjective film experience, or to the 
remainders in consciousness. It also does not refer to the institutional 
category of film experience discussed above. Yet, the above statement makes 
deductive sense: it is hard to imagine “film consciousness” without a 
corresponding set of “film experiences” from which the consciousness arises.  
This means there is still a definition of ‘film experience’ that has not been 
considered, in spite of exhausting the definitions of ‘experience’ introduced at 
the beginning of this chapter. I believe that this ‘film experience’ – as opposed 
to those mentioned – is an undefined, hypothetical construction that is 
logically necessary when positing a causal relation between anything that fits 
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under the general heading of “people” (culture, consciousness, spectators) and 
“cinema” (film, film-like things). Whenever film is presumed to affect people – 
in whatever form one defines “film” or “people” – it is through the channel of 
‘film experience’; in other words, the category exists because it is functionally 
necessary to a given premise – a premise which forms the basis of many 
works on film history – which is that cinema has an impact on people in both 
the short and long term.  
The question, of course, is how this ‘film experience’ is different than, say, 
merely ‘film viewing’. And the answer, to me, is that it must necessarily 
include everything potentially imaginable as a point of contact between film 
and people: a cinema, a film club, film production, books, video jackets, and so 
forth. I will define, further below, eight points of contact between film and 
people, each of which, because of the possibilities of experience entailed in 
such contacts, should be regarded as “film experience.” I believe that I am 
merely making explicit the specific channels through which such contact 
occurs in order to see each of these points of contact as having a particular 
nature – and causal parameters – but also to highlight the fact a hypothetical, 
undefined ‘film experience’ is necessary to pursuing lines of inquiry that posit 
causal relations between film and people. In other words, we do not always 
understand how the cause-effect relation works, only that there is a cause-
effect relation. ‘Film experience’ is a necessarily ambiguous, and messy, way 
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of glossing over this problem, in the absence of definitive evidence 
establishing such a link.  
Returning to Casetti, I believe that his third definition of ‘filmic experience’ – 
which is perhaps the only true definition of film experience he presents (the 
other definitions I rather assume on the basis of Casetti presenting different 
definitions of ‘experience’ in order to arrive at his main definition) – fits 
within the general parameters of this “point of contact” definition of film 
experience. As stated, a tendency in Casetti is that he merges a given 
definition (of ‘experience’ in this case) with his interpretation of the function 
of that definition, so this complicates an understanding of his definition of 
“film experience.” As mentioned, when Casetti defines ‘experience’ as “the act 
of exposing ourselves to something that surprises and captures us,” he 
combines the neutral dimension – “the act of exposing ourselves to something” 
– with an orientation, quality or function that is layered on top – “that 
surprises and captures us.” Clearly, this latter dimension is not necessary to 
the definition of ‘experience’ – it is merely Casetti’s way of regarding the 
purpose of experience.  
The same is true, then, of Casetti’s third (or only) definition of ‘filmic 
experience’: it has a component that is neutral and essential and then there 
are the parts that Casetti adds to this definition that orient the category in a 
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particular direction. I believe that the neutral part of the category is similar 
to the definition advanced in this section.  In “The Filmic Experience: An 
Introduction,” a paper that derives from a seminar Casetti offered at Yale 
University, Casetti assembles the different ‘experiences’ already mentioned in 
previous sections of this chapter into a new construct that resembles the 
“point of contact” sense of ‘film experience’ discussed here, although with a 
more orientational perspective: 
The term “experience” in general, indicates, on one hand the 
possibility of perceiving reality as if for the first time and in the first 
person (“to experience”), and, on the other hand, the acquisition of 
knowledge and competence which allow an individual to face reality 
and create meaning from it (“to have experience”). By analogy, we 
can define the filmic experience as that particular modality through 
which the cinematographic institution allows the spectator to 
perceive a film and to re-elaborate the perception into knowledge 
and competence. This is a vision that challenges the obviousness of 
the scopic activity, creating reflexive and projective relationships 
between the spectators and themselves and between the spectators 
and the world, and leading them to a “knowing how” and a “knowing 
that” they are seeing the film both as a film and as a reality 
represented.45 
In spite of the complexity of this statement, the main element of the filmic 
experience Casetti defines is that it stands as a meeting ground between film 
(“cinematographic institution”) and people (“spectator”). Perhaps it is more 
accurate to say this “point of contact” is a “modality” – as does Casetti – in 
which a particular kind of exchange or activity is engaged between film and 
                                            
45 Casetti, “The Filmic Experience: An Introduction,” 1-2. 
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people, but the preference in this section – in this thesis – is towards the most 
neutral and general perspective; the perspective that most simply defines 
‘film experience’ as a point of contact between some notion of ‘film’ and some 
notion of ‘person’. Once we establish this category, it is then possible to add 
functions and characteristics, as Casetti does, such as when he says this point 
of contact enables “spectators” “to perceive a film and to re-elaborate the 
perception into knowledge and competence” and “creating reflexive and 
projective relationships between the spectators and themselves and between 
the spectators and the world.” 
Moreover, I would like to add that my “point of contact” definition is much 
broader than Casetti’s. It includes every sort of imaginable definition of ‘film’, 
not just film viewing. Thus, in addition to film viewing, the following are also 
considered points of contact between film and people, and therefore instances 
of film experience that play a role in the construction of “film consciousness:” 
(1) Film-related environments, such as theatres, museums, and video clubs;46 
                                            
46 It is possible to conceptualize a video club, for example, as offering a film experience that 
produces an understanding, or awareness, of some characteristics related to film, such as 
genre, synopses, advertisements, film emblems (video box images that are emblematic of 
some aspect of film), and so forth. An encounter takes place in this environment that 
contributes to the construction of film consciousness – and this is independent of actually 
viewing films. Of course, this environment has now been transposed to a digital platform, 
therefore it is question of hypothesizing differences in effects between these experiences: what 
is essential about the video club film experience in contrast with, for example, Netflix menus? 
It is not a research question that has been explored, other than from the perspective of the 
social experience of cinema. 
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(2) Parafilmic material, including trailers, posters, and DVD cases;47 (3) Film 
discourse, such as film criticism, film reviews, film historiography, 
biographies, and theory; (4) “Film derivatives,” which is when “film” appears 
within other media, not just as a subject, but also as an analogous aesthetic, 
such as in comics;48  (5) Film production, such as editing, screenwriting, 
directing, and so forth; (6) Film scholarship and all academic activities 
involving film (research, writing, archiving, teaching); (7) Film technology, 
such as the use of cameras and associated technologies (DVD players, 
projectors, etc.); 49  and (8) the social experience of cinema, such as 
conversations after movies, in film clubs, or engaging with curators and video 
club employees.50  These are just some examples of situations, places or 
channels through which a ‘film experience’ takes place, and which has the 
effect of constructing some element of film consciousness (an awareness of 
film, an attitude toward film, a memory of film, etc).   
                                            
47  Lise Kernan defines trailers as “paratexts” that “reify not only (fictionalized) past 
experience but also the future – the anticipated experience of future moviegoing, and even 
future memories of past moviegoing.” Lisa Kernan, Coming Attractions: Reading American 
Movie Trailers. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 16. 
48 The premise of my presentation with Pierre Chemartin, “Learning Film Performance 
through Comics,” at DOMITOR (Brighton, 2012), was that comics provided an aesthetic 
experience to viewers from which readers potentially gained an understanding of film 
aesthetics, especially in terms of framing and editing. 
49 As discussed, Marc Fursteneau and Martin Lefebvre consider the effects of DVD technology 
on “the film experience” in “Digital Editing and Montage: The Vanishing Celluloid and 
Beyond,” Cinémas 13, no.1-2 (Fall 2002), 69-107. 
50  Robert C. Allen, “Reimagining the History of the Experience of Cinema in a Post-
Moviegoing Age,” in Maltby, Stokes, and Allen, Going to the Movies, 41-57. 
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There are probably more categories than these, or other ways of formulating 
them, but these eight different ‘film experiences’ seem to satisfy the condition 
of being “filmic” in nature and standing as a point of contact between a person 
and film. In this point of contact, a particular awareness or consciousness of 
film is formed. The point of contact provides parameters and possibilities of 
engagement – the digital film editor develops a different film consciousness 
(as the Fursteneau and Lefebvre article shows) than the analogue film editor, 
and these two individuals different than the film scholar or the video club 
employee. While this thesis will not necessarily demonstrate the means 
through which each of these points of contact present a set of parameters or 
possibilities, it is important to merely recognize that when the premise “film 
consciousness belongs to a world in which film experiences occur” is 
considered, it is this indefinite, point of contact ‘film experience’ that is 
imagined – which is the aggregate of all film experiences mentioned, yet none 
in particular.  
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CHAPTER 7: “AN ENTITY IN CONSCIOUSNESS”  
In an entry on his personal website entitled “Chinese boxes, Russian dolls, 
and Hollywood movies”, David Bordwell writes: 
In the 1990s and 2000s, American cinema was hit by a rash of fancy 
storytelling. Filmmakers experimented with flashbacks, replays, 
shifting points of view, multiple universes, network narratives, and 
a host of other unusual devices. (Some prototypes: Pulp Fiction, The 
Usual Suspects, Memento, and Short Cuts.) These developments 
nudged me into analyzing the trend in The Way Hollywood Tells It, 
but my interest in such tricky narration goes back to my adolescent 
love of detective fiction and the stories of Henry James, Faulkner, 
and James Joyce. For me, mysteries and modernism went together. 
That was especially true of 1940s movies, which I now realize loom 
large in my film consciousness. Many of the fractured, densely 
plotted movies I wrote about at length in Narration in the Fiction 
Film, such as Murder My Sweet, The Big Sleep, In This Our Life, 
and The Killers, come from the same era as Citizen Kane and How 
Green Was My Valley. So do subjects I wrote about later, such 
as Mildred Pierce and Rope and network pictures like Weekend at 
the Waldorf and Tales of Manhattan.1 
In the second paragraph Bordwell uses the phrase “in my film consciousness.” 
This usage appears to raise new questions about the meaning of ‘film 
consciousness’ – what does it signify in this context in contrast to those 
already presented? As explained in Chapter 5, Bordwell (along with Kristin 
Thompson) has used the term previously to mean “film culture awareness” 
(the social value of film, which includes being aware of film history and the 
                                            
1 David Bordwell, “Chinese boxes, Russian dolls, and Hollywood movies,” David Bordwell’s 
Website on Cinema (June 6, 2011). http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2011/06/06/chinese-
boxes-russian-dolls-and-hollywood-movies/ 
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need to preserve film).2 The above usage does not seem to have this intended 
meaning. The preposition “in” and the possessive pronoun “my” reveal, I 
believe, a different understanding of the formulation.  
The following excerpt, from a different author, Spencer Shaw, appears in the 
Introduction of the book Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to 
Deleuze: 
The second half of the book develops the idea of film 
consciousness as a unique vision of the world and as a change to 
human sensibility.3 
This usage of ‘film consciousness’ also differs from those considered in 
previous chapters. In this case, the author offers an explicit definition, that of 
“a unique vision of the world,” which represents “a change to human 
sensibility.” 
While different, I believe these two usages share a common denominator: 
“film consciousness” is imagined as a discrete, unified phenomenon that has 
become an “entity of consciousness.” By “entity,” I mean a thing with distinct 
standing, either imagined or real. The implications of this way of using the 
formulation – or conceptualizing the formulation – are different than those in 
                                            
2 See Chapter 5 on “Film Culture Awareness.” 
3 Spencer Shaw, Film Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Deleuze (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 2008), 3 
 277 
previous chapters. When imagined as an entity, there are new possibilities of 
‘film consciousness’ – which open into different areas of discussions.  
I already covered in the Introduction, and at other points, the difference 
between using ‘film consciousness’ to name a presumed thing in the world, 
“an entity,” and a concept or category that serves to render a relationship 
between film and consciousness describable and analyzable from different 
perspectives. Some of the implications of holding this “fact of the world” view 
– which is, essentially, as an entity in consciousness, whether enduring or 
contingent – is that ‘film consciousness’ comes to refer to rather concrete 
ideas, supported through different sorts of metaphors. In Bordwell’s case, ‘film 
consciousness’ is imagined as “a place” in consciousness where film memories 
and film experiences are stored.4 The contents of this “place” are further 
presumed as integral to personal identity in some manner; from his 
perspective, these contents are seen as essential to Bordwell’s identity as a 
person and academic. This way of using ‘film consciousness’ – to refer to a 
place and to a sense of self – is inscribed in the “language of consciousness” 
discussed in the first two chapters. This chapter further elaborates on the 
metaphors that sustain these ideas.  
                                            
4 This similar to Martin Lefebvre’s concept “imaginary museum” which I will return to below. 
Martin Lefebvre, “On Memory and Imagination in the Cinema,” New Literary History: 
Cultural Inquiries 2, no. 2 (1999): 479-98. 
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I also defined last chapter a category of film experience named “film 
remainders” – those phenomena that remain in consciousness after a film 
experience, or after film experiences. What remains in consciousness over a 
period of time – from these film experiences – appears dividable into at least 
two areas. The first area is, roughly speaking, a “form of knowledge,” or 
“know-how” that is applicable to the world at large, especially in relation to 
phenomena that is construable as “film-like.” In such a conceptualization, 
“film consciousness” becomes rather a faculty of consciousness – it functions 
to determine the way the world is apprehended, understood, rationalized, and 
so forth. Shaw’s usage of ‘film consciousness’ reflects this understanding of 
the term. Rather than “a place,” as with Bordwell’s usage, Shaw sees “film 
consciousness” as “a vision” – also an “entity” in consciousness – that 
performs certain functions, or has certain effects, within consciousness (the 
particular functions it performs is never really clarified in Shaw’s work, but it 
is conceptualized on these terms, which is the issue here). This perspective 
connects with other concepts in film studies that similarly regard film 
experiences as producing fundamental and enduring changes to 
consciousness, such as Casetti’s notion of “film gaze,” which will form part of 
the discussion below. All of these understandings of the effect of film 
experiences on consciousness result in the construction of some entity (vision, 
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gaze, etc) that represents the accrued changes – in the case of this chapter, 
that entity is “film consciousness.”  
The second area is definable as “subjective film consciousness,” which derives, 
over time, from “subjective film experiences,” that raw experience of film that 
remains in consciousness. “Subjective film consciousness” is also an entity – in 
that it can be spoken about as a distinct thing – but it represents something 
quite different than a faculty, which is largely outside of conscious attention. 
“Subjective film consciousness” is a peculiar kind of conscious experience, 
which each individual will define differently. It is characterized by moods, 
sensations, feelings, thoughts, or emotions intimately linked with past film 
experiences, such that from the perspective of the person defining this 
experience, it feels “film-like” in some regard. In this chapter, I will present 
some conditions under which a person might come to this determination, as 
well as some personal examples illustrating this phenomenon.  
There are then at least four interrelated – yet quite distinct – ways of using 
‘film consciousness’ in terms of an entity in consciousness. The first is as an 
imagined “place” within consciousness “containing” film-related consciousness 
phenomena; the second – and connected to this first – is as an element or 
aspect of personal identity; thirdly, it is imaginable as a faculty of 
consciousness that determines the way reality is engaged with and 
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apprehended; and finally, ‘film consciousness’ is definable as a particular kind 
of “conscious experience.” Each of these share in common that “film 
consciousness” is regarded as a “thing” as opposed to a concept or analytical 
category that expresses a relationship between a person and the object of film. 
This chapter will also attempt to provide a sense of the linguistic, 
metaphorical, and philosophical conditions that render these 
conceptualizations possible.  
 
1. Identity  
As with the other possibilities of ‘film consciousness’ discussed in previous 
chapters, our analysis begins with examining the words in the formulation. 
However, this time a different meanings of ‘consciousness’ is inserted into the 
formulation. We have already seen that when ‘consciousness’ is used in 
relation to an object, it sometimes means “awareness of [something]”: 
someone has “consciousness” of a book on a table, of a thought or idea, of an 
emotion, of a memory, and so forth. Thus, as argued, ‘film consciousness’ can 
mean “awareness of film,” or “film awareness.” We have further seen that 
‘consciousness’ sometimes refers to the shared and defining ideas, beliefs, and 
sensibilities of a set of people or period, such that when combined with ‘film’ 
the formulation comes to mean “a way of existing towards film,” as in a “film 
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movement.” Now we will consider a new meaning, presented in Chapter 3 
(section 4), under the heading “personal consciousness:”  
The totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, which make 
up a person’s sense of self or define a person’s identity. 5 
As can be seen, this ‘consciousness’ does not necessarily refer to a single 
phenomenon, but rather to a collection of “conscious phenomena” that in 
“totality” represents a person’s “sense of self” and “identity.” The above list of 
conscious phenomena, constituting this totality, should be regarded as 
illustrative, not exhaustive. For example, it might include a memory, an 
experience, a sensation, or an image, such that the above definition would 
read, “The totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, and also, 
memories, experiences, sensations, or images, which make up a person’s sense 
of self or define a person’s identity.” The particular conscious phenomena that 
are seen as defining identity are only knowable from the perspective of the 
individual and expressed through – as Richard Rorty defines it – a personal or 
“final vocabulary:”  
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to 
justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the 
words in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for 
our enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our 
highest hopes. They are the words in which we tell, sometimes 
                                            
5 “consciousness, n., entry 4a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
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prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives. I 
shall call these words a person’s “final vocabulary.”6 
One of the words in a person’s “final vocabulary” is ‘consciousness’, especially 
in expressions such as “my consciousness.” The meaning of ‘consciousness’ in 
this expression differs from “identity,” which is also, one might say, a word in 
a person’s “final vocabulary.” An important difference between these 
expressions – “my consciousness” and “my identity” – is that the latter 
expression includes external conditions: profession, name, ethnicity, 
appearance, sex and so forth. However, when someone makes reference to “my 
consciousness,” it does not include these external conditions – it points to an 
imagined area of consciousness that is private, and perhaps essential, to 
identity, and that is not bound to external conditions. The following example, 
taken from an article published in The Guardian entitled “The English at 
leisure” by Simon Roberts, illustrates this usage – we will note the particular 
content attached to the expression ‘my consciousness’:  
I was born in Croydon, south London, in 1974, but my formative 
years were spent in Oxted, a provincial town in Surrey’s commuter 
belt. Holidays often involved walking in the Lake District or visiting 
my grandparents in Angmering, a retirement village on the south 
coast. Childhood memories, and the range of associations and 
images they suggest, became the starting point for We English. My 
memories of holidays, for example, were infused with very particular 
landscapes: the lush greenness around Ennerdale Water or the flint-
grey skies and pebbles of Angmering’s beaches. It seemed to me that 
these landscapes formed an important part of my consciousness of 
                                            
6 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 73. 
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who I am and how I ”remember” England, whether I am at home or 
abroad.7 
Since for Roberts “my consciousness” means “who he is,” then “childhood 
memories,” “associations,” and “images” are the salient phenomena that bring 
definition to that sense of self. The importance of the word “my” (or any 
personal pronoun, including “our,” as presented below) is essential to 
recognizing this usage of ‘consciousness’. The meaning of the word 
‘consciousness’ in this context is not an objective, depersonalized, or global 
understanding, such as with the expression “to lose consciousness.” It would 
be absurd to say, “I lost my consciousness.” We say, instead, “I lost 
consciousness.” The pronoun in “my consciousness” thus refers to a different 
understanding of ‘consciousness’, what I’m referring to as “personal 
consciousness.”  
One way of making sense of the expression “my consciousness” in relation to a 
more global or depersonalized understanding of “consciousness” is to see “my 
consciousness” as a “token” example of “general consciousness.” However, in 
practice, these two understandings of consciousness do not really connect at a 
descriptive level. The impersonal, or depersonalized, understanding of 
consciousness refers to the capacity to think or be aware of oneself and the 
world, among other features (which are discussed in more detail in the section 
                                            
7  Simon Roberts, “The English at Leisure,” The Guardian (August 22, 2009).  
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/aug/22/english-leisure-simon-roberts 
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below entitled “Faculty”). The personalized usage of ‘consciousness’ (as “my 
consciousness”) is not really a token example of this type (in large part 
because consciousness is not really a type of anything, just as matter or time 
are not types, as David Chalmers explains in the passages already cited in 
Chapter 2) – other than a type of understanding of the way ‘consciousness’ is 
sometimes used in these sorts of contexts (to refer to the totality of conscious 
phenomena that make up a sense of self).  
If this manner of speaking is considered, in which it makes sense to define 
some memories, impressions, and experiences as a “totality” that defines 
“personal identity,” there is some logical semantic ground for extending this 
manner of speaking to an expression such as “my film consciousness.” Of 
course, there is then the question of what the ‘film consciousness’ in “my film 
consciousness” refers to – and the answer is perhaps deceptively, or naively, 
simple. It refers to the exact same things as the ‘consciousness’ in “my 
consciousness,” with the exception that it encompasses only those things that 
are seen by someone as film-related. When Bordwell writes about his “film 
consciousness,” he means that conscious phenomena that has remained in his 
consciousness and that belongs, in some especially meaningful way, to 
Bordwell’s identity (otherwise, he might have said the similar, but not 
equivalent expression “my experiences of film,” rather than “in my film 
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consciousness” – these different turns of phrase, while overlapping, 
nevertheless communicate different ideas).   
There is also another dimension that is important to consider in relation to 
this phrase. We know the phrase refers to film-related conscious phenomena 
that define David Bordwell. But why does the expression lack quotation 
marks? Why does Bordwell not make reference to the “conceptuality” of the 
statement itself? Imagine if instead of “film consciousness” Bordwell had used 
Lefebvre’s similar concept “imaginary museum” (discussed in the next 
section). Surely in that case Bordwell would have placed the concept in 
quotation marks and offered an explanation. In this case, there is no such 
concern for explaining the conceptuality of the statement, in spite of the fact it 
is hardly used in the academic world. Yet, its intelligibility is a given. There is 
an intuitive sense to the expression, in this context, that does not require 
further explanation.  
I provided one such explanation for this innate intelligibility in Chapter 3 
when discussing the way compound expressions that use ‘consciousness’ 
borrow from an existing grammar – a grammar that is partially constructed 
on the basis of other compound terms that include ‘consciousness’, such as 
“national consciousness,” “public consciousness,” and so forth. There exists in 
public language, then, a “template” for compound expressions with the word 
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‘consciousness’, which people borrow at different times for different purposes, 
such that coming across a new iteration, such as ‘film consciousness’ does not 
cause any immediate confusion. We should not assume that because ‘film 
consciousness’ is difficult to explain that it is not easy to understand in many 
cases – because that is the case with Bordwell, to some degree.  
Nevertheless, there is a second reason this expression is intelligible – and 
understood as linked to identity – when read in its original context. In spite of 
the template that renders new compound expressions that use ‘consciousness’ 
intelligible – not all compound expressions that use ‘consciousness’ will strike 
people this way. If someone says “in my tree consciousness” to define all 
conscious phenomena related to trees, or “in my house consciousness” to 
define all conscious phenomena related to houses, confusion is likely. It seems 
that in compound expressions with ‘consciousness’ something about the object 
itself renders the expression as a whole intelligible. Certainly, it is only a 
question of imagining a hypothetical context in which an expression like “in 
my tree consciousness” is intelligible, but at least, with regard to “film 
consciousness,” we have one real example to base an opinion on – and that 
from a prominent scholar in Film Studies. And the question is – why does the 
formulation make sense without having to think about it? Why is it already 
somewhat plausible that someone might say “in my film consciousness”?  
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My sense is that there is already a background understanding – what 
Bourdieu might refer to as a “doxa” 8  or Charles Taylor a “horizon of 
significance”9 – that renders such an expression superficially intelligible. This 
“background understanding” is that films and film experiences are already 
generally seen as meaningfully linked to the formation of identity. Films, as 
opposed to cats and trees, provide experiences, and historically, public 
experiences, that either become part of identity or through which identity is 
engaged. Annette Kuhn addresses precisely this point in her study on “cinema 
memories.” In discussing some tendencies in “Type A” cinema memories (as 
discussed last chapter, that of actual films as opposed to the theatre or other 
situational elements), Kuhn writes:  
It is as if the remembered image or scene and the body of the person 
remembering it are fused together in the moment of recollection, 
and in the feelings that the memory evokes.10 
This link with identity is made clearer in Type B cinema memories, which are 
those “in which films and scenes or images from films are remembered within 
a context of events in the subject’s own life.”11 In discussing this set of 
                                            
8 In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Pierre Bourdieu defines “the field of doxa” as “that which 
is taken for granted.” Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), 166.  
9 Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord, Ont: Anansi, 1991), 52. 
10 Annette Kuhn, “What to do with Cinema Memory?”, in Explorations in New Cinema 
History: Approaches and Case Studies, edited by Richard Maltby, Daniël Biltereyst, and 
Philippe Meers. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 89. 
11 Ibid., 91. 
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evidence, Kuhn notices another related tendency that illustrates how cinema 
memories and identity become intertwined in consciousness: 
In discursive terms, Type B memories are distinguished by what 
may be termed an ‘anecdotal’ rhetoric, a form of address that 
typically involves a story narrated in the first person singular about 
a specific, one-off event or occasion, a story in which the informant 
constructs herself or himself as chief protagonist. 12 
Based on Kuhn’s reading, a cinema memory becomes embedded within 
identity, both in terms of re-experienced bodily sensations, such as in Type A 
memories, but also in the way the account includes recognizing the place of 
cinema within a personal journey of understanding the world. This latter 
point is illustrated in one of the accounts that Kuhn presents in her study 
from one Terence Davies: 
When I was seven I was taken by my eldest sister to see Singin’ in 
the Rain. Sitting in the dark brown, baroque interior of the Odeon, 
Liverpool, watching Gene Kelly dance with an umbrella, I entered 
for the first time a world of magic: the cinema.13 
Kuhn’s analysis provides a further context, then, for making sense of 
Bordwell’s usage of ‘film consciousness’, by establishing an intuitively 
understood fact: that film and identity are intimately linked within modern 
culture, in the way film experiences form identity or accompany the formation 
                                            
12 Ibid., 101. 
13 Ibid., 91. 
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of identity, or serve as turning points or markers within a personal narrative, 
such that film experiences become a part of a person’s “final vocabulary.” 
 
2. Place 
Thus far, I have shown that Bordwell’s usage of ‘film consciousness’ refers to 
“film-related conscious phenomena” and that these conscious phenomena – 
because of the nature of the word ‘consciousness’ itself, especially in 
expressions such as “my consciousness” – are bound to identity. Furthermore, 
the intelligibility of the formulation in this context is based, in part, on 
recognizing a grammar of the word ‘consciousness’ (how it is typically used in 
expressions) and on a “doxa” in which the link between the formation of 
identity, and sense of self, is reasonably understood to intersect with film 
experiences. However, there is one final point to make regarding Bordwell’s 
usage, and this regards the “spatial dimension” that these film-related 
conscious phenomena are given. As I mentioned at the beginning, the key 
words preceding ‘film consciousness’, in the Bordwell example, are “my” and 
“in.” Therefore, I will now discuss the pertinence of the word “in” with respect 
to this usage. Bordwell imagines these film-related conscious phenomena as 
being rather organized, located in a “place” within consciousness. This signals 
yet another way of thinking about “film consciousness.”  
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First of all, we will expand our set of examples in order to further characterize 
this conceptualization of “film consciousness” as a “place.” In writing about a 
barely remembered film from twenty years before, an Internet Movie 
Database member (IMDB) comments:  
[The film] is lying around my film consciousness, shoved somewhere 
between “The Leech Woman” and “Sunset Boulevard.”14 
Notice that the IMDB user does not say “memory” or “film experience,” but 
rather imagines ‘film consciousness’ as a “place” that contains a library of past 
film viewings.  
The next two examples reflect the same usage of ‘film consciousness’, this 
time, however, attributed to a collective rather than to an individual. In a 
review of the DVD of Bob Le Flambeur, Stephanie Lundhall writes:  
Bob Le Flambeur, perhaps because it got there first, feels much 
looser in the way that it approaches the mechanics of the operation 
and even looking at it from the perspective of 2009, when the 
elements of the film are so familiar that they’ve become part of the 
collective film consciousness, it still seems fresh and new.15 
The other example is from a teacher’s (Gayle Gorman) course notes on 
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960):  
                                            
14 Andy Sandfoss, comments section of the Internet Movie Database (Accessed January 11, 
2011). http://www.imdb.com/user/ur0550290/comments 
15Stephanie Lundhall, “Bob Le Flambeur - Jean-Pierre Melville.” 
 http://culturazzi.org/review/cinema/bob-le-flambeur-jean-pierre-melville. 
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Sam and Norman mirror each other in the motel lobby while Lila 
inspects Marions’s motel room, one in black, one in white. 
 
The horizontal composition of the motel split by the vertical 
direction of the dreaded house on hill cutting it in two. This house 
has become iconic, perched as it is, into our collective film 
consciousness.16 
While these examples imagine “film consciousness” as place that either 
belongs to the individual or to a collective – in which film-related conscious 
phenomena are stored – the latter two examples also display a similar view as 
presented in Chapter 1 in relation to the expression “national consciousness” 
(it is hardly ever the case that a given usage of ‘film consciousness’ can be 
pinned down to a single category of meaning). Thus, “collective film 
consciousness” roughly means an ongoing, shared understanding and 
awareness of film and film history. Nevertheless, it is conceptualized as a 
place. Therefore, for now I would like to focus attention on the preposition 
“into” preceding “our collective film consciousness,” which is the same as 
Bordwell’s use of “in” in his example. 
As some language philosophers have noted, the language that accompanies 
abstract ideas provides some understanding of the way the abstract idea is 
imagined as a physical reality. The use of “in” and “into,” and even “lying 
around,” are indicative of the imagined spatial dimension of “film 
                                            
16 Gayle Gorman, “Alfred Hitchcock as Intro to Film Analysis,” (Accessed November 11, 2011). 
http://www.gaylegorman.com/teaching/mediastudies/hitch/psycho.html  
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consciousness,” which reinforces its place as an “entity,” or “part,” or “feature” 
of consciousness. “Film consciousness” is rather imagined as a “room” or a 
“place” within a larger space. This larger space is some global understanding 
of consciousness. This way of imagining and locating places in relation to 
consciousness is constructed on the basis of a rather common metaphor that 
pervades ordinary language and ways of talking about abstract ideas, which 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson define as the “container metaphor.”  
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors orient 
our understanding of the world and determine beliefs about concepts and 
behaviour, such as “argument” or “money.”17 Such metaphors are presumed in 
the act of speech, rather than being explicitly mentioned. For example, Lakoff 
and Johnson see the metaphor “Argument is War” as structuring attitudes 
toward argument. This metaphor pervades many expressions related to 
argument, thus determining, in some way, how a person engages in such an 
activity. The examples below illustrate the metaphor as manifest in common, 
ordinary expressions, although it should be noted that the authors did not 
have access to the Internet at the time, and therefore were limited in quickly 
accessible examples. Some of the examples below seem rather artificial but 
the point generally stands. 
                                            
17 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980). 
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Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were 
right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I’ve never won an argument with him. 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out. He shot down all of my 
arguments.18 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, “It is important to see that we don’t just 
talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose 
arguments.” 19  In this sense, “the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that 
we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.” 20 
The authors further raise the point that not all cultures might view 
arguments in terms of war, for example a culture “where no one wins or loses, 
where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground.” 21 
In such a culture, the understanding of argument may result in a completely 
different set of actions, perhaps a collaborative approach, or where 
“argument” does not exist in the way we understand. This different 
understanding would then become manifest in the language that is used to 
discuss that activity (and in a sense, this different understanding also exists 
                                            
18 Ibid., 5. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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in our language, such as when arguments are treated as buildings – a point 
that Lakoff and Johnson raise in a different section of their book – which 
allows the possibility of collaboration, rather than conflict).22  
Of course, this example is not necessarily connected to “film consciousness,” 
but I believe it effectively illustrates what Lakoff and Johnson mean by  
“metaphors we live by” – which is connected to ‘film consciousness’. The 
metaphor I am drawing attention to is more elusive, and therefore less 
illustrative, but takes form through the same “ordinary language” mechanism 
as presented above. One of the “metaphors we live by,” according to Lakoff 
and Johnson, are “Ontological Metaphors,” which are used extensively in the 
way this thesis is organized as well (these metaphors are unavoidable because 
they sustain the very basis of communication). “Ontological metaphors” derive 
from, and are continuous with, the way physical objects in the world are 
generally treated: 
When things are not clearly discrete or bounded, we still categorize 
them as such, e.g., mountains, street corners, hedges, etc. Such ways 
of viewing physical phenomena are needed to satisfy certain 
purposes that we have: locating mountains, meeting at street 
corners, trimming hedges. Human purposes typically require us to 
impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete 
just as we are: entities bounded by a surface.23 
                                            
22 Ibid., 47. 
23 Ibid., 26. 
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Imposing boundaries on things serves a social and discursive function through 
which certain activities are engaged, including fitting abstract concepts 
within a hierarchy of other abstract ideas (such as when ideas are imagined 
as fields enclosed in larger territories and so forth). Thus, when things that 
lack a physical dimension are discussed, one tendency is to draw from our 
physical experiences in order to provide these abstract things discrete, 
bounded surfaces that enable the same sort of organized activity toward them; 
and thus “our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) 
provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological 
metaphors.”24 The act of regarding non-physical objects on these terms is 
extremely significant, especially in the sorts of activities engaged with in 
academics and in this thesis:  
Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances 
allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as 
discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Once we can 
identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to 
them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this 
means, reason about them.25  
We have, then, an explanation for why non-physical objects are treated as 
physical objects. We render these objects intelligible, and quantifiable, by 
providing them the same sorts of properties as physical objects, including 
establishing boundaries. But as with the “argument is war” metaphor, this 
                                            
24 Ibid., 26. 
25 Ibid., 26. 
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way of treating non-physical objects is not necessarily explicit, nor conscious, 
it is simply ingrained in everyday language. Consider the way “life” is spoken 
about in everyday speech: 
I’ve had a full life. Life is empty for him. There’s not much left for 
him in life. Her life is crammed with activities. Get the most out of 
life. His life contained a great deal of sorrow. Live your life to the 
fullest.26 
These are examples of the “container metaphor” in practice. But in this case, 
it is implied mainly in prepositions, which have the effect of transforming 
non-physical phenomena into ever-smaller containers, into which are placed 
other similar things, much like a Russian Doll. The container metaphor is 
powerful – and pervasive – because it derives from our very own physical 
nature: 
Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out 
orientation. We project our own in-out orientation onto other 
physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view 
them as containers with an inside and an outside. But even where 
there is no natural physical boundary that can be viewed as defining 
a container, we impose boundaries—marking off territory so that it 
has an inside and a bounding surface—whether a wall, a fence, or 
an abstract line or plane.27 
We are simply noting that one of the ways “film consciousness” makes sense – 
as in the Bordwell example – is that it is sustained through an ontological 
metaphor, that of a container, that enables us to see it as an entity. The 
                                            
26 Ibid., 52. 
27 Ibid., 30. 
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examples presented earlier illustrate this fact, by showing that the container 
metaphor, which have bounded surfaces with an inside and outside, structure 
the statements and associated ideas related to them:  
into our collective film consciousness 
in my film consciousness 
laying around my film consciousness 
This way of talking about “film consciousness” is not necessarily specific to 
this conceptualization, since such container metaphors are common in 
discussions about the mind, but I believe it is through this metaphor that 
“film consciousness” not only becomes intelligible, but also connects with 
other similar concepts in film studies. It is not accidental, I would say, that 
Martin Lefebvre, through a very different argumentative and theoretical 
trajectory arrives at a more or less equivalent concept, that of “imaginary 
museum,” in which “we keep the various films and film fragments that have 
touched us deeply.”28 The film consciousness discussed in this section – as a 
“place” – is not just manifest in the way this formulation is used; it is also a 
concept, a way of imagining where film experiences end up in relation to 
consciousness, through which some effect is implemented, and through which 
our thinking about these experiences are organized.   
 
                                            
28 Lefebvre, “On Memory and Imagination in the Cinema,” 480. 
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3. Faculty 
There is a current of thought in film studies that regards film experiences as 
producing a measurable, or definable, effect on consciousness, therefore 
becoming an integral entity in consciousness. This “entity” is seen as a having 
an impact on the way the world is apprehended and experienced. Different 
terms are used for defining it, but many derive from “ocular” metaphors.29 
Francesco Casetti, for example, defines it as a “film gaze.” Adopted over a 
period of time, the film gaze is then reapplied in other areas of life. Casetti’s 
argument is of course substantially more complex than this, but the causal 
arrangement is rather straightforward: film experiences produce effects on 
consciousness; these effects are imagined as a single, enduring entity in 
consciousness; this entity is seen as performing a set of functions, including 
the way the world is experienced. It is then a question of naming the “entity” 
or “element of consciousness.” Casetti names it “film gaze,” for various 
reasons,30 but it carries other names too, according to the writer.  
                                            
29 The preponderance of eye metaphors is a fact Martin Jay refers to as “ocularcentrism.” 
Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 8. 
30 Casetti writes, “we must not forget that film, from its inception, was first and foremost 
identified and publicized as a marvellously optical device. . .” The visual dimension of 
Casetti’s metaphor addresses this aspect of film and brings the focus onto questions of film 
aesthetics, style, and technology as elements connected to the gaze and the way it impacts 
consciousness. Francesco Casetti, Eye of the Century: Film, Experience, Modernity (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 2. 
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For example, as mentioned, Spencer Shaw defines it as a “vision” (named ‘film 
consciousness’). Annemone Ligensa characterizes film “as a form of 
perception,”31 and of course there is John Berger’s popular notion of “ways of 
seeing,” which while not necessarily about film, encompasses the effects of 
visual culture as a whole, writing, “It is seeing which establishes our place in 
the surrounding world . . . The relation between what we see and what we 
know is never settled.”32 A “way of seeing” consists of beliefs, awareness, 
perception, and knowledge acquired from images, and thus “the way we see 
things is affected by what we know or what we believe.”33 All of these ocular 
characterizations, including the “film gaze,” share in common the belief that 
exposure to visual culture, including films and film derivatives, produce 
observable changes in consciousness. The particular label used to name this 
entity reflects something about the nature of the causes that produces the 
entity, thus the reliance on ocular metaphors, and also something about the 
way this entity is imagined as functioning in consciousness: the cause of the 
entity is film experiences (and thus visual experiences) and the effects of this 
entity become manifest in the sense of vision.   
                                            
31 Annemone Ligensa, “Film 1900 as Technology,” in Film 1900: technology, perception, 
culture, edited by Klaus Kreimeier and Annemone Ligensa (Indiana University Press, 2009), 
2. 
32 John Berger, Ways of Seeing (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 7. 
33 Ibid., 7-8. 
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But there is another characteristic reflected in the terminology, which is that 
these ocular terms are deliberately vague, unspecific and evocative. The 
precise cause and effect relationship that results in the entity, and the precise 
function this entity plays in consciousness, is difficult to pinpoint. It is not 
really possible to build a reductive causal argument, in which a clear causal 
relation is established between film experiences, the entity in consciousness, 
and future behaviour and experiences. Even if we allow that there is a clear 
causal link between film experiences and future behaviour, including 
subjective experiences, it is still difficult, if not impossible, to explain the 
conscious processes in which this entity figures. We only have access to the 
“inputs” (film experiences) and “outputs” (behaviour). Therefore, the 
vagueness of the name reflects this lack of knowledge, leaving it an open 
question about how precisely the entity functions.  
So there are two significant problems then in discussions about this 
mysterious entity that film experiences construct; one, it defines an unknown, 
and perhaps, unknowable process in consciousness; and two, it represents a 
cause-effect relationship between “inputs” and “outputs” that is too variable, 
and elusive, to reduce to specific causes and effects. At the most basic level, 
we know that film experiences have an impact on consciousness, just as all 
experiences have an impact, but the specific process through which this 
impact is implemented, and the eventual behaviour that arises is hard to 
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grasp, except, I would suggest, at the level of subjective film experience – or 
“subjective film consciousness” – which is at least describable from the 
perspective of each individual (discussed in the next section).  
Obviously, given the subject of this thesis I have a preference for naming this 
entity ‘film consciousness’, although unlike Shaw, I cannot say if ‘film 
consciousness’ is a “vision.” I do know that, given the ensemble of arguments 
presented in this thesis, it makes logical and semantic sense to name an 
imagined set of film-related conscious phenomena that become a part of 
consciousness as “film consciousness.” I would say there are at least three 
reasons for adopting the term; one, it avoids the “ocularcentrism” of the other 
concepts which tend to overstate the degree to which it is possible to 
demarcate this entity from other aspects or areas of consciousness; two, it 
creates a meaningful link between something that is felt and experienced and 
something that is imagined as causing that experience, by creating a 
terminological continuity between them (the experience is named ‘film 
consciousness’ and the cause of this experience is named ‘film consciousness’, 
a point discussed in the final section of this chapter); and three, the 
formulation establishes a link between the other categories of “film 
consciousness” discussed in this thesis and chapter, fitting with the approach 
named in the Introduction of this thesis as “thinking in terms of ‘film 
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consciousness’, which involves thinking about a single problem from multiple 
perspectives sharing the same terminology.   
The first question to examine, then, is why Shaw’s usage of ‘film 
consciousness’ makes semantic sense, in the same way that Bordwell’s usage 
of ‘film consciousness’ made intuitive semantic sense, not just conceptual 
sense. Shaw’s usage of ‘consciousness’ derives its sense from the fifth 
definition of ‘consciousness’ discussed in Chapter 3, named “global 
consciousness” (which is my own label for practical purposes):  
The faculty or capacity from which awareness of thought, feeling, 
and volition and of the external world arises . . .34 
This is a rather common definition of ‘consciousness’ – it names an imagined 
faculty that is essential to all humans. Other terms reflect the same basic 
idea that consciousness is “a system,”35 “a capacity,”36 or sometimes, “the 
                                            
34  “consciousness, n., entry 2a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
35   Ari N. Schulman covers many of these computer-like terms in “Why Minds Are Not Like 
Computers:” “People who believe that the mind can be replicated on a computer tend to 
explain the mind in terms of a computer. When theorizing about the mind, especially to 
outsiders but also to one another, defenders of artificial intelligence (AI) often rely on 
computational concepts. They regularly describe the mind and brain as the ‘software and 
hardware’ of thinking, the mind as a ‘pattern’ and the brain as a ‘substrate,’ senses as ‘inputs’ 
and behaviors as ‘outputs,’ neurons as ‘processing units’ and synapses as circuitry,’ to give 
just a few common examples.” Ari N. Schulman, “Why Minds Are Not Like Computers,” The 
New Atlantis (Winter, 2009). http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-
like-computers 
36  I presented the full definition in Chapter 2. Norman Stuart Sutherland, ed., The 
International Dictionary of Psychology (New York: Continuum, 1989), 95, quoted in 
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brain.”37 It is the thing (“consciousness”) from which conscious experience 
arises (also named “consciousness”). As explained in Chapter 3, this is rather 
confusing because the word ‘consciousness’ is used to define both the cause 
and the effect: ‘consciousness’ refers to the faculty and also to the product of 
the faculty. For this reason, the second ‘consciousness’, the one that is the 
product or outcome, is sometimes defined as “conscious experience,” but the 
term ‘consciousness’ is often used interchangeably. In short, the word 
‘consciousness’ will sometimes refer to the faculty, and sometimes it will refer 
to the experience the faculty generates. I refer to the first – the faculty – as 
“global consciousness.”  
What happens then if we apply the above definition of ‘consciousness’ – as a 
faculty – to the formulation ‘film consciousness’ as we have in previous 
chapters? The effect is to transform the formulation into a term that refers to 
a “faculty” of consciousness and which gives rise to conscious experience, also 
named ‘film consciousness’, that is characterized by certain features (film-like 
features, discussed in the next section.) The previously mentioned terms, 
“gaze,” “vision,” “perception,” or “way of seeing,” thus refer to this imagined 
“faculty,” which is regarded as a structural component of consciousness. The 
formulation ‘film consciousness’ thus establishes the same kind of causal link 
                                                                                                                                   
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 3. 
37  Daniel Dennett presents this view in an interview with Robert Wright. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ss0aCWpNzSM  
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between a cause (the faculty) and effect (an experience) as the word 
‘consciousness’. It enables us to think about certain kinds of conscious 
experience – those that we relate to film and which we name ‘film 
consciousness’ – as coming from a place in consciousness – a faculty – that is 
also named ‘film consciousness’.  
However, it is unlikely that anyone would accept that ‘film consciousness’ is a 
“faculty” in some enduring sense on the same order as “consciousness.” After 
all, it is a construction – a useful construction, in my view – that establishes a 
link between a perceived cause and effect, but it is a construction just the 
same. It is awkward, and perhaps counterintuitive, to imagine ‘film 
consciousness’ as a faculty – but what about if we see it as a “form of 
consciousness?” This latter expression serves as a bridge between something – 
a faculty – that is imagined as fixed and enduring and something that is 
“faculty-like,” but transitory, and more importantly is linked to the same 
semantic field as global consciousness. The Oxford Dictionary of English in 
fact regards this usage of ‘consciousness’ as a subcategory of the above 
definition of ‘global consciousness’: 
As a count noun. A state or form of consciousness.38 
                                            
38  “consciousness, n., entry 2a”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39477?redirectedFrom=consciousness (accessed July 10, 
2015). 
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When imagined as a “form of consciousness,” the nature of the entity in 
question contains all of the same properties as global consciousness, but with 
the crucial difference that it is contextual and transitory. It is also, 
potentially, a faculty that is adopted and used for specific purposes. In order 
to gather a sense of the semantic nature of this expression – “form of 
consciousness” – we can consider some actual examples.  
Scholar Natasha Hurley, in an interview about the circulation of 
“unpredictable” texts in culture, including film texts, observes: 
The circulations of these texts create forms of consciousness that are 
not easily visible.  They institute new ways of thinking.  They create 
communities.  They give us a glimpse into a kind of complexity that 
we still do not have a name for.39 
For Hurley, a “form of consciousness” is essentially a “way of thinking,” but 
one which is not “easily visible.” In “From Film and Television to Multimedia 
Cognitive Effects,” Lucia Lumbelli draws an even clearer connection between 
this expression (“form of consciousness”) and film: 
However, this fundamental aspect was also stressed by theorists 
who are in favour of the new forms of consciousness introduced by 
cinema. Kracauer (1960) claimed that “unlike the other types of 
pictures, film images affect primarily the spectator’s senses, 
                                            
39Natasha Hurley, “Research Profile,” 
http://www.efs.ualberta.ca/en/Research/ResearchProfiles/PastResearchProfiles/NatashaHurle
yResearchProfile.aspx  (accessed August 15, 2015) 
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engaging him physiologically before he is in a position to respond 
intellectually.”40 
Both of these examples give a sense of the expression’s meaning, which is 
essentially a statement about new “ways of seeing” or “thinking,” in the John 
Berger sense of the term. Therefore, a “form of consciousness” more or less 
encompasses features of global consciousness, like awareness, thoughts, 
feelings, and so forth, but it is given a particular character in relation to a 
time, place or people. A “form of consciousness” is merely a particular instance 
of global consciousness, but defined according to its relationship with an 
object. Thus, when regarded as a “form of consciousness,” ‘film consciousness’ 
refers to those features that belong to global consciousness, such as 
awareness, thoughts, feelings, which have been affected by film experience 
over time. It is more open-ended, yet specific, than “vision” in this regard, 
because it encompasses the same set of features as global consciousness and is 
not limited to the visual domain.  
 Another definition of ‘form’ further clarifies the potential meaning of ‘film 
consciousness’ in terms of a faculty. Anthropologists Nigel Rapport and 
Joanna Overing write: 
Forms are the means by which individuals come together, negotiate 
continuing relations and affiliate into groups. Through a sharing of 
                                            
40  Lucia Lumbelli,  “From Film and Television to Multimedia Cognitive Effects,” in 
Understanding Multimedia Documents, edited by Jean-François Rouet, Richard Lowe and 
Wolfgang Schnotz (Springer, 2008), 224. 
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language and other formal, classificatory systems, individuals are 
able to meet in regular and routine interaction: are able to make 
‘society’. . . Forms do not become things-in-themselves; they do not 
live their own lives. Rather it is individuals who continue to lead 
their lives through them.41 
Thus, another way of imagining ‘film consciousness’ as a “form of 
consciousness” is as something that exists independently of any given 
individual, and as a function of particular objects and activities, such as 
cinema, through which individuals “lead their lives through them.” In such a 
conceptualization, ‘film consciousness’ is also a means through which people 
form relationships in the activity of film (through the shared experience of 
film viewing, for example).  
Obviously, I am only providing broad contours in this case, a way of thinking 
about the meaning of ‘film consciousness’ as a “faculty” (or form of 
consciousness) based on usage, grammar and semantics. It is, as mentioned, 
continuous with other concepts in film studies, although distinct because of 
the fact it forms part of a larger conceptual framework in which it makes 
sense. Therefore, I would like to explain how this conceptualization 
potentially works in the context of an analysis, through the example of 
Francesco Casetti, who uses “film gaze” instead of ‘film consciousness’ in order 
                                            
41 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing define this concept as follows: “Consciousness comes to 
know itself in and through the movement between different points of view in time and space.” 
Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2000), 188.  
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to designate this entity or form of consciousness (I will provide my own 
examples in the next section).  
 In his Eye of the Century: Film, Experience and Modernity, Casetti studies 
the role cinema played in “negotiating” the complex experiences of modernity. 
The first decades of the twentieth century mark the introduction of new urban 
environments, modes of transportation, communication, industry and social 
norms that transformed a sense of time, space and self-understanding. While 
this new environment gave rise to new, exciting opportunities and sensations, 
it also brought conflicting and disorienting experiences. Casetti argues that 
cinema filters these experiences and reproduces them in ways that reconcile 
the contradictory effects. The result is the construction of a negotiating “gaze” 
that the spectator appropriates and employs in his or her own ordinary life. In 
other words, the audience adopts a form of consciousness though which 
individuals come to live their life and engage with the world around them. To 
be sure, as mentioned above, the precise mechanism through which this 
process of negotiation occurs, in which film experiences attain this status, is 
complex and open to substantial interpretation. Nevertheless, Casetti 
presents a series of links that can be regarded as causally related.  
For example, Casetti conceives of the relationship between cinema and 
modernity as a back and forth dialectic process, exemplified in the key concept 
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of “film gaze” constituting the central concern of his study. The gaze is 
characterized according to a number of features that make it an important 
cultural form at the time it emerged. For instance, it is a gaze that displays 
“synchronicity” (being “in tune”) with its time.42 It is a technology and art 
form that absorbs the concerns of the period and reflects them back onto the 
spectator, through myths, and aesthetic strategies, that resolves (or 
negotiates) the underlying tension. As Casetti argues, cinema reflects “the 
issues of emerging social orders” and “negotiates” the paradoxes of modernity 
by uniting “conflicting stimuli in an age torn by strife and dilemma” and then 
“offering them up in their mundane, yet at times touching and magical, 
everydayness.”43 Film’s “gaze” incorporates each of these three features of 
cinema, though the latter function, as “negotiator”, emerges as the most 
essential in Casetti’s argument. 
The strategy Casetti applies is identifying a fact about modernity, usually in 
connection with some aspect of cinema, through an array of evidence, 
including “reviews, analyses, essays, prophecies, political speeches, ironic 
reporting, drafts of laws, literary pieces and so on”44 from the period. This fact 
could be, for example, the “intensification of nervous stimulation,” which, 
according to a 1903 publication by one of the first sociologists, Georg Simmel, 
                                            
42 Casetti, Eye of the Century, 15. 
43 Ibid., 3. 
44 Ibid., 70. 
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is characteristic of modern city life. With this scheme in mind, Casetti then 
finds examples of film that serve to produce, through particular aesthetics, a 
gaze that manages to addresses this “intensification of nervous stimulation.”45 
The implication, in Casetti’s argument, is that film experiences expose 
spectators to the repetition of certain stimulations, which in turn creates a 
virtual “crust” that protects spectators from similar stimulations found in 
ordinary modern life.46 Casetti uses the example of Griffith’s films, which 
produced “dizzying” effects in spectators through crosscutting. In becoming 
habituated to crosscutting, and the dizzying effects, a spectator is then able to 
negotiate similarly dizzying effects of modern life.47  There is a definite logic 
in Casetti’s argument that manages to render this causal link between 
abstract concepts and film aesthetics, if not believable, at least plausible.  
In addition, such arguments are supported in other studies that examine 
changes to consciousness on the basis of the nature of some new technology. 
For example, in The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media, 
John Thompson writes: 
The use of technical media provides individuals with new ways of 
organizing and controlling space and time, and new ways of using 
space and time for their own ends. The development of new 
technical media may also have a profound impact on the ways in 
                                            
45 Ibid., 131. 
46 Ibid., 115-116. 
47 Ibid., 120. 
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which individuals experience the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
social life.48 
Thus, it is not entirely without merit to suggest that ‘film consciousness’ as a 
“form of consciousness,” retains a lasting structure and permanence that goes 
beyond a local context, even if this is difficult to accept. In short, when Casetti 
applies the term ‘film gaze’, it could very well be described as a “form of 
consciousness,” and more precisely, as “film consciousness,” which 
encompasses a structural change in consciousness, and also a form through 
which individuals “lead their lives.” In Casetti’s model, this film consciousness 
has definite objectives. It serves an important social function that manages to 
justify the social and artistic value of film. It gives film an explicit, positive 
and enduring purpose that goes well beyond entertainment and the specific 
historical context he studies.  Although, when regarded on these terms, film 
consciousness need not serve any useful function whatsoever, it is just simply 
present.  
 
4. Subjective Film Consciousness  
So apparent was the impact of film on consciousness to early film critics that 
by 1911 W. Stephen Bush noted the extent to which it occupied an important 
place in film publications:  
                                            
48 John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 22. 
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The power and intensity of the moving picture, its direct, yet subtle 
and lasting influence on the mind and memory, have often been 
dwelt upon in these columns . . .49  
In this concluding section of the thesis, I would like to consider a final way of 
thinking about ‘film consciousness’ – and perhaps the most personal way –
that carries over from W. Stephen Bush’s 1911 acknowledgement about the 
impact of film on consciousness.   
Thus, in addition to “personal consciousness” and “global consciousness,” 
there is the last definition of ‘consciousness’ presented in Chapter 3, 
“conscious experience.” 50  When considered from this perspective, ‘film 
consciousness’ becomes a converging point, or point of integration, for the 
other categories and sub-categories of film consciousness already discussed. 
This “conscious experience” is the outcome of the “faculty of film 
consciousness” and includes content emerging from an imagined “place” or 
“location” in consciousness. It will also seem to have the character of being an 
essential part of identity. However, the defining character of this ‘film 
consciousness’ – in terms of conscious experience – is that it has a particular 
subjective feeling that will vary from person to person in terms of character. 
This feeling becomes present in ordinary, daily life, perhaps triggered by 
external events such as film viewing, but also by other types of encounters, 
                                            
49 W. Stephen Bush, “New Aspects of the Moving Picture,” Moving Picture World (Oct 14, 
1911):105. 
50 Chapter 3, Section 6. 
 313 
and is identifiable only from the perspective of the individual. It will seem to 
that individual that a particular experience, connected to film in some 
capacity, feels qualitatively unique or distinct. In such a case, it will seem as 
if this experience is more precisely “film consciousness,” or to reformulate it in 
distinction from other examples considered, “subjective film consciousness.”  
We can begin by considering what it means to say “conscious experience” in 
terms of a “particular feeling.” In 1974, Thomas Nagel published a now 
essential paper within the field of consciousness studies named “What is it 
like to be a bat?” The problem posed in this paper is recognized today as the 
“hard problem of consciousness,”51 but perhaps the most fascinating aspect of 
the argument is the way Nagel choses to frame the problem, which offers a 
question applicable to other areas of experience:  
Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at 
many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence 
in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general 
what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared 
to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in 
countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other 
solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form 
may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all 
means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that 
organism. There may be further implications about the form of the 
experience; there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about 
the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has 
                                            
51  David Chalmers, “The Hard Problem of Consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to 
Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans, and Susan Schneider (Malden, MA; Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 226. 
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conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is to 
be that organism—something it is like for the organism.52 
One of Nagel’s goals in this paper is to problematize “physicalist,” 
“materialist,” or “reductive” theories of mind, which are explanations that 
tend to dismiss or ignore the fact “global consciousness” includes a subjective 
dimension that is invisible to epistemologically objective study.53 There is no 
way of knowing or confirming the existence of this subjective dimension other 
than by actually having oneself the property of “conscious experience”. As 
quoted from the Dictionary of Psychology definition in Chapter 1, “The term 
[“consciousness”] is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible 
without a grasp of what consciousness means.” This is of course unlike other 
elements of the universe, which can be analyzed into progressively smaller 
and smaller components whose relationship with the whole is clearly 
established. Thus, conscious experience stands outside of an epistemologically 
objective framework. Nagel’s account clearly illustrates that when 
‘consciousness’ is used to mean “conscious experience,” it represents a problem 
that is nearly beyond rational comprehension: 
Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much 
less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The most 
important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena 
                                            
52 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 4, no. 83 (1973): 
436. 
53 John Searle argues that consciousness forms part of an “ontologically subjective” reality 
and therefore cannot be studied from “epistemologically objective” approach. John Searle, The 
Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 8. 
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is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try 
to explain it.54 
A vital limitation, then, in the study of conscious experience is that it is only 
describable from a first person perspective. In this regard, we can say that the 
“film consciousness” described in this section is only describable, and 
knowable, from a first person perspective. Thankfully, the history of film 
reception includes this sort of evidence, what one film scholar has named 
“subjective, first-person reports.”55 Because the description is directed at the 
experience as opposed to the film itself, these reports provide insight into 
subjective experience, as discussed last chapter in relation to Maxim Gorky.  
I already began to draw a distinction between “subjective film experience” and 
“subjective film consciousness” last chapter, but in this section I will attempt 
to go further. As discussed, “subjective film experience” refers to the 
subjective experience occurring while viewing a film, which is to say, all of the 
conscious phenomena, thoughts, images, feelings, present to consciousness 
while viewing a film. “Subjective film consciousness,” on the other hand, is not 
limited to the conscious experience of film viewing. It refers, rather, to a more 
enduring conscious experience that is potentially manifest in ordinary life. It 
is also a conscious experience one might define as part of identity, as coming 
                                            
54 Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, 436. 
55 Beja Margithazi, “ ‘Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows…’ The Role of Body and 
Senses in Various ‘First Contact’ Narratives,” Ősz (December 10, 2012). 
http://uj.apertura.hu/2012/osz/margithazi-the-role-of-body-and-senses/ 
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from a certain place in consciousness, or in term of a faculty. When examined 
subjectively – which is to say, when conscious attention is placed on 
“subjective film consciousness” it will “feel like” a distinct experience that is 
related to film in some enduring manner.  Only a person who experiences film 
consciousness will ultimately decide if it fits this condition (being distinct, 
feeling as if it is connected to film). It is then a question of characterizing this 
conscious experience.    
In fact, the intrigue of Nagel’s argument, as mentioned, is that he formulates 
a question that contextualizes and particularizes “conscious experience.” This 
is a recognized strategy in philosophy. A general problem sometimes requires 
a specific, narrow question in order to answer the general question by limiting 
the parameters to an area or issue that is seen as essential. When Alan 
Turing wanted an answer to the question “Can machines think?” he 
formulated a more limiting and contextual question that implied an answer to 
the general one: “Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well 
in the imitation game?”56 The “imitation game” involves someone attempting 
to deduce or guess whether it is a computer or a human that is answering a 
question. The advantage of this question is that it dismisses the meaning of 
“thinking” and focuses on the question of human behaviour. A computer could 
hypothetically fool an observer into thinking it is human for reasons that are 
                                            
56 Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59, No. 236 (Oct., 1950), 442. 
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particular to that observer, such as the things an observer will come to see as 
being human as opposed to a computer.   
By the same token, Nagel does not seek to define “conscious experience” 
according to a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, such that is possible 
to conclude, on the basis of these criteria, that a particular organism may 
have conscious experience, or something close to it. Rather, he suggests that if 
there is something that it is like to be that organism, then conscious 
experience is present. This is the “necessary” part: that there is “something 
that it is like.” This question can be further applied to the different 
performances, moments and identities of a given organism: what it is like to 
be a father, what it is like grow old, what it is like to drink wine, what it is 
like to read. All of these experiences have corresponding subjective qualities 
that indicate conscious experience, which require the ability to express and 
describe this experience through a language and vocabulary. This “what it is 
like” feeling – according to those who engage in debates about the evolution of 
consciousness – is regarded as “mysterious,” because it appears to serve no 
particular evolutionary function.  
It still seems utterly mysterious that the causation of behavior 
should be accompanied by a subjective inner life. We have good 
reason to believe that consciousness arises from physical systems 
such as brains, but we have little idea how it arises, or why it exists 
at all. How could a physical system such as a brain also be 
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an experiencer? Why should there be something it is like to be such 
a system?57  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Chalmers ultimately regards “consciousness” (in 
terms of conscious experience) as a fundamental aspect of the universe, along 
the lines of matter or space. 58  It cannot be defined or reduced to an 
explanation of some further element that stands behind it. As Chalmers says, 
“The best we can do is to give illustrations and characterizations that lie at 
the same level.”59  While these characterizations do not “qualify as true 
definitions, due to their implicitly circular nature,” Chalmers believes “they 
can help to pin down what is being talked about.”60 What, precisely, then are 
characterizations of conscious experience? 
Conscious experiences range from vivid color sensations to 
experiences of the faintest background aromas; from hard-edged 
pains to the elusive experience of thoughts on the tip of one’s tongue; 
from mundane sounds and smells to the encompassing grandeur of 
musical experience; from the triviality of a nagging itch to 
the weight of a deep existential angst; from the specificity of the 
taste of peppermint to the generality of one’s experience of selfhood. 
All these have a distinct experienced quality. All are prominent 
parts of the inner life of the mind.61 
Nagel’s “what it is like” question is then intended to elicit answers that 
bracket conscious experience in every context. Thus, if we take the answer to 
                                            
57   David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press), xi. 
58 Ibid., 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 4. 
61 Ibid. 
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be “film consciousness,” then a Nagel-like question could be, “what is it like to 
have experienced film”? Any answer to this question will naturally point in 
the direction of “subjective film consciousness,” and moreover, any answer will 
constitute a characterization that helps “pin down what is being 
talked about.” We have a question then that opens the discussion in a 
particular direction that allows for a broad range of experiences and 
situations to provide answers.  
I will first consider some general aspects of “what it is like” to have 
consciousness, what John Searle defines as structural features of 
consciousness. Drawn from a history of discourse on consciousness, and 
personal observations, these are features that belong to almost all “normal” 
instances of conscious experience (Searle notes exceptions, such as the “split 
brain phenomena” or even the possibility of cultural differences).62 Any person 
who directs attention toward consciousness will presumably recognize the 
following features.  
There is, first of all, the basic fact that “[h]uman consciousness is manifested 
in a strictly limited number of modalities.”63 By “modalities,” Searle means 
our five basic senses (sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing), the “sense of 
balance,” bodily sensations such as “proprioception,” and what Searle calls 
                                            
62 John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 130. 
63 Ibid., 128. 
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“the stream of thought,” which is rather like the “stream of consciousness,” or 
what just generally seems to take place in consciousness while “thinking.”  
The stream of thought contains not only words and images, both 
visual and otherwise, but other elements as well, which are neither 
verbal nor imagistic. For example, a thought sometimes occurs to 
one suddenly, “in a flash,” in a form that is neither in words nor 
images. Furthermore, the stream of thought, as I am using this 
expression, includes feelings, such as those generally called 
“emotions.” For example, in the stream of thought I might feel a 
sudden surge of anger or a desire to hit someone or a strong thirst 
for a glass of water.64 
Therefore, all consciousness will become manifest – or determined or 
experienced – through these limited modalities. Another feature of 
consciousness is that all of our conscious states “come to us as part of a 
unified sequence.”65 This unity has two dimensions, “horizontal” and “vertical” 
(Searle is aware of using spatial metaphors in this case). The horizontal 
dimension refers to our ability to hold a string of thoughts or speech together 
as part of a single conscious event, in which the first part of the string is “kept 
in mind” as the rest of the string unfolds: “For example, when I speak or think 
a sentence, even a long one, my awareness of the beginning of what I said or 
thought continues even when that part is no longer being thought or 
spoken.”66 The vertical dimension refers to “simultaneous awareness of all the 
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diverse features of a conscious state.” 67  For example, all of the features of our 
stream of thought and sensory information (sight, smell, etc) are experienced 
as a unified whole, rather than as discrete elements:  
I do not just have an experience of a toothache and also a visual 
experience of the couch that is situated a few feet from me and of 
roses that are sticking out from the vase on my right . . . I have my 
experiences of the rose, the couch, and the toothache all as 
experiences that are part of one and the same conscious event. 68   
Additionally, Searle notes “we have little understanding of how the brain 
achieves this unity” (keeping in mind this was written in the 1990s, but it is a 
point Searle has not revised since then). 69  However, he says this issue has 
been given different names, depending on philosopher or field: “In 
neurophysiology it is called ‘the binding problem,’ and Kant called the same 
phenomenon ‘the transcendental unity of apperception.’” 70    
The feature of “intentionality” – which refers to the fact our conscious states, 
such as thoughts and emotions, are almost always about something, whether 
real or fantasy – predates phenomenology, but is most closely associated with 
this movement within philosophy.71 An example of a conscious state that is 
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71  According to Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith, “Although ‘intentionality’ is a 
technical term in philosophy, it stands for something familiar to us all: a characteristic 
feature of our mental states and experiences, especially evident in what we commonly call 
being ‘conscious’ or ‘aware.’ As conscious beings, or persons, we are not merely affected by 
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not necessarily about something is “anxiety,” which is not always directed at 
anything in particular. But most everything else has the character of 
intentionality. Searle here makes the observation that “all intentionality is 
aspectual.” By this he means that all conscious experience is “perspectival,” 
which is to say, is always from a point of view. But in spite of an overreliance 
on visual metaphors to make this point generally, Searle notes that this 
perspective applies to all sensory experiences:  
Perspective and point of view are most obvious for vision, but of 
course they are features of our other sensory experiences as well. If I 
touch the table, I experience it only under certain aspects and from 
a certain spatial location. If I hear a sound, I hear it only from a 
certain direction and hear certain aspects of it . . . Noticing the 
perspectival character of conscious experience is a good way to 
remind ourselves that all intentionality is aspectual. Seeing an 
object from a point of view, for example, is seeing it under certain 
aspects and not others. In this sense, all seeing is “seeing as.”72 
When an object is perceived within our “perceptual field” (what is available to 
be perceived from our visual perspective), it remarkably always appears “as a 
figure against a background,” a notion emphasized within Gestalt psychology: 
For example, if I see the sweater on the table in front of me, I see 
the sweater against the background of the table. If I see the table, I 
see it against the background of the floor. If I see the floor, I see it 
                                                                                                                                   
things in our environments; we are also conscious of these things.” Ronald McIntyre and 
David Woodruff Smith, “Theory of Intentionality,” in Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook, 
edited by J.N Mohanty and William R. McKenna (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced 
Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1989), 1.             
72 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 131. 
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against the background of the whole room, until finally we reach the 
limits of my visual field. 73  
However, Searle argues “what is characteristic of perception seems to be 
characteristic of consciousness generally.” 74  Several of the features of 
consciousness Searle discusses seem connected to or derive from this 
observation. The first is that “attention” can be imagined as a “field of 
attention,” in which there is a “center of attention” and a “periphery of 
attention.” What this means in practical terms is that conscious experience 
consists of multiple, simultaneous experiences of different stimulations, 
thoughts, and inputs from our senses. As mentioned before, we experience all 
of these as a unity, as a singular conscious event. However, only one of these 
will be at the “center of attention,” while the rest will still be felt, or sensed, 
but on the “periphery.” Searle has given many examples of this over the years, 
but a simple example would be the act of writing while sitting. The activity of 
writing is at the center of attention, but one also senses the fingers touching 
the keyboard, the sounds of the keyboard, and the sensation of sitting in the 
chair. Almost as a spotlight, it is possible to shift our attention to any of these 
experiences and sensations on the periphery at a moments notice. Suddenly, 
the sensation of the fingers on the keyboard is at the center of attention, while 
everything else moves to the periphery. The act of shifting attention is partly 
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an act of “will power,” as Searle explains, but might also be triggered by 
external events (a sharp sound, for instance).  
Following this, it is possible to imagine the different objects in our field of 
attention as demonstrating traits similar to the perceptual field, in the sense 
that there are perceived boundaries: “whatever I focus my attention on will be 
against a background that is not the center of attention; and the larger the 
scope of the attention, the nearer we reach the limits of my consciousness 
where the background will simply be the boundary conditions.” 75  This point 
is not as intuitive as the others and requires some conceptual – and not just 
experiential – validation. I personally do not experience “boundaries” in my 
consciousness, although I do experience a “center of attention” and a 
“periphery” when these terms are not used literally. But I think Searle’s point 
is made clearer through another structure of consciousness, which does make 
intuitive sense, and which completes the “boundary condition” idea (one 
hopefully notices at this stage that all of Searle’s points, and indeed, all 
statements about “what consciousness is like,” are validated only, and 
exclusively, through the personal experiences of the readers he addresses; 
which is why Searle, and most consciousness philosophers today rely on 
ordinary experiences as justifications, as opposed to the heavy rhetorical style 
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of some phenomenologists in film studies, who demonstrate less of an 
intuitive connection with the ordinary experiences of reality).  
This other feature of consciousness is one Searle defines, variously, as 
“situatedness” or as “the boundary of consciousness.”76 The idea is in fact 
quite straightforward, and from experience, true. No matter the particular 
activity engaged in, or what is within the field of attention (either on the 
periphery or center), people continue to have a basic sense of who they are, 
where they are, what time of the day it is, and other elements of their own 
history, both recent and in the past. In other words, people recognize that 
consciousness is located “somewhere” specific according to these different 
characteristics, “but the location may itself not be at all the object of 
consciousness.”77 Interestingly, this boundary or situatedness only becomes 
apparent in “cases of its breakdown:” “There is, for example, a sense of 
disorientation that comes over one when one suddenly is unable to recall what 
month it is, or where one is, or what time of day it is.”78 In this particular 
regard, Searle’s point that all attention has a “boundary” is easier to grasp – 
this boundary entails a sense of knowing some basic aspects about oneself and 
where one is and what has recently transpired. When this boundary breaks 
                                            
76  Searle’s terminology evolves over time. In some works, he uses “boundary conditions” and 
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77 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 139. 
78 Ibid., 139. 
 326 
down, consciousness itself breaks down in a fundamental way, to the point 
where we might say of someone who is unaware of these facts that they are no 
longer conscious of themselves or of the surrounding world, even when they 
might very well be conscious of what stands before them, or still engaged in 
consciousness-like behaviours and experiences.   
A feature that Searle returns to frequently that ties many of these structural 
features together, and which is itself a structure of consciousness, is that of 
“mood.” For example, when discussing modalities (senses and stream of 
thought), he indicates that each “can occur under the aspect of pleasant or 
unpleasant.” 79 The way we interpret, or feel, the character of these modalities 
(a pleasant or unpleasant smell, a pleasant thought, etc) is sometimes beyond 
“any form of intentionality,” meaning that there is something innately 
pleasant or unpleasant about certain experiences (such as smells). However, 
the pleasantness or unpleasantness will vary “with certain sorts of associated 
intentionality.” 80 As Searle says, “pain can be simply experienced as painful.” 
However, “If one believes the pain is being inflicted unjustly, it is more 
unpleasant than if one believes it is being inflicted, for example, as part of a 
necessary medical treatment.” 81  Therefore, sometimes this aspect of 
modalities depends on context and sometimes it is a function of something 
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else (biology, for example). The point Searle wants to make, however, is that, 
one way or another, this aspect (of pleasant or unpleasant) is there; it is a 
part of consciousness, and this is most true, or apparent, when it comes to 
“mood.” 
With mood we approach more directly, perhaps, the perplexing question of 
“what it is like.” Many of the above features of consciousness are 
rationalizable because of spatial and temporal metaphors that provide a 
necessary, but perhaps misleading, sense of structure. We can imagine 
attention and awareness as a “field” with “boundaries,” “centers,” and 
“peripheries,” organized in “vertical” and “horizontal” dimensions. We can 
further imagine a “perspective” and a “location.” All of these terms are 
metaphors that enable a description of something that actually has no 
extension in the physical world at all. The feature of “mood” problematizes 
this rational vocabulary in a way that gets at the problem of “what it is like” – 
which is that sometimes, and perhaps very often, we experience things that 
are beyond the capacity of words to describe, precisely because it lacks 
referential content. Thus, Searle writes: 
A mood, by itself, never constitutes the whole content of a conscious 
state. Rather, the mood provides the tone or color that characterizes 
the whole of a conscious state or sequence of conscious states. 82 
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In other words, a mood lacks the sort of “content” that is given to analytic 
description, or even words, but the certainty is that it is always present in one 
form or another: 
We certainly are not always in a mood that has a name in a 
language like English. At present, I am neither especially elated nor 
especially depressed; I am neither ecstatic nor in despair; nor indeed 
am I simply blah. Yet is seems to me there is what one might call a 
“tone” to my present experiences. And this seems to me to be 
properly assimilable to the general notion of mood. The fact that my 
present experiences have a somewhat neutral tone does not mean 
they have no tone to them at all. It is characteristic of moods that 
they pervade all of our conscious experiences. 83 
As with the boundary conditions, or situatedness, moods become apparent to 
attention during sharp changes, “When one’s normal mood is radically shifted 
either up or down, either into an unexpected elation or depression, one 
suddenly becomes aware of the fact that one is always in some mood and that 
one’s mood pervades one’s conscious states.” 84   This “up” and “down” 
characterization of mood is – incidentally – one of the “metaphors we live by” 
according to Lakoff and Johnson.85 In other words, it is still possible to ascribe 
an “orientational” dimension to mood, although it does not “feel” spatial as 
with the other examples mentioned. It is interesting to observe that in spite of 
being spatial, some metaphors are actually experienced as spatial, because of 
the way we experience consciousness (as having extension and boundaries), 
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while some spatial metaphors are more aptly symbolic (although there is a 
physical correlation with feeling up or down in the way we walk and look). 
Nevertheless, some moods are neither up nor down and have no describable 
spatial characteristic, a state of boredom for example, or nostalgia. The 
important point is that mood is a permanent feature of consciousness, 
whether or not it is describable, and whether or not it has intentional content 
(although an intentional content could serve to explain a mood, such as 
winning a game).  
Finally, there is that conscious experience everyone is familiar with and 
which defies rationalization, especially, one might say, in activities that 
require focused attention. I raised this point in the section on psychological 
film experience, which is a microcosm of the problem of psychological, or 
cognitive explanations of the mind, which are limited to examining mental 
processes rather than experiences. As we know, it is possible to be engaged in 
watching a film but also thinking about something else entirely. Those who 
promote cognitive film theory are aware of this issue in the experience of 
certain types of filmmaking, such as Art films, which create a deliberate 
distance or detachment in viewers. But it is simply a fact of consciousness 
that there is nearly always, as Searle describes it, “overflow” in conscious 
experience:  
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Conscious states in general refer beyond their immediate content . . .  
In such a case the immediate content tends to spill over, to connect 
with other thoughts that in a sense were part of the content but in a 
sense were not. 86 
Searle means, in part, that experience of engaging in an activity, perhaps in a 
very directed activity, such as a conversation, when suddenly a word, or an 
image produced by a word, or anything triggered by the conversation, 
produces a new stream of thought, even while the conversation continues in 
the same direction as before. It rather feels like the mind is wandering, 
moving from association to association, and in some cases resulting in a 
moment of realization unrelated to anything in the conversation. Therefore, it 
is an experience that cannot be known to outside observers, or even 
hypothesized, based on trying to understand, for example, the effect of film on 
viewers, in which a one to one relationship is posited between a film element 
and cognitive element over a given sequence of time. Yet, “overflow” is present 
in all cases. When it is presented to outside observers, it is possible, as with 
Martin Lefebvre’s work, to construct an explanation for some of the outcomes 
of this overflow event. This aspect of “overflow,” Searle notes, is not just 
manifest in the experience of thoughts through the form of “associations,” but 
also in acts of directed attention or perception, such as when someone is asked 
to describe what they see: 
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For example, as I look out the window now at the trees and the lake, 
if asked to describe what I see, the answer would have an indefinite 
extendability. I don’t just see these as trees, but as pines, as like the 
pines of California, but in some ways different, as like in these 
respects but unlike in those, etc. 87 
In other words, describing a complex – or even straightforward – visual scene 
containing a range of objects can result in a broad, potentially indefinite, 
description, because description is bound to associations that are particular to 
the conscious overflow of the individual.  
We have in Searle then some understanding of “what it is like” to have 
conscious experience; it is now then a question of combining some of these 
elements with our discussion about “subjective film consciousness” in order to 
create a descriptive vocabulary for rendering “subjective film consciousness” 
visible, and intelligible, with reference to the different understandings of film 
consciousness already presented. In this regard, I would like to speak frankly 
about my own experience. It is not an extraordinary experience, rather an 
ordinary, fleeting moment that arrived and left in a “flash,” but which 
nevertheless is an example of “subjective film consciousness.” It answers to 
the question “what is it like have experienced film?”  
All of the “elements of film consciousness” discussed in this chapter are 
ultimately “ways of talking,” or should be regarded as such; ways of rendering 
                                            
87 Ibid., 140. 
 332 
an aspect of conscious reality intelligible through a particular terminology. I 
would like to expand on this point before presenting a personal experience. 
The first example (the one labeled “identity”) shows that ‘film consciousness’ 
refers to the totality of film-related consciousness phenomena that is regarded 
by an individual as being essential to identity – those film experiences which 
left an impression or which revealed something essential about oneself or 
which marked a journey toward self-definition. Annette Kuhn’s study 
indicated that “cinema memories” become embedded in identity and are 
bound to it in ways that makes them inseparable in the course of describing a 
past cinema event. Martin Lefebvre also offers an account of film experience 
that highlights this connection with identity. In defining the means through 
which spectators construct “figures” – a mental operation that involves 
creating a memory of an event – Lefebvre uses the metaphor of an “imaginary 
museum:”  
We each possess inside us a sort of imaginary museum of the cinema 
where we keep the various films and film fragments that have 
touched us deeply or made a profound impression on us.88  
The notion of “imaginary museum” therefore combines two “elements of film 
consciousness” discussed in this chapter: it is a “location” which contains past 
film experiences, or film fragments, but it is also linked with identity, because 
it is precisely the identity of the individual that determines which fragments 
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retain a lasting place in the museum. Lefebvre’s example is similar, if not 
identical in many respects, to the way Bordwell uses the term ‘film 
consciousness’ when he says that 1940s movies “loom large in my film 
consciousness.” Even though both terms point to the same reality, Lefebvre’s 
expression is more deliberately an “academic concept.” It requires explanation 
and has certain rhetorical objectives in mind. On the other hand, Bordwell’s 
usage of ‘film consciousness’ is presented without explanation, without 
quotation marks, or without drawing attention to the “conceptuality” of the 
formulation. It is intelligible without further explanation, and moreover, it 
feels “familiar.” I believe this is an important fact.  
With the exception of this section on conscious experience, every category of 
film consciousness presented in this thesis so far has been accompanied by 
examples drawn from everyday discourse. These have been examples, mostly, 
of people using the formulation ‘film consciousness’ in the course of describing 
something film-related, as with Bordwell on several occasions. They are 
mostly usages without a deliberate conceptual component. It is a formulation 
drawn from a public language, because ‘consciousness’ forms part of a public 
language, either as a standalone term, or as part of a series of known 
expressions, such that coming across ‘film consciousness’ in a passage does 
not raise any issues about its meaning. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, when it 
comes to ‘consciousness’ it is easier to understand than it is to explain, and 
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the same is true of ‘film consciousness’; it is easier to understand in context 
than it is to explain. The fact ‘film consciousness’ goes unperceived as 
“conceptual,” as in the case with Bordwell and the many other examples, is 
precisely one of the aspects of the formulation that is most perplexing.  
This is in contrast with “imaginary museum” which is a deliberate attempt at 
formulating a concept, and one that would not be found in regular usage 
without the author clarifying the meaning. Bordwell would not use it in the 
same context as the above passage, unless specifying the meaning of the 
words, or placing it in quotation marks, as a special category of concept. The 
formulation ‘film consciousness’ is situated somewhere between the 
specialized, and the ordinary and familiar. It is a formulation that could be 
used without imagining it as ambiguous or complicated, yet it is 
unquestionably difficult to explain once it becomes the “center of attention.” I 
think one of the interesting qualities of ‘film consciousness’ is precisely this 
public character; it points to a familiar place that is at the same time 
extremely difficult to verbalize.   
Lefebvre’s concept is therefore an academic representation of an idea that 
appears to be understood rather intuitively, which is that film experiences 
end up somewhere, in some sort of defined space, with a tangible impact on 
identity and consciousness. Where Lefebvre goes further is in studying the 
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means through which such a “container” of film fragments within 
consciousness interacts with film viewing and film interpretation. In such a 
model, a viewing experience entails an interaction between images already 
“stored” in the museum and the film images “entering” consciousness. The 
combination of these two sets of images (those already there and those 
entering) creates unique impressions, associations and relationships, which 
determine responses to film in the form of commentary, criticism, 
interpretation, feelings, and ascription of meaning. 
The third example I offered of ‘film consciousness’ was that of a “faculty” of 
‘film consciousness’. As with Searle and his description of the structure of 
consciousness, there is already a “language-game” for precisely these sorts of 
statements about consciousness, which render it intelligible through 
metaphor, in this case visual, as opposed to spatial, metaphors. Film 
experiences are seen as constructing an operational faculty within 
consciousness – “a vision,” “a gaze,” “a way of seeing,” “a perception,” and so 
forth. This new element of consciousness is henceforth regarded as playing a 
determining role in the way reality is “seen.” When Spencer Shaw defines this 
“vision” as ‘film consciousness’ there is once again no need to further explain 
how this formulation could come to mean ‘vision’. It is part of the “language of 
consciousness” that ‘consciousness’ can be used to mean ‘vision’ in this sense, 
in terms of “a new consciousness” or a “form of consciousness” that expresses 
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the idea of a “new way of apprehending reality” (or some equivalent 
expression) as result of film experiences.  
All of these usages of ‘film consciousness’ are clearly different, yet each shares 
in common a family resemblance, through a semantic connection that creates 
a continuity of meaning. When ‘film consciousness’ is applied to a particular 
situation of analysis, to “conscious experience,” it draws from each of these 
meanings of ‘film consciousness,’ to create a continuous but changing 
perspective of the many different ways of imagining the relationship between 
‘film’ and ‘consciousness’, none of which encapsulate the totality of the 
experience, but which, rather, “pins down” in some logical way the 
phenomena under description. This “logical way” – what I refer to as 
“thinking in terms of ‘film consciousness’” – involves bringing to bear all of the 
“categories of film consciousness” into a unified description, in which the parts 
relate to a whole, but without discontinuities, without acknowledgment of a 
separation between these different conscious phenomena, regarded as one 
unified thing named ‘film consciousness.’ This will hopefully be made clearer 
with an example.  
Several months ago, I was walking down an alleyway, hand in hand with my 
daughter, when I noticed a set of metal stairs and ladders descending from a 
second floor balcony. It was the sort of ladder that “slides down” in case of 
 337 
emergency. The sight of these ladders seemed to trigger a moment of 
“overflow” that I believe is definable as “film consciousness,” or what I take it 
to mean at this point (since it is always evolving and changing). I point out 
that this example of conscious experience did not occur in a cinema or in a 
film-related context, such as reading a book about cinema. It took place in the 
middle of an ordinary day, without the slightest relation to an actual film 
event.  
As I observed these stairs, a “flash” of “film images” entered my stream of 
thought. These film images shared in common that they were drawn from 
“alleyway chase scenes.” It was not a film scene in particular, but rather a 
type of scene; some images of a hand extending toward a ladder, some images 
of a ladder sliding down rails, some people making an escape up the ladder, 
other people chasing behind. There were also images of chases on the rooftops 
interspersed with these ladder images. The sequence of images was not 
necessarily in a logical temporal order. To use Searle, it had a vertical and 
horizontal unity; all of the images were apprehended and understood as a 
singular idea or conscious event. I have little idea, now, how long this 
conscious event lasted. It might have been a few seconds, or a split second; it 
also probably lasted longer than it might have normally because it became a 
focus of attention. 
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The experience of these film images was accompanied by certain thoughts. 
For example, I had the thought that film scenes disproportionately 
overrepresent the number of “alleyway-ladder-rooftop” chases that take place 
in reality, followed by the thought that this must be something “cinematic”, a 
type of scene that is particularly attractive for visual and narrative reasons. If 
I could segment the experience into intervals, I would say that the first part, 
the moment the actual ladders triggered a set of film-like images to enter my 
stream of thought, lasted only a few seconds. The second interval, which 
included these same images, in addition to the above-mentioned thoughts, 
was also just a few seconds long. By the time I looked forward, with my 
attention back toward walking down the alleyway, the second interval was 
nearly complete. When I think about the question, “what is it like to have 
experienced film?” I would say that this sort of experience answers the 
question, it is a particular kind of conscious experience interwoven into the 
day, related to past film experiences, that includes a stream of thought that 
not only contains film images, but is somehow presented in film-like terms, as 
a sort of atemporal montage. It lingers in the imagination and then 
disappears. It is impossible for me to determine if it has an actual impact in 
some domain of life, a “way of seeing” for example. Nonetheless, I would 
assume that every person that has experienced film has these sorts of events 
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in everyday life. Calling it “film consciousness” is a first step toward 
understanding it as an element of consciousness, as an aspect of modern life.  
This interval in ordinary life can be considered from two perspectives: it can 
be ignored as inconsequential, or it can be taken seriously as an important 
element of consciousness, as something which is clearly there for reasons that 
are film-related and which connect with everyday experiences in spite of the 
absence of film itself. It is true that the experience resulted in analytical 
thoughts, such as remarking that alleyway chases are particularly cinematic, 
or that they overrepresent reality, both of which could serve as the basis of a 
more prolonged analysis that engages with cognitive film theory, or with an 
ideological perspective. But I am not speaking about this aspect of the 
experience; I am limiting myself to thinking about those few seconds as 
“something-in-itself.”  
This is where the formulation ‘film consciousness’ begins to assume another 
function. If I start thinking about this experience in terms of ‘film 
consciousness’ I can start to segment the experience into pieces that make 
familiar sense. For example, I will ask myself where these film images come 
from? And I will say “film consciousness.” What I am imagining here is a place 
in consciousness where these film images and fragments are located. Insofar 
as these images appeared, and subsequently combined with thoughts about 
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them, which is to say, triggered a manner of thinking, and a conscious 
experience in relation to and through these images, I would like to say that 
“my film consciousness” was activated at that moment. It came into play as a 
faculty; it produced the film consciousness I then experienced. Finally, I 
certainly felt, at that moment, that this film consciousness represented a part 
of my identity, an unmistakable aspect of the landscapes I traverse, like the 
English author writing about the impact of landscapes on his consciousness. 
Except that in my case landscapes are not limited to physical landscapes, but 
also to those found in film, which are combined with landscapes of the world 
when film consciousness brings them into relation.  
Once this sort of thinking is engaged, the thinking about a conscious event in 
“terms of film consciousness,” it should become clear that the event becomes 
evermore diffuse. It is not a question of pinpointing a single thing, a single 
phenomenon or moment, as “film consciousness,” but rather in regarding this 
wave of experience as a totality, as a feeling that this is appropriately defined 
as such, that includes variations and natures that draw from the meanings of 
‘film consciousness’. 
Of course, there seems a missing step in this process of thinking, as if it 
should be necessary to generalize from this example some “truth” or theory 
about film consciousness that is applicable broadly. However, as much as 
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possible, I have attempted to avoid this approach in this thesis, focusing 
instead on rendering the field of film consciousness visible. Rather, each 
category or type of film consciousness considered in this chapter, and in this 
thesis, is a starting point towards going further. In the case of subjective film 
consciousness it is obviously the most personal, but I have tried to present 
some of terms for coming to describe a feeling that is elusive, but, based on 
the preponderance of the expression ‘film consciousness’ obviously present 
within modern culture.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have attempted to follow through on two “calls for further 
research” from recognized film scholars. One from Jan Olsson, speaking about 
the need for treating early film publications as a “discursive domain,”1 and the 
other from Murray Smith who noted that the relationship between film and 
consciousness constitutes an “unchartered territory.” 2  Developing a 
methodology that established a link between these two fields and which 
defined a “field of film consciousness” has been, I believe, another contribution 
to film studies. This field consists of various “categories of film consciousness,” 
some of which are more disposed to historiography (such as “film awareness” 
and “a way of existing towards film”), while others serve to identify various 
entities in consciousness (“place,” “identity,” “faculty,” and “conscious 
experience”). More globally, these categories of film consciousness each 
represent individual areas of research with concomitant questions and 
criteria, but which nevertheless exist on a continuum that the key term ‘film 
consciousness’ brings into constant rhetorical relation. In this regard, it 
follows that there is an approach defined in this thesis as “thinking in terms 
of film consciousness,” which involves simultaneously drawing from elements 
                                            
1 Jan Olsson, Los Angeles before Hollywood: Journalism and American Film Culture, 1905 to 
1915 (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2008), 18. 
2 Murray Smith, “Consciousness,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, 
edited by Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 40. 
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of each of these categories in order to examine the relationship between film 
and consciousness in a given set of data from multiple, overlapping 
perspectives. In this conclusion, I would like to briefly summarize the findings 
in each of these areas, as well explain the limitations, strengths and 
weakness of the argument presented.   
In terms of early film publications, I have investigated and examined a range 
of sources and materials, mostly presented in Chapter 1, but also discussed in 
other chapters, that shows a “movement of consciousness” during the years 
between 1907 and 1912 when film trade publications first appeared. This 
movement of consciousness, seen as the beginnings of “film consciousness” 
(defined in this case as a “set of shared defining beliefs,” “a way of existing 
towards film,” different sorts of “film awareness,” and perhaps, even, a new of 
“way of seeing” cinema) is manifested in attitudes taken toward film criticism 
(film interpretation), changes in terminology and language-use (in the naming 
of film and film aesthetics, as well as in the identification of authors), a 
recognition of the constructedness of film (“film aesthetic awareness”), the 
study of audiences, and in the self-definition of the writers and film criticism 
institution. Some of these facts, while appearing in other studies,3 receive a 
unified consideration in this thesis, as well as a particular perspective 
                                            
3 As mentioned in preceding chapters, the works of Jan Olsson, Richard Abel, and Charlie 
Keil, among others.  
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focusing on consciousness. Not all of the data appearing in these publications 
necessarily fits within a “trade press” explanatory model – which is to say, 
there was more freedom and experimentation that one might expect. Writers 
were engaged in a process of defining the very nature of the object of cinema 
as well as the place of critics and criticism within this process.  
The approach adopted towards film publications has been to divide them 
according to regions of activity (or regions of consciousness). Consequently, it 
is possible to study one region based on knowledge gained from other regions, 
such that the overall effect is to regard each set of data as constituting, or 
representing, some element of consciousness that is – surprisingly – as 
important as the evidence that is usually taken as more salient (such as 
lengthier articles, or film criticism). More specifically, I divide journals into 
two broad areas of consciousness comprising different regions. One area of 
consciousness, which concerned film aesthetic awareness, includes the regions 
of headings, titles, articles, advertisements, and film criticism. The other area 
is definable as self-consciousness, and concerns the activities of critics, such 
as the study of audiences (which in turn provides self-knowledge), awareness 
of terminology, and discussions about the profession itself. Once seen from 
this perspective, every data point becomes relevant to the study of film 
consciousness, not just a particular article, or section, that is especially 
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striking based on surface motifs (for instance, in mentioning a key term, such 
as “art,” which while certainly relevant, only offers one part of the picture).   
In this context, I contended as well that Janet Staiger – who has argued most 
strongly for a contextualized approach to the study of historical evidence – 
commits a methodological error that reveals an operative assumption about 
these publications, which is that the writers hold a “naïve consciousness.” In 
one example from her seminal study Interpreting Films: Studies in the 
Historical Reception of American Cinema (1992), Staiger extrapolates a 
general conclusion about early film spectatorship based on a review of The 
“Teddy” Bears (Porter, 1907) that shows this naïve consciousness extends to 
the audience. While this conclusion was based on several logical errors, the 
main issue, ironically in her case, was the decontextualization of the evidence. 
It is because the data is assumed to be a factual representation of thinking 
that it is transposable to other consciousness of a similar kind (that of early 
film spectators, who are also imagined as naïve.) If we would not assume, for 
example, that Canudo’s thoughts on film are representative of the population 
as a whole, why then would the writings of a single author operating within a 
trade publication be taken as representative? The answer, I believe, is the 
belief of a naïve consciousness.  
 346 
Thus, seeing early film publications from the perspective of film consciousness 
has methodological import. First, it provides a deeper and richer context for 
interpreting early film discourse, by interconnecting the different regions of 
activity. Secondly, it rehabilitates the consciousness of the writers, rendering 
them more complex entities engaged in an intense process of self-definition 
and struggling with defining the nature of cinema. Thirdly, it renders all data 
relevant and interesting because it now refers to a global category that 
encompasses it (film consciousness). Finally, it breaks from the approach to 
early film publications that searches for “discourse of interest” (film criticism, 
film as art discourse, film theory, film historiography, and so forth) severed 
from the broader context. Indeed, it seems important to think of film 
publications in terms of consciousness since each region contributes to an 
overall implied theory of cinema that is not fully expressed in any given 
region. It is useful, perhaps, to see this as “collective intentionality,” a concept 
that John Searle uses to define thinking or actions that contribute to a larger 
objective but which itself is merely an incomplete piece of the puzzle (thus, 
each player in a football game is engaged in executing a single action that 
forms part of a larger play, but none of which reveal the play).4 
                                            
4  “In addition to singular intentionality there is also collective intentionality. Obvious 
examples are cases where I am doing something only as part of our doing something. So if I 
am an offensive lineman playing in a football game, I might be blocking the defensive end, 
but I am blocking only as part of our executing a pass play. If I am a violinist in an orchestra 
I play my part in our performance of the symphony.” John Searle, The Construction of Social 
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The second field of research conceptualizes the relationship between film and 
consciousness according to different categories. On the whole these categories 
can be seen along a continuum representing an imagined field of film 
consciousness. I have tried to provide as much detail as possible to these 
categories in order to differentiate them from one another, but also to give a 
sense of the problems and questions that are particular to each. A further 
distinction was drawn between regarding the formulation as referring to a 
concept or analytic category, through which evidence is considered, or as 
referring to an existing entity (a unified, indivisible fact of the world or 
consciousness). These categories are “film awareness” (consisting of “film 
aesthetic awareness,” “film production awareness,” and “film culture 
awareness”), a "way of existing towards film,” and an “entity in consciousness” 
(in terms of “identity,” “place,” “faculty” and “conscious experience”). In 
developing these categories, three domains of evidence and discourse were 
considered.  
The first domain consisted of a presentation of the issues relating to the 
definition of ‘consciousness’ as well as defining a “semantic field of 
consciousness” (presented in Chapters 2 and 3). The challenges involved in 
defining consciousness include the polysemic nature of the term, the different, 
sometimes overlapping referential contexts in which the word is meaningfully 
                                                                                                                                   
Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 23.  
 348 
used (consciousness studies, humanities, medical environments, and in day to 
day life), the resemblances it shares with other terms (mind, perception, 
cognition, awareness) which creates parallel discourses that are nevertheless 
about the same general phenomena, and most difficult of all, that no “brute 
facts” (as John Searle defines it) underlies consciousness. This latter fact 
means that consciousness is only confirmable from a first person perspective 
and according to David Chalmers is an irreducible element of the universe 
(along with time, space, and matter). As mentioned, there is the further issue 
that ‘consciousness’ gains different meanings in the context of compound 
expressions, in which the term ‘consciousness’ usually draws from multiple 
senses of the term, thus forming hybrid definitions.  
In confronting these challenges, it made sense then to focus on the language 
side of the question as opposed to the phenomena side. However difficult it is 
to define ‘consciousness’ for the above reasons, it still remains that the word is 
successfully used every day. Therefore, the first order of work was to define 
“areas of definition” within which the ambiguity or nature of the term or 
phenomena is defined and debated. As Wittgenstein writes, sometimes the 
purpose of words is to indicate “roughly there.” 5  These rough areas of 
                                            
5 “[Gottlob] Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries 
cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. 
But is it senseless to say: “Stand roughly there”? Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
§71.  
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definition, each of which correspond with a category or subcategory of film 
consciousness, were “wakefulness,” “awareness of something,” “shared and 
defining beliefs,” “personal consciousness,” “global consciousness,” and 
“conscious experience.” These categories thus served as semantic starting 
points for developing the field of film consciousness.  
The second set of evidence consisted of actual uses of ‘film consciousness’. As 
it turns out ‘film consciousness’ is an expression that is used with some 
frequency, both in public and academic discourse. Although the vast majority 
of these examples do not use the formulation as an institutional or defined 
concept, they nevertheless represent a sense of the way one might apply the 
term as well as some clues about how to define a concept. Bordwell, for 
instance, has used it to mean at least four different ideas – an awareness of 
film culture, a sense of film aesthetics, a faculty, and a place in consciousness 
bound to personal identity. That it keeps appearing in Bordwell’s vocabulary 
without formal definition is much like a Barthesian “punctum”6 – it calls 
attention, perhaps to an area of thinking or field that is still in the process of 
being defined, and for which there is not yet an adequate name. Moreover, 
there seem to be many different contexts and situations in which it is logical, 
and appropriate, to name a particular thing ‘film consciousness’ or to see a 
                                            
6 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1981), 51. 
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particular phenomena from the perspective of this terminology. In labelling 
these different things ‘film consciousness’ and in placing them into the same 
basket, so to speak, an obligation is created to find the thread the connects 
them. Thus, the main challenge in this aspect of this thesis has been solving 
that puzzle – why is it that so many different phenomena are nameable as 
‘film consciousness’? What binds these different phenomena together? The 
frequent usages of the formulation provide some of the evidence towards 
answering these questions.  
A third set of evidence is scholarly works and discourse. These include film 
theorists and film scholars that have explored these questions from the 
perspective of their own particular conceptual framework and terminologies. 
Among others, extensive attention was given to Edward Branigan’s Projecting 
a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory (in which he develops a model 
sometimes applied in this thesis for interpreting certain key terms as 
reflecting implied theories or understandings of film), various works of 
Francesco Casetti (in which he defines “film experience” and “film gaze”), 
Annette Kuhn (with her key concept of “cinema memories”), and François 
Albera’s notion of “cinematic episteme.” I also drew from the works of various 
language philosophers and writers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein (whose 
emphasis on ordinary language serves as a general guide), George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson (whose “container metaphor” and ontological metaphors” help 
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explain some usages of film consciousness), and many consciousness 
philosophers who provide insight into the “structure of consciousness” (most 
especially, as presented last chapter, that of John Searle who identifies at 
least ten features common to all conscious experience).  
I would also suggest that the thesis represents itself a contribution to 
knowledge by showing the process through which words become academic 
concepts. In the Introduction I presented the different trajectories of terms 
but also mentioned that the trajectory of ‘film consciousness’ within this 
thesis should be seen, as well, as an example of a formulation (any 
formulation) attaining academic functionality. The approach was to regard 
‘film consciousness’ as having its own ontological nature, which requires 
various strategies in order to interpret and begin constructing meaning, 
thoughts, conjectures and categories that logically followed as outcomes.  
In the Introduction, I made reference to one of the quotes I most appreciate 
from Ludwig Wittgenstein: “If I am supposed to describe how an object looks 
from far off, I don’t make the description more accurate by saying what can be 
noticed about the object on closer inspection.”7 When considering the value of 
this thesis from an academic but also a personal perspective, I have the sense 
of having studied ‘film consciousness’ from afar, as if laying out the pieces of a 
                                            
7 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §171. 
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puzzle in order to see the different possibilities of the formulation. I believe 
the value is above all in this endeavour (in the Introduction, I also cited 
Hayden White’s approach to history, which he defines as formist, which “aims 
at the identification of the unique characteristics of objects inhabiting the 
historical field.”8) However, like two sides of a coin, this approach presents 
some shortcomings. Perhaps the value of future research projects will be 
precisely in taking one of these categories and providing a “closer inspection,” 
although I would argue that at least in terms of the way early film 
publications were treated, such an inspection was provided.  But certainly, I 
see the greatest challenge this thesis overcame was in developing an approach 
to defining ‘consciousness’ and defining a formulation that appears prevalent 
in discourse. Thus, I see this thesis as a first step – defining the field of film 
consciousness – on the basis of which further research into any one of these 
categories is now possible. As Richard Rorty says, sometimes the purpose of 
inquiry is to “keep the conversation going rather than to find objective truth,”9 
and in this regard, I believe the thesis met this objective.   
More specifically, I would like to conclude by explaining why it is that ‘film 
consciousness’ is destined to remain an intriguing formulation to continue 
                                            
8 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 13-15. 
9 “[T]he point of edifying philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find 
objective truth.” Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the mirror of nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 377. 
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thinking about and using in research. One of its most unique features is that 
it is deliberately non-essential – it will vary according to any definition of 
consciousness that is inserted into the formulation, thus continuing to 
generate new categories of film consciousness. Secondly, and more 
subjectively, there is a difference between writing with defined terms, such as 
those defined in this thesis as film consciousness categories, and “thinking 
with terms,” which is a distinct order of experience from writing because it is 
shifting and impermanent (although writing with nonlinear text editors 
sometimes emulates that experience).  
I would suggest that one of the ways in which a formulation like ‘film 
consciousness’ “directs the attention” is as follows. If definitions of terms are 
imagined as two decks of cards, one containing a set of cards with different 
definitions of ‘film’, and the other a deck containing cards with different 
definitions of ‘consciousness’, then a rational process, such as that applied in 
this thesis, entails taking a definition from each deck and combining them. 
The result, as shown, is a series of categories named ‘film consciousness’. 
However, this process becomes muddled in thinking. When a situation arises 
in which it will make sense to use ‘film consciousness’, the meaning assigned 
to the formulation is analogous to the “deck of cards” model, that of combining 
two definitions of ‘film’ and ‘consciousness’, but rather than rationally 
selecting individual cards from a deck of definitions, and combining them 
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objectively, the process is more akin to taking bits and pieces from several 
different cards, forming unique, transient ideas of film consciousness that 
make sense within very peculiar contexts. This was the case in Chapter 1 
when I applied the formulation more or less “intuitively” to early film critics. 
In the end, the way it was used corresponds with some of the categories that 
were subsequently rationally devised, such as film aesthetic awareness, but 
there were also aspects that did not necessarily rationally follow – such as 
self-consciousness, or in the development of new terminologies, which 
nevertheless felt as if these should fit within a film consciousness concept in 
spite of there being no clear semantic link.  
Even in writing a substantial concentration and effort is required to 
demarcate the different usages of ‘consciousness’ homonyms. The act of 
thinking with a particular formulation in mind does not necessarily provide 
an opportunity to demarcate homonyms clearly and conclusively, which 
means that the combination process entailed is less rational, drawing from a 
more elusive and diverse set of definitions. The result is that ‘film 
consciousness’ – in the way it functions in the imagination as opposed to the 
more external, rational construction of categories – is applied without a 
singular, consistent meaning. In allowing it a space within consciousness, it 
retains a “poetic dimension,” which pushes against boundaries of a limiting 
idea and which adapts to new contexts both in the way someone might define 
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‘consciousness’, but also in the particular data that will call attention to 
consciousness. It is a formulation, then, that should continue to capture the 
imagination of writers, as already shown in the many examples presented in 
this thesis.   
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